{"title":"The Valdez Oil Spill, Environmental Impact and Corporate Liability","authors":"H. Satish","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3882784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3882784","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the 21st century being more educated, richer, healthier, peaceful and better connected than the previous centuries, a negligent happening of the past - Exxon Valdez oil-spill of 1989 still looms, hovers and monitors our actions today. Though it is not the largest oil spill recorded, the impact on the Alaskan shoreline makes it one of the lowest points in history for it was an accident that grew out of sheer dereliction. The loss of biodiversity and commercial activities in the region hit by the spill had a butterfly effect on the economy of the country. Ever since the occurrence of this accident, a lot more care has been given to the degree of risk concerned with the transportation of oil through laws and regulations to abide by at the sea. Sound statutes are one of the many reasons why Prince William Sound has not witnessed a major oil leakings since the Valdez accident. In light of the climate crisis and the UN Sustainable Goals of 2030, this article aims to explore the Exxon Valdez accident, corporate liabilities and the importance of stringent laws to understand environmental damages and compensations.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"264 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117102810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Leader Member Exchange Leadership Model in Workplaces: A Theoretical Review","authors":"R. Olaniyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695319","url":null,"abstract":"Leadership means different things to different people. The most important dimensions of leadership are influence and goals; though the process through which influence is exerted to achieve pre-determined organizational goals differs from leaders to leaders. However, leadership cannot exist in a vacuum. The author conceptualize leadership as a process that centers on the interaction between leaders and their followers. In this article, the author dissected, analyzed, and synthesized extant literature on leader-member exchange (LMX) theory with the aim of discovering useful insights about LMX leadership practices in today’s workplaces. The author established that future research should begin to view LMX as a relational model of nested relationship. The paper concluded that The LMX is a good leadership model but may not be a good fit for diversity practicing organizations.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127357285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investor Relations and Stakeholder Communications (IRSC) and Cost of Debt and Equity Capital","authors":"Harjeet S. Bhabra, Sam Kolahgar, Rahul Ravi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3520923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3520923","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we examine whether firms’ engagement in Investor Relations and Stakeholder Communication (IRSC) activities reduce the cost of information asymmetry at the time of external financing. We also analyze the intermediary role of financing source (debt vs equity) and the existing level of firm transparency. Measures of IRSC initiatives are frequency of press releases, frequency of events (conferences and meetings, including industry gatherings as well as investment bank seminars), ratio of question and answer portion to the length of events, the average length of answer per question asked during events, and the frequency of slides used in event presentations. Sample includes 1,190 firms listed on S&P1500 index (small, medium, and large-cap firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges) from 1999 to 2018. Multiple regression analyses (with robust standard errors) show that press frequency and the portion of question and answer in events have a significant and positive relationship with the cost of financing and event frequency and the average length of answers have a negative association with the cost of financing. Multivariate multiple regression analyses (seemingly unrelated regression models) are used to control for simultaneous effects of debt and equity issue and show that these findings are more pronounced for firms of lower transparency who are going to issue equity compared to firms of higher transparency who are going to issue debt.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121090401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lai T. Hoang, Marvin Wee, Joey (Wenling) Yang, Jing Yu
{"title":"Institutional Trading around Firms’ Negative ESG Incidents","authors":"Lai T. Hoang, Marvin Wee, Joey (Wenling) Yang, Jing Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485411","url":null,"abstract":"Using transaction-level institutional trades and a firm’s negative ESG incidents, we find<br>that institutional investors adjust their order flow prior to these non-financial events.<br>First, their trading is in the same direction of post-event cumulative abnormal returns<br>and results in abnormal profits. Second, the relationship between institutional order<br>flow and the subsequent abnormal return is also influenced by the firm’s existing CSR<br>score, and their trading in high-CSR firms lead to significant profit attenuation. These<br>findings suggest that institutional investors’ trading decisions are driven by financial<br>as well as social incentives. We conduct further analysis on firm-level information<br>asymmetry and shareholder breadth to identify their information advantage for their<br>profits. A subsample analysis reveals that institutional order flow is negatively related<br>to their preference for social responsible investment measured by the institution-level<br>CSR index.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129277932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Broadcast Media and Asset Prices: The Effect of an Anti-Corruption Message in China","authors":"M. Conyon, Xi Fu, Meng He, Zhifang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3640213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3640213","url":null,"abstract":"Does entertainment broadcast media affect equity stock prices? We exploit an exogenous event to identify such media effects, namely, the broadcasting in China of the highly popular TV drama ‘In the Name of People’ on March 28th, 2017. The TV show contained a robust State-approved anti-corruption message and is expected to alter investor perceptions. We find that stock prices fall in reaction to the broadcast. Importantly, the negative effect on asset prices is higher in magnitude for firms with political connections. Also, privately-owned politically connected firms exhibit more substantial adverse price effects compared to state-owned firms. The reduction in investors’ valuation of politically connected firms persists over the long run. Our empirical findings support the notion that traditional mass-media (i.e., TV) modifies the information set of investors and has significant educational value. In our case, an anti-corruption TV drama raises investors’ awareness of the potentially high costs of a firm’s political connections when the State is actively pursuing an anti-corruption strategy.