{"title":"Keccak的代数碰撞攻击","authors":"Rachelle Heim Boissier, C. Noûs, Yann Rotella","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.239-268","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze the collision resistance of the two smallest versions of Keccak which have a width of 200 and 400 bits respectively. We show that algebraic and linearization techniques can serve collision cryptanalysis by using some interesting properties of the linear part of the round function of Keccak. We present an attack on the Keccak versions that could be used in lightweight cryptography reduced to two rounds. For Keccak[40, 160] (resp. Keccak[72, 128] and Keccak[144, 256]) our attack has a computational complexity of 273 (resp. 252.5 and 2101.5) Keccak calls.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"55 1","pages":"239-268"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Algebraic Collision Attacks on Keccak\",\"authors\":\"Rachelle Heim Boissier, C. Noûs, Yann Rotella\",\"doi\":\"10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.239-268\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we analyze the collision resistance of the two smallest versions of Keccak which have a width of 200 and 400 bits respectively. We show that algebraic and linearization techniques can serve collision cryptanalysis by using some interesting properties of the linear part of the round function of Keccak. We present an attack on the Keccak versions that could be used in lightweight cryptography reduced to two rounds. For Keccak[40, 160] (resp. Keccak[72, 128] and Keccak[144, 256]) our attack has a computational complexity of 273 (resp. 252.5 and 2101.5) Keccak calls.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37077,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"239-268\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.239-268\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.239-268","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we analyze the collision resistance of the two smallest versions of Keccak which have a width of 200 and 400 bits respectively. We show that algebraic and linearization techniques can serve collision cryptanalysis by using some interesting properties of the linear part of the round function of Keccak. We present an attack on the Keccak versions that could be used in lightweight cryptography reduced to two rounds. For Keccak[40, 160] (resp. Keccak[72, 128] and Keccak[144, 256]) our attack has a computational complexity of 273 (resp. 252.5 and 2101.5) Keccak calls.