{"title":"Epistemological Randomization, or On Creativity in Science","authors":"A. M. Dorozhkin, S. Shibarshina","doi":"10.5840/eps20236012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236012","url":null,"abstract":"This article attempts to comprehend the problem within the methodology of science. The authors compare the concepts of creativity and heuristics and suggest a semantic differentiation between them, and also offer their own viewpoint on the main types of activity corresponding to these concepts. The problem of creativity is associated with the characteristics that a person must have in order to solve tasks and problems. The authors consider the relationship between the problem and the task, as well as some major techniques to tackle them. Here they substantiate the idea of a wider adaptation of randomization as a special tactic, that is, going beyond the narrow framework of mathematical statistics and empirical research. In this context, the authors introduce the notion of “epistemological randomization”, designed to denote the following of open rationality without abandoning the rational way of solving scientific problems. This technique is viewed as a phenomenon related to the counterfactual thinking. The last part of the article proposes a typology of personalities as problem and task solvers – adaptive, heuristic and creative personalities. It is assumed that the “heuristic” personality aims to complete tasks, which, unlike problems, have a final solution, while the “creative” personality aims to expand the problem field. The latter type is characterized as capable and inclined to use the “epistemological randomization”, the techniques of lateral thinking and other techniques that suggest several methods of solving problems and tasks at once.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130007243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Historical and Philosophical Reconstruction of the Discussion on Verifiability at the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society","authors":"V. Ogleznev","doi":"10.5840/eps202360233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360233","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents a detailed consideration of the arguments from the symposium “Verifiability”, which was held on July 14, 1945 in London, proposed by Scottish philosopher and theologian Donald MacKinnon, Austrian logician and mathematician Friedrich Waismann and English logician and philosopher of science William Kneale. MacKinnon’s approach to verifiability was based on the metaphysics of fact, while Waismann and Kneale’s approach was based on the semantic specificity of empirical concepts (“open texture” and context of use) and on the truth-values of empirical propositions. The symposium in question is interesting primarily because it is the last meaningful discussion on the concept of verifiability in the form in which it was understood by the Vienna Circle. Despite the fact that, in the coming years, this concept received a completely different interpretation, which stands away from the original source, the 1945 symposium could be rightfully treated as a canonical discussion on verifiability in the sense that nothing like this has ever happened in the philosophy after.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130259336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neuroethics: Discussions about the Subject","authors":"E. Bryzgalina, A. Gumarova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259111","url":null,"abstract":"The term “neuroethics” emerged in the 1970s denoting medical ethics in neuroscience. The development of neuro-turn in philosophical studies, beginning of wide empirical research in neurobiology and cognitive science and rise of public interest in brain studies in the first decade of the 21st century caused the emergence of neuroethics as an independent research field. The questions of definition the subject area, methodology, priority directions and conceptual foundations of neuroethics still remain as the subjects of discussions nowadays. The main modern approaches to understanding the subject of neuroethics are reported in the article. The authors of the article propose to interpret neuroethics as a metadiscipline and highlight four approaches of it. A. Roskies divides neuroethics into two fields of study: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. This approach is refined in modern research. The article reveals that neuroethics can be understood as a description of the neural correlates of moral action; as an assessment of the ethics of research and therapeutic interventions in the brain; as a critical understanding of social practices based on knowledge of brain functioning or the usage of neurotechnology; as an analysis of the social consequences of the neurotechnologies development. The authors note that neuroethics still has a status of an “emerging field”, which makes the analysis of its development an independent research task.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124199284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Technoscience, Humanity and Man","authors":"Y. Volkov","doi":"10.5840/eps202259115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259115","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a reflection on some conceptual ideas of the book “Humanity and Technos: the philosophy of coevolution” related to negative assessments of the socio-anthropological consequences of the development of technoscience. It is noted that the author’s criticism of novationist interpretations of scientific and technological progress is subordinated to the main idea of the book about the incompatibility of the principles of convergence and coevolution in the relationship between man and technology. It is shown that the book examines not only the external challenges of technoscience, but also the areas of scientific research that threatens the world of traditional man. Based on the results of the analysis of the book's content the following main conclusions are made. 1. Despite the presence of a large group of social problems generated by the fourth technological order the authors of the book are most concerned about the consequences of the development of digital technologies that can change the man's generic nature. 