2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium最新文献

Automated Proofs for Diffie-Hellman-Based Key Exchanges 基于diffie - hellman的密钥交换的自动证明

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.11

Long Ngo, C. Boyd, J. G. Nieto

引用次数: 7

Guiding a General-Purpose C Verifier to Prove Cryptographic Protocols 指导通用C验证器证明加密协议

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.8

François Dupressoir, A. Gordon, J. Jürjens, D. Naumann

引用次数: 50

Vertical Protocol Composition 垂直协议组成

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.23

Thomas Gross, S. Mödersheim

{"title":"Vertical Protocol Composition","authors":"Thomas Gross, S. Mödersheim","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2011.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2011.23","url":null,"abstract":"The security of key exchange and secure channel protocols, such as TLS, has been studied intensively. However, only few works have considered what happens when the established keys are actuallyused -- to run some protocol securely over the established \"channel\". We call this a vertical protocol composition, and it is truly commonplace in today's communication with the diversity of VPNs and secure browser sessions. In fact, it is normal that we have several layers of secure channels: For instance, on top of a VPN-connection, a browser may establish another secure channel (possibly with a different end point). Even using the same protocol several times in such a stack of channels is not unusual: An application may very well establish another TLS channel over an established one. We call this self-composition. In fact, there is nothing that tells us that all these compositions are sound, i.e., that the combination cannot introduce attacks that the individual protocols in isolation do not have. In this work, we prove a composability result in the symbolic model that allows for arbitrary vertical composition (including self-composition). It holds for protocols from any suite of channel and application protocols that fulfills a number of sufficient preconditions. These preconditions are satisfied for many practically relevant protocols such as TLS.","PeriodicalId":364995,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132804635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Resource-Aware Authorization Policies for Statically Typed Cryptographic Protocols 静态类型加密协议的资源感知授权策略

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.13

M. Bugliesi, Stefano Calzavara, F. Eigner, Matteo Maffei

引用次数: 20

Attacking and Fixing Helios: An Analysis of Ballot Secrecy 攻击和修正太阳神:选票保密分析

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2012-0458

V. Cortier, B. Smyth

引用次数: 180

Information-Theoretic Bounds for Differentially Private Mechanisms 差分私有机制的信息论界

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.20

G. Barthe, Boris Köpf

{"title":"Information-Theoretic Bounds for Differentially Private Mechanisms","authors":"G. Barthe, Boris Köpf","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2011.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2011.20","url":null,"abstract":"There are two active and independent lines of research that aim at quantifying the amount of information that is disclosed by computing on confidential data. Each line of research has developed its own notion of confidentiality: on the one hand, differential privacy is the emerging consensus guarantee used for privacy-preserving data analysis. On the other hand, information-theoretic notions of leakage are used for characterizing the confidentiality properties of programs in language-based settings. The purpose of this article is to establish formal connections between both notions of confidentiality, and to compare them in terms of the security guarantees they deliver. We obtain the following results. First, we establish upper bounds for the leakage of every eps-differentially private mechanism in terms of eps and the size of the mechanism's input domain. We achieve this by identifying and leveraging a connection to coding theory. Second, we construct a class of eps-differentially private channels whose leakage grows with the size of their input domains. Using these channels, we show that there cannot be domain-size-independent bounds for the leakage of all eps-differentially private mechanisms. Moreover, we perform an empirical evaluation that shows that the leakage of these channels almost matches our theoretical upper bounds, demonstrating the accuracy of these bounds. Finally, we show that the question of providing optimal upper bounds for the leakage of eps-differentially private mechanisms in terms of rational functions of eps is in fact decidable.","PeriodicalId":364995,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127286102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 88

Dynamic Enforcement of Knowledge-Based Security Policies 基于知识的安全策略的动态实施

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.15

Piotr (Peter) Mardziel, Stephen Magill, M. Hicks, M. Srivatsa

{"title":"Dynamic Enforcement of Knowledge-Based Security Policies","authors":"Piotr (Peter) Mardziel, Stephen Magill, M. Hicks, M. Srivatsa","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2011.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2011.15","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the idea of knowledge-based security policies, which are used to decide whether to answer queries over secret data based on an estimation of the querier's (possibly increased) knowledge given the results. Limiting knowledge is the goal of existing information release policies that employ mechanisms such as noising, anonymization, and redaction. Knowledge-based policies are more general: they increase flexibility by not fixing the means to restrict information flow. We enforce a knowledge-based policy by explicitly tracking a model of a querier's belief about secret data, represented as a probability distribution, and denying any query that could increase knowledge above a given threshold. We implement query analysis and belief tracking via abstract interpretation using a novel probabilistic polyhedral domain, whose design permits trading off precision with performance while ensuring estimates of a querier's knowledge are sound. Experiments with our implementation show that several useful queries can be handled efficiently, and performance scales far better than would more standard implementations of probabilistic computation based on sampling.","PeriodicalId":364995,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129133476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 42

Local Memory via Layout Randomization 通过布局随机化的本地内存

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.18

R. Jagadeesan, Corin Pitcher, J. Rathke, J. Riely

{"title":"Local Memory via Layout Randomization","authors":"R. Jagadeesan, Corin Pitcher, J. Rathke, J. Riely","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2011.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2011.18","url":null,"abstract":"Randomization is used in computer security as a tool to introduce unpredictability into the software infrastructure. In this paper, we study the use of randomization to achieve the secrecy and integrity guarantees for local memory. We follow the approach set out by Abadi and Plot kin. We consider the execution of an idealized language in two environments. In the strict environment, opponents cannot access local variables of the user program. In the lax environment, opponents may attempt to guess allocated memory locations and thus, with small probability, gain access the local memory of the user program. We model these environments using two novel calculi: lambda-mu-hashref and lambda-mu-proberef. Our contribution to the Abadi-Plot kin program is to enrich the programming language with dynamic memory allocation, first class and higher order references and call/cc-style control. On the one hand, these enhancements allow us to directly model a larger class of system hardening principles. On the other hand, the class of opponents is also enhanced since our enriched language permits natural and direct encoding of attacks that alter the control flow of programs. Our main technical result is a fully abstract translation (up to probability) of lambda-mu-hashref into lambda-mu-proberef. Thus, in the presence of randomized layouts, the opponent gains no new power from being able to guess local references of the user program. Our numerical bounds are similar to those of Abadi and Plot kin, thus, the extra programming language features do not cause a concomitant increase in the resources required for protection via randomization.","PeriodicalId":364995,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115545638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 61

StatVerif: Verification of Stateful Processes StatVerif:有状态进程的验证

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2011.10

Myrto Arapinis, J. Phillips, Eike Ritter, M. Ryan

引用次数: 84

Modular Protections against Non-control Data Attacks 针对非控制数据攻击的模块化保护

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI: 10.3233/JCS-140502

Cole Schlesinger, K. Pattabiraman, N. Swamy, D. Walker, B. Zorn

引用次数: 28