IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology最新文献

{"title":"Comparing Large-unit and Bitwise Linear Approximations of SNOW 2.0 and SNOW 3G and Related Attacks","authors":"Xinxin Gong, Bin Zhang","doi":"10.46586/TOSC.V2021.I2.71-103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/TOSC.V2021.I2.71-103","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study and compare the byte-wise and bitwise linear approximations of SNOW 2.0 and SNOW 3G, and present a fast correlation attack on SNOW 3G by using our newly found bitwise linear approximations. On one side, we reconsider the relation between the large-unit linear approximation and the smallerunit/ bitwise ones derived from the large-unit one, showing that approximations on large-unit alphabets have advantages over all the smaller-unit/bitwise ones in linear attacks. But then on the other side, by comparing the byte-wise and bitwise linear approximations of SNOW 2.0 and SNOW 3G respectively, we have found many concrete examples of 8-bit linear approximations whose certain 1-dimensional/bitwise linear approximations have almost the same SEI (Squared Euclidean Imbalance) as that of the original 8-bit ones. That is, each of these byte-wise linear approximations is dominated by a single bitwise approximation, and thus the whole SEI is not essentially larger than the SEI of the dominating single bitwise approximation. Since correlation attacks can be more efficiently implemented using bitwise approximations rather than large-unit approximations, improvements over the large-unit linear approximation attacks are possible for SNOW 2.0 and SNOW 3G. For SNOW 3G, we make a careful search of the bitwise masks for the linear approximations of the FSM and obtain many mask tuples which yield high correlations. By using these bitwise linear approximations, we mount a fast correlation attack to recover the initial state of the LFSR with the time/memory/data/pre-computation complexities all upper bounded by 2174.16, improving slightly the previous best one which used an 8-bit (vectorized) linear approximation in a correlation attack with all the complexities upper bounded by 2176.56. Though not a significant improvement, our research results illustrate that we have an opportunity to achieve improvement over the large-unit attacks by using bitwise linear approximations in a linear approximation attack, and provide a newinsight on the relation between large-unit and bitwise linear approximations.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"40 12","pages":"71-103"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72467456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Resistance of SNOW-V against Fast Correlation Attacks","authors":"Xinxin Gong, Bin Zhang","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.378-410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.378-410","url":null,"abstract":"SNOW-V is a new member in the SNOW family of stream ciphers, hoping to be competitive in the 5G mobile communication system. In this paper, we study the resistance of SNOW-V against bitwise fast correlation attacks by constructing bitwise linear approximations. First, we propose and summarize some efficient algorithms using the slice-like techniques to compute the bitwise linear approximations of certain types of composition functions composed of basic operations like ⊞, ⊕, Permutation, and S-box, which have been widely used in word-oriented stream ciphers such as SNOW-like ciphers. Then, using these algorithms, we find a number of stronger linear approximations for the FSM of the two variants of SNOW-V given in the design document, i.e., SNOW-V σ0 and SNOW-V⊞8, ⊞8. For SNOW-V σ0, where there is no byte-wise permutation, we find some bitwise linear approximations of the FSM with the SEI (Squared Euclidean Imbalance) around 2−37.34 and mount a bitwise fast correlation attack with the time complexity 2251.93 and memory complexity 2244, given 2103.83 keystream outputs, which improves greatly the results in the design document. For SNOW-V⊞8, ⊞8, where both of the two 32-bit adders in the FSM are replaced by 8-bit adders, we find our best bitwise linear approximations of the FSM with the SEI 2−174.14, while the best byte-wise linear approximation in the design document of SNOW-V has the SEI 2−214.80. Finally, we study the security of a closer variant of SNOW-V, denoted by SNOW-V⊞32, ⊞8, where only the 32-bit adder used for updating the first register is replaced by the 8-bit adder, while everything else remains identical. For SNOW-V⊞32, ⊞8, we derive many mask tuples yielding the bitwise linear approximations of the FSM with the SEI larger than 2−184. Using these linear approximations, we mount a fast correlation attack with the time complexity 2377.01 and a memory complexity 2363, given 2253.73 keystream outputs. Note that neither of our attack threatens the security of SNOW-V. We hope our research could further help in understanding bitwise linear approximation attacks and also the structure of SNOW-like stream ciphers.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"59 1","pages":"378-410"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85826267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Algebraic Collision Attacks on Keccak","authors":"Rachelle Heim Boissier, C. Noûs, Yann Rotella","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.239-268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.239-268","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze the collision resistance of the two smallest versions of Keccak which have a width of 200 and 400 bits respectively. We show that algebraic and linearization techniques can serve collision cryptanalysis by using some interesting properties of the linear part of the round function of Keccak. We present an attack on the Keccak versions that could be used in lightweight cryptography reduced to two rounds. For Keccak[40, 160] (resp. Keccak[72, 128] and Keccak[144, 256]) our attack has a computational complexity of 273 (resp. 252.5 and 2101.5) Keccak calls.