2. Rhetorical theory of number considering in the book as a worldview paradigm of the digital revolution actually has a narrower subject specificity. 3. The assumption that exist a parallel evolution of technology independent of human is contradicting the original premise about the artificial nature of artifacts. 4. Conclusion about the presence of animal traits in humans that were lost during technological revolution is requires specification. 5. The problem of an existential crisis caused by the appearance of a new class of technical artifacts and also the theme of the deficit of freedom in the virtual space has not been its developed. 6. The project of the ideology of left conservatism positioned as the most consistent variant of the philosophy of resistance to the “technogenic degradation of mankind” seems to contradict the dialectical-revolutionary essence of classical Marxism. In conclusion the ideological sense of the main goal for humanity proposed by the authors and the relativity of the ideology of conservatism are shown.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126870616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creativity is not Essence but Existence!","authors":"I. Kasavin, A. Sakharova","doi":"10.5840/eps20236015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236015","url":null,"abstract":"The article offers a socio-historical approach to the problem of creative personality in polemic with the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. Creative activity is considered not as a psychological process or an expression of cognitive abilities, but as a result evaluated by the professional scientific community and even by the entire society. The distinction between the psychological, historical and historical-epistemological interpretation of creativity is discussed. The authors argue that although the proposed approach has an explanatory potential for creativity as a socio-historical phenomenon, it reduces the nature of individual personalities and their role in scientific research to a public response to a new result. The personality of an author is getting vanished in this result, becoming only a label of some social achievement. Using the terminology of J.-P. Sartre, the essence of the author as a unique individual is reduced to his social existence as a scientist. The purpose of this existence is not the fulfillment of a vocation, but the implementation of a professional mission to promote science as a public good, which consists, among other things, in creating a field of intellectual tension. The scientist ensures the objective increase of public awareness of the painful points of history and modernity; critically analyzes global risks from ecology to security; and presents images of a possible and required future. Thus, creative science acts as a source for development through problematization, a factor of cognitive dissonance, a troublemaker, a potential violator of social stability.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122235173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intention, Subject of Will, and Social Theory","authors":"V. Surovtsev","doi":"10.5840/eps20225913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225913","url":null,"abstract":"The article contains some considerations on K.A. Rodin’s reconstruction of the theory of action in works of later L. Wittgenstein. His apophatic approach to descriptions of will, volition, subject of will is analyzed. This approach is compared with approaches to Husserl’s definition of a transcendental subject. It is argued that the apophatic approach to the description of volition as a foundation of social theory is doubtful.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132348219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Знакомство с вымышленным объектом","authors":"Иван Борисович Микиртумов","doi":"10.5840/eps202360345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360345","url":null,"abstract":"В этой статье я пытаюсь ответить на вопрос о том, какие наиболее общие семантические и прагматические условия должны выполняться, чтобы употребление пустых в действительном мире термов de re в естественном языке было осмысленным. Для этого я затрагиваю взаимосвязь универсума возможного миров с наиболее общими представлениями об объектах, рассматриваю семантические и прагматические условия знакомства с вымышленным объектом, привлекаю анализ высказываний о вымышленных объектах. Я прихожу к следующим выводам. Во-первых, для интерпретации фиктивных имен, употребляемых в модусе имагинативного de re, наиболее удачными являются структуры возможных миров, образованные хронологически упорядоченными последовательностями миров (историями), среди которых так называемые лейбницевские истории отвечают некоторой «наивной» теории объекта. Она обеспечивает сводимость или несводимость историй друг к другу, а также распределение объектов по историям, в разной степени отдаленным от актуализированного мира. Это позволяет дать определение различным видам историй. Во-вторых, семантика терма при имагинативном de re должна оперировать психологическими состояниями агента, в частности некогнитивными. Они призваны удостоверять прозрачность истории и мира для знакомства в нем с вымышленным объектом. Такие состояния играют, однако, роль внешних данных. Это позволяет описать следующие прагматические предписания говорящему при употреблении термов в модусе имагинативного de re: имагинативная ясность, прозрачность и удержание агентности. В-третьих, сингулярные термы и в некоторых ситуациях индексные выражения в зависимости от контекста могут употребляться de re для обозначения как референта в актуальном мире, так и специфического знакового объекта, получающего название транспаренты. Этот объект актуального мира представляет собой знак вымышленного объекта в мире альтернативной истории. Его коммуникативное значение состоит в возможности описания дискурса развертывания такой истории. Прагматические правила сохраняются и тут: заданный транспарентой объект должен находиться по эту сторону порога прозрачности.