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114093940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do CEOs Use the Media for Reputation Management?","authors":"Ela Ostrovsky-Berman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3445987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3445987","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to investigate whether CEOs use the media as a strategic tool to manage and enhance reputation. This is pursued by examining the tendency of CEOs to provide interviews to the financial press as a reaction to past, present, and future events that influence their reputation. <br>The tendency of CEOs to give press interviews is examined as a function of a set of proxies that are used for gauging CEOs’ reputations: CEO tenure, press coverage, being a CEO appointed from inside/outside of the firm, and firm performance during CEO tenure.<br><br>The results of this paper reveal that the timing of CEOs’ decisions to give interviews is not random and provides evidence that is consistent with the notion that CEOs use the media as a strategic tool to manage and enhance reputation.<br><br>The author shows that interviews tend to follow positive firm performance, and tend to precede extremely negative firm performance. This behavior is more pronounced for CEOs with lower initial reputation. In addition, low future performance motivates CEOs to give more interviews in advance, which could be an attempt to influence investors' expectations.<br><br>The paper sheds new light on the selective usage of the media for shaping public perceptions. This study has practical value for both regulators and investors by virtue of analyzing information that is provided via the media.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"232 1-2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132119132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who is Really Managing Reputations?","authors":"P. Leoni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3078867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078867","url":null,"abstract":"I consider many principals who interact sequentially against the same agent. The agent hides his disutility for efforts from the principals, and tries to use this asymmetric information to extract some surplus from the principals. Principals are isolated, and can coordinate their actions only through direct communication. I show that communication is systematically manipulated by the principals, and that it leads to inefficiency. The result holds not only with Bayesian principals, but also for most ways of updating beliefs. I introduce a new concept of equilibrium to take account of non-Bayesian updating; this concept generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium introduced in Kreps and Wilson cite{Kr-Wi}. I characterize all the equilibria. The inefficiency generated by this form of direct communication is made clear by the above characterization.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121666620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality","authors":"I. Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Felipe Varas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2839587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2839587","url":null,"abstract":"We study firm's incentives to invest and build reputation for quality, when quality can be certified at a cost. We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification. We show that reputation-based certification has a very limited effect on incentives to invest in quality, so that in equilibrium the firm invests only its reputation is the lowest. We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification. These problems can be avoided with time-based certification, which can allow first-best investment in quality for sufficiently small certification cost, despite investment being unobservable. We also show that the optimal certification duration results in the firm certifying when its reputation is high.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125730629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promoting a Reputation for Quality","authors":"Daniel N. Hauser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2845375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845375","url":null,"abstract":"A firm builds its reputation not only by investing in the quality of its products, but also by controlling the information consumers can see. I consider a model in which a firm invests in both product quality and in a costly signaling technology in order to build its reputation, the market's belief that its quality is high. The firm influences the rate at which consumers’ receive information about quality: the firm can either promote, which increases the arrival rate of signals when quality is high, or censor, which decreases the arrival rate of signals when quality is low. I study how the firm's incentives to build quality and signal depend on its reputation and current quality. The firm's ability to promote or censor plays a key role in the structure of equilibria. Promotion and investment in quality are complements: the firm has stronger incentives to build quality when the promotion level is high. Costly promotion can, however, reduce the firm's incentive to build quality; this effect persists even as the cost of building quality approaches zero. Censorship and investment in quality are substitutes. The ability to censor can destroy a firm's incentives to invest in quality, because it can reduce information about poor quality products.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124410001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managing Third-Party Platform Litigation Risk in Crowdfunding: Terms, Pricing, and Reputation","authors":"Joan Macleod Heminway","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2811489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2811489","url":null,"abstract":"Third-party platforms, intermediaries in the financing proposition offered by crowdfunding, assume various risks in undertaking that intermediation role, including the risk that legal actions may be brought against them by those seeking funding and the funders they attract. This litigation risk undoubtedly affects the terms of the services provided by third-party platforms, including platform terms of use and the pricing of platform services. Moreover, the reputation of a platform may impact and be impacted by litigation risk.Untangling these factors and assessing their interaction will involve multiple studies over an extended period of time. This paper begins that process by identifying platform litigation risks (using U.S. law as a key reference point) and specific nonfinancial terms of platform hosting arrangements relating to litigation risk. Preliminary, anecdotal observations are made about the effects of litigation risk on the pricing of platform services and platform reputation. In later work, it is anticipated that empirical observations also could be made about certain elements of the relative cost of platform services and platform reputation.","PeriodicalId":369476,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Reputation eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129811193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}