基于diffie - hellman的密钥交换的自动证明

2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2011-06-27 DOI:10.1109/CSF.2011.11

Long Ngo, C. Boyd, J. G. Nieto

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引用次数: 7

摘要

提出了一种基于diffie - hellman密钥交换协议安全性的自动验证方法。该方法包括hoare风格的逻辑和语法检查。该方法在Bellare-Rogaway-Pointcheval模型(2000)的简化版本中应用于协议。通过Kudla和Paterson(2005)的模块化证明技术，可以自动建立协议在完整模型中的安全性。

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Automated Proofs for Diffie-Hellman-Based Key Exchanges

We present an automated verification method for security of Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocols. The method includes a Hoare-style logic and syntactic checking. The method is applied to protocols in a simplified version of the Bellare-Rogaway-Pointcheval model (2000). The security of the protocol in the complete model can be established automatically by a modular proof technique of Kudla and Paterson (2005).

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2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium

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