Vertical Protocol Composition

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI:10.1109/CSF.2011.23

Thomas Gross, S. Mödersheim

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引用次数: 26

Abstract

The security of key exchange and secure channel protocols, such as TLS, has been studied intensively. However, only few works have considered what happens when the established keys are actuallyused -- to run some protocol securely over the established "channel". We call this a vertical protocol composition, and it is truly commonplace in today's communication with the diversity of VPNs and secure browser sessions. In fact, it is normal that we have several layers of secure channels: For instance, on top of a VPN-connection, a browser may establish another secure channel (possibly with a different end point). Even using the same protocol several times in such a stack of channels is not unusual: An application may very well establish another TLS channel over an established one. We call this self-composition. In fact, there is nothing that tells us that all these compositions are sound, i.e., that the combination cannot introduce attacks that the individual protocols in isolation do not have. In this work, we prove a composability result in the symbolic model that allows for arbitrary vertical composition (including self-composition). It holds for protocols from any suite of channel and application protocols that fulfills a number of sufficient preconditions. These preconditions are satisfied for many practically relevant protocols such as TLS.

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垂直协议组成

密钥交换和安全通道协议(如TLS)的安全性已经得到了深入的研究。然而，只有很少的作品考虑到当建立的密钥被实际使用时会发生什么——在建立的“通道”上安全地运行一些协议。我们称之为垂直协议组合，它在当今各种vpn和安全浏览器会话的通信中确实很常见。事实上，我们有几层安全通道是正常的:例如，在vpn连接的顶部，浏览器可能建立另一个安全通道(可能具有不同的端点)。即使在这样的通道堆栈中多次使用相同的协议也很常见:应用程序很可能在已建立的通道上建立另一个TLS通道。我们称之为自我合成。事实上，没有什么能告诉我们所有这些组合都是可靠的，也就是说，这些组合不能引入单独的单个协议所没有的攻击。在这项工作中，我们证明了符号模型中的可组合性结果，该模型允许任意垂直组合(包括自组合)。它适用于满足许多充分先决条件的任何通道和应用程序协议套件中的协议。这些前提条件满足了许多实际相关的协议，如TLS。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium

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