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"55 1","pages":"239-268"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90903704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Atom: A Stream Cipher with Double Key Filter","authors":"S. Banik, Andrea Caforio, Takanori Isobe, Fukang Liu, W. Meier, Kosei Sakamoto, Santanu Sarkar","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.5-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.5-36","url":null,"abstract":"It has been common knowledge that for a stream cipher to be secure against generic TMD tradeoff attacks, the size of its internal state in bits needs to be at least twice the size of the length of its secret key. In FSE 2015, Armknecht and Mikhalev however proposed the stream cipher Sprout with a Grain-like architecture, whose internal state was equal in size with its secret key and yet resistant against TMD attacks. Although Sprout had other weaknesses, it germinated a sequence of stream cipher designs like Lizard and Plantlet with short internal states. Both these designs have had cryptanalytic results reported against them. In this paper, we propose the stream cipher Atom that has an internal state of 159 bits and offers a security of 128 bits. Atom uses two key filters simultaneously to thwart certain cryptanalytic attacks that have been recently reported against keystream generators. In addition, we found that our design is one of the smallest stream ciphers that offers this security level, and we prove in this paper that Atom resists all the attacks that have been proposed against stream ciphers so far in literature. On the face of it, Atom also builds on the basic structure of the Grain family of stream ciphers. However, we try to prove that by including the additional key filter in the architecture of Atom we can make it immune to all cryptanalytic advances proposed against stream ciphers in recent cryptographic literature.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"34 1","pages":"5-36"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74629231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Improved Preimage Attacks on 4-Round Keccak-224/256","authors":"Le He, Xiaoen Lin, Hongbo Yu","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.217-238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.217-238","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we provide an improved method on preimage attacks of standard 3-round Keccak-224/256. Our method is based on the work by Li and Sun. Their strategy is to find a 2-block preimage instead of a 1-block one by constructing the first and second message blocks in two stages. Under this strategy, they design a new linear structure for 2-round Keccak-224/256 with 194 degrees of freedom left, which is able to construct the second message block with a complexity of 231/262. However, the bottleneck of this strategy is that the first stage needs much more expense than the second one. Therefore, we improve the first stage by using two techniques. The first technique is constructing multi-block messages rather than one-block message in the first stage, which can reach a better inner state. The second technique is setting restricting equations more efficiently, which can work in 3-round Keccak-256. As a result, the complexity of finding a preimage for 3-round Keccak-224/256 can be decreased from 238/281 to 232/265.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"5 1","pages":"217-238"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89920156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"MOE: Multiplication Operated Encryption with Trojan Resilience","authors":"Olivier Bronchain, Sebastian Faust, Virginie Lallemand, G. Leander, Léo Perrin, François-Xavier Standaert","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.78-129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.78-129","url":null,"abstract":"In order to lower costs, the fabrication of Integrated Circuits (ICs) is increasingly delegated to offshore contract foundries, making them exposed to malicious modifications, known as hardware Trojans. Recent works have demonstrated that a strong form of Trojan-resilience can be obtained from untrusted chips by exploiting secret sharing and Multi-Party Computation (MPC), yet with significant cost overheads. In this paper, we study the possibility of building a symmetric cipher enabling similar guarantees in a more efficient manner. To reach this goal, we exploit a simple round structure mixing a modular multiplication and a multiplication with a binary matrix. Besides being motivated as a new block cipher design for Trojan resilience, our research also exposes the cryptographic properties of the modular multiplication, which is of independent interest.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"47 1","pages":"78-129"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76241877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring Differential-Based Distinguishers and Forgeries for ASCON","authors":"David Gérault, Thomas Peyrin, Q. Tan","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i3.102-136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i3.102-136","url":null,"abstract":"Automated methods have become crucial components when searching for distinguishers against symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. While MILP and SAT solvers are among the most popular tools to model ciphers and perform cryptanalysis, other methods with different performance profiles are appearing. In this article, we explore the use of Constraint Programming (CP) for differential cryptanalysis on the Ascon authenticated encryption family (first choice of the CAESAR lightweight applications portfolio and current finalist of the NIST LWC competition) and its internal permutation. We first present a search methodology for finding differential characteristics for Ascon with CP, which can easily find the best differential characteristics already reported by the Ascon designers. This shows the capability of CP in generating easily good differential results compared to dedicated search heuristics. Based on our tool, we also parametrize the search strategies in CP to generate other differential characteristics with the goal of forming limited-birthday distinguishers for 4, 5, 6 and 7 rounds and rectangle attacks for 4 and 5 rounds of the Ascon internal permutation. We propose a categorization of the distinguishers into black-box and non-black-box to better differentiate them as they are often useful in different contexts. We also obtained limited-birthday distinguishers which represent currently the best known distinguishers for 4, 5 and 6 rounds under the category of non-black-box distinguishers. Leveraging again our tool, we have generated forgery attacks against both reduced-rounds Ascon-128 and Ascon-128a, improving over the best reported results at the time of writing. Finally, using the best differential characteristic we have found for 2 rounds, we could also improve a recent attack on round-reduced Ascon-Hash.