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132147570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Copernicus Contra Kuhn","authors":"I. Dmitriev","doi":"10.5840/eps202259462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259462","url":null,"abstract":"T. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions has repeatedly been the subject of criticism. It is important to note that Kuhn pays very limited attention to the phenomenon of the scientific revolution itself, comparing the revolution either with a religious conversion or with a gestalt switch. Such comparisons, however, are very superficial. This paper outlines a new understanding of the scientific revolution as a result of the resonance of the intellectual trends of the early modern period. It was the quasi-simultaneous action of various factors (from the great geographical discoveries to social cataclysms and the religious Reformation) that led to revolutionary changes in natural philosophy, which, in turn, gave rise (already in the XVIIIth century) to the actual scientific revolution. In addition, the article shows that the Copernican Revolution cannot be described within the model of scientific revolution developed by T. Kuhn. Ptolemy’s theory was mathematically constructed so that it could not make inaccurate predictions of planetary motion, because – as we are now clear – the function characterizing the trajectory of planetary motion was actually represented as a Fourier series. The Copernican revolution was not a Kuhn-type scientific revolution, nor was it caused by the empirical failures of Ptolemaic astronomy (i.e. the accumulation of anomalies turning into a crisis). Events unfolded according to a different scheme. Copernicus set out to carry out the principle of the uniform circular motion of the planets more consistently than had been done in Ptolemy’s theory, at the same time presenting to this theory those requirements of an aesthetic and methodological order, which the cognitively fragmented system of Ptolemy, for all its flexibility, could not satisfy and, by the conditions of its creation, could not satisfy. In addition, the article shows that Copernicus, in constructing his heliocentric theory, was essentially seeking answers to the challenges that Alberti’s artificial perspective and Nicholas of Cusa’s theological speculation posed to the visual experience in the sixteenth century.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133049801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wittgenstein on Intention and Action in the Perspective of Contemporary Approaches in Social Theory","authors":"K. Rodin","doi":"10.5840/eps20225912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225912","url":null,"abstract":"A sequential reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s notes on action and intention (presented in this article) aims to stimulate a further discussion of the productivity of using Wittgenstein’s notes on action theory within social theory (and within research in moral philosophy and philosophy of law). It provides as an illustration of Wittgenstein’s consistent commitment to the principle of contextualism (suggesting an inextricable bond of social and philosophical concepts and their inclusion into various forms of life and linguistic practices). In terms of the principle of contextualism, the article examines numerous attempts to incorporate the philosophy of the late Wittgenstein into social and related research (Albert Ogien, Chantal Mouffe, ethnomethodology, Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, the sociology of color).","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122530957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creativity and Digitalization","authors":"E. Maslanov","doi":"10.5840/eps202259338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259338","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a part of the discussion of Ilya Kasavin’s article “Creativity as a social phenomenon” and is devoted to the analysis of creativity in the era of digitalization. The author discusses creativity in computer programs and the actions of assistant robots. They can be creative because they are able to find new solutions to various problems. The Go program used new strategies that human players had never played before; another program predicted the crystal structure of various substances that had not yet been studied experimentally. The concept of implicit knowledge is used to answer the question about the specifics of creativity. H. Collins singled out three types of tacit knowledge: relative, somatic and collective. The first is associated with the acquirement of various procedures – like cooking, the second – various skills related to body control, such as swimming or cycling, the third – social and cultural rules. Only the third type of tacit knowledge is associated with creativity. Programs and assistant robots can master relative and somatic implicit knowledge. They are not able to work with collective implicit knowledge. Creativity cannot be digitized. At the same time, digitalization forms important social prerequisites for the development of creativity. Currently, a new social group is being formed – the precariat. This is a marginal group; its representatives are not very firmly included in social structures. It is possible to single out the scientific precariat. With the help of digital technologies, it forms new ways, mechanisms, strategies and tools for solving various problems, form new ideas that expand our collective tacit knowledge.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121996297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