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"73 1","pages":"102-136"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73604136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Maximums of the Additive Differential Probability of Exclusive-Or","authors":"N. Mouha, N. Kolomeec, D. Akhtiamov, I. Sutormin, M. Panferov, Kseniya A. Titova, T. Bonich, E. Ishchukova, N. Tokareva, Bulat Zhantulikov","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i2.292-313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i2.292-313","url":null,"abstract":"At FSE 2004, Lipmaa et al. studied the additive differential probability adp⊕(α, β → γ) of exclusive-or where differences α, β, γ ∈ F2 are expressed using addition modulo 2. This probability is used in the analysis of symmetrickey primitives that combine XOR and modular addition, such as the increasingly popular Addition-Rotation-XOR (ARX) constructions. The focus of this paper is on maximal differentials, which are helpful when constructing differential trails. We provide the missing proof for Theorem 3 of the FSE 2004 paper, which states that maxα,β adp⊕(α, β → γ) = adp⊕(0, γ → γ) for all γ. Furthermore, we prove that there always exist either two or eight distinct pairs α, β such that adp⊕(α, β → γ) = adp⊕(0, γ → γ), and we obtain recurrence formulas for calculating adp⊕. To gain insight into the range of possible differential probabilities, we also study other properties such as the minimum value of adp⊕(0, γ → γ), and we find all γ that satisfy this minimum value.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"16 1","pages":"292-313"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84171241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploiting Weak Diffusion of Gimli: Improved Distinguishers and Preimage Attacks","authors":"F. Liu, Takanori Isobe, W. Meier","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.185-216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.185-216","url":null,"abstract":"The Gimli permutation proposed in CHES 2017 was designed for cross-platform performance. One main strategy to achieve such a goal is to utilize a sparse linear layer (Small-Swap and Big-Swap), which occurs every two rounds. In addition, the round constant addition occurs every four rounds and only one 32-bit word is affected by it. The above two facts have been recently exploited to construct a distinguisher for the full Gimli permutation with time complexity 264. By utilizing a new property of the SP-box, we demonstrate that the time complexity of the full-round distinguisher can be further reduced to 252 while a significant bias still remains. Moreover, for the 18-round Gimli permutation, we could construct a distinguisher even with only 2 queries. Apart from the permutation itself, the weak diffusion can also be utilized to accelerate the preimage attacks on reduced Gimli-Hash and Gimli-XOF-128 with a divide-and-conquer method. As a consequence, the preimage attacks on reduced Gimli-Hash and Gimli-XOF-128 can reach up to 5 rounds and 9 rounds, respectively. Since Gimli is included in the second round candidates in NIST’s Lightweight Cryptography Standardization process, we expect that our analysis can further advance the understanding of Gimli. To the best of our knowledge, the distinguishing attacks and preimage attacks are the best so far.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"35 1","pages":"185-216"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76339843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Proving Resistance Against Infinitely Long Subspace Trails: How to Choose the Linear Layer","authors":"Lorenzo Grassi, Christian Rechberger, Markus Schofnegger","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i2.314-352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i2.314-352","url":null,"abstract":"Designing cryptographic permutations and block ciphers using a substitutionpermutation network (SPN) approach where the nonlinear part does not cover the entire state has recently gained attention due to favorable implementation characteristics in various scenarios.For word-oriented partial SPN (P-SPN) schemes with a fixed linear layer, our goal is to better understand how the details of the linear layer affect the security of the construction. In this paper, we derive conditions that allow us to either set up or prevent attacks based on infinitely long truncated differentials with probability 1. Our analysis is rather broad compared to earlier independent work on this problem since we consider (1) both invariant and non-invariant/iterative trails, and (2) trails with and without active S-boxes.For these cases, we provide rigorous sufficient and necessary conditions for the matrix that defines the linear layer to prevent the analyzed attacks. On the practical side, we present a tool that can determine whether a given linear layer is vulnerable based on these results. Furthermore, we propose a sufficient condition for the linear layer that, if satisfied, ensures that no infinitely long truncated differential exists. This condition is related to the degree and the irreducibility of the minimal polynomial of the matrix that defines the linear layer. Besides P-SPN schemes, our observations may also have a crucial impact on the Hades design strategy, which mixes rounds with full S-box layers and rounds with partial S-box layers.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"14 1","pages":"314-352"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79575828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}