{"title":"Znaczenie idei „niszczenia się świata” w kształtowaniu filozofii przyrody Jana Jonstona w dziele O stałości natury","authors":"Z. Pietrzak","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.015","url":null,"abstract":"W niniejszym artykule (bardzo wybiórczo) chciałbym przedstawić poglądy Jana Jonstona (Johannes Jonstonus) 1603-1675 na dzieje przyrody i człowieka oraz pokrótce przedstawić jego sylwetkę. Rekonstruując owe filozoficzne i metodologiczne kwestie, warto także przytoczyć kilka zagadnień związanych z życiorysem tego uczonego oraz z recepcją jego dzieł. \u0000 Jonston był przyrodnikiem, lekarzem i filozofem. Obecnie jest mało znany i zapomniany, a w konsekwencji jego filozofia przyrody i filozofia człowieka, jego wizja świata, a więc w pewnym sensie i Kosmologia, uległy zapomnieniu i marginalizacji. Uległa także zapomnieniu jego filozofia i metodologia nauki. \u0000 Jonston należał do pokolenia Kartezjusza, jednakże jego poglądy na przyrodę i na naukę były bliższe filozofii brytyjskiej niż kontynentalnej i nawiązywały do idei, które sformułował Francis Bacon, a potem kontynuował Robert Boyle. Zapewne stanowisko Jonstona zostało ukształtowane w trakcie jego studiów na uniwersytetach w Wielkiej Brytanii. Owe inspiracje metodologią nauk zasługują, by były się przedmiotem osobnych rozważań, ale ze względu na ograniczony charakter pracy zostaną tu pominięte. \u0000 Jonston w pracy O stałości natury (An history of the Constancy of Nature…) formułuje swoją wizję przyrody. Owa filozofia przyrody kształtuje się w konfrontacji z poglądami chiliastów dotyczącymi natury człowieka i pośrednio całej przyrody. Poglądy chiliastów wynikały ze specyficznej interpretacji Biblii mówiącej o „starzeniu się” świata człowieka, kultury, a w konsekwencji i przyrody. W związku z tym, że idea chiliastów obejmuje zjawiska przyrodnicze i antropologiczne, a w dodatku maja historyczny charakter, Jonston w swoich kontrargumentach musiał odwoływać się i do empirii, i do historii: Biblijnej, oraz naturalnej. Tym samym, współuczestniczył nie tylko w tworzeniu nowożytnej filozofii przyrody, ale także nowożytnej „historii naturalnej” i nowożytnej metodologii, postulującej matematyzację wiedzy o przyrodzie.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42048296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ateny Lwa Szestowa","authors":"Jan Filcek","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.019","url":null,"abstract":"Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę ukazania symboliki Aten w twórczości Lwa Szestowa. W tym celu autor odwołuje się do Szestowowskiej koncepcji rozumu, którą Rosjanin buduje w ramach refleksji nad dziejami myśli filozoficznej. Wedle autora Aten i Jerozolimy rozum (za pośrednictwem działalności przytłaczającej większości filozofów), wikła człowieka w poznanie narażone na rozmaite błędy epistemiczne. Rozum występuje wobec rzeczywistości z postulatami m.in. jedności, ścisłości oraz powszechnej obowiązywalności, które eliminują z horyzontu poznania zjawiska niejednoznaczne i wyjątkowe. Owe kategorie służące rozumowi do opisu rzeczywistości, wybrzmiały w filozofii wielkich myślicieli: Talesa z Miletu, Sokratesa, Barucha Spinozy i Artura Schopenhauera. W artykule dokonana została analiza krytyki Szestowa względem idei głoszonych przez wskazanych myślicieli.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45428344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Galileusz i rozróżnienie między jakościami pierwotnymi a wtórnymi (II). Problem statusu ontologicznego wrażeń","authors":"B. Żukowski","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.013","url":null,"abstract":"Artykuł stanowi kontynuację pracy poświęconej teoretycznej analizie głównego argumentu użytego przez Galileusza do sformułowania rozróżnienia między jakościami pierwotnymi a wtórnymi. Jego przedmiotem jest problem ontologicznego statusu jakości wtórnych/wrażeń. W artykule omawiam trzy główne linie interpretacji tego zagadnienia, rozpatrywane w świetle ustaleń poczynionych w pierwszym tekście. Pierwsza część pracy poświęcona jest mentalistycznej interpretacji Galileuszowych jakości wtórnych. Dociekania te uzupełnia analiza mechanistycznych przesłanek jego koncepcji, za sprawą których zasługuje ona na miano „śmieciowej teorii sensorium”. W części drugiej, analizuję argumenty na rzecz materialistycznej interpretacji jakości wtórnych oraz, posiłkując się wynikami uzyskanymi w pierwszym artykule, wskazuję związane z nią trudności teoretyczne. W trzeciej części pracy, omawiam hermeneutyczne zalety i teoretyczne wady wykładni Galileuszowych jakości wtórnych w kategoriach arystotelesowskich. Artykuł konkluduję uwagami na temat tekstualnego podłoża i historycznego znaczenia ujawnionych trudności interpretacyjnych.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43888902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anselm of Canterbury and the many senses of “being”","authors":"Hernán Guerrero-Troncoso","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.021","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents the so-called “ontological argument” from a comparison with the “regula” Anselms establishes in his Monologion, c. 15. This rule would allow, under a certain respect, to consider existence as a perfection attributable to God, even though it does not possess the same ontological status of any other attribute, i.e. cannot be considered a real predicate. Consequently, it is possible to outline the different senses in which Anselm understands the notion of “being” and the conditions under which existence and real perfection can transcend the sphere of creatures and help conceiving God. This distinction of the senses of being would later allow for existence to be considered a perfection, just as real predicates are, but according to a completely different meaning.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46009928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To normalize the solitude – the task to be done","authors":"Michał Idasiak","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.027","url":null,"abstract":"The pandemic situation showed us, that the separation from other people is an important part of our lives and makes even more impact than we thought. Yet, the dominant picture of this separation is hugely negative and was so for a long time. Solitude, being nor positive nor negative on its own, just as being with others, is not something that people as a whole acknowledge in their lives – it is perceived as a state to endure, something that can be useful, but not something we should just live with, at least partially. This paper shows how important it is to create a new picture of solitude – as something normal, not exceptional. It indicates the task to create a new vocabulary around the phenomena of solitude, free of its negative connotations, which will enable us to incorporate the solitude back to our lives. I argue, that such change in vocabulary may enable us normalization of solitude and that such normalization should be our goal.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46645252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Many Times Can One Die? The Death of Art","authors":"M. Wołek","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.025","url":null,"abstract":"This article deals with the problem of death and the end of art. The discourse on the subject is still ongoing only due to the authority of Hegel, several contemporary authors and above all – this is my main thesis – a metaphorical projection inscribed in our language and the concept of art itself. This allows us to perceive organic features in art, thus contributing to the ease with which one can formulate a thesis on end or death. However, as I point out, these categories become highly problematic when any artistic phenomenon is described. The aim of the paper is to shed the light on these metaphors.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44658276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In decline or on the threshold of a renaissance? On the place of the philosophy of history in the contemporary world","authors":"Grzegorz Bednarczyk","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.026","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000The aim of this article is an attempt to diagnose the current condition of the philosophy of history, as well as to show its potential in explaining contemporary phenomena and constructing a rational image of the world. Two recent works by Steven Pinker (The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined and Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress) and the methodological work of Karl Raimund Popper provide a point of reference. And although the works mentioned are not classed as historiosophical (even by Pinker himself), it is the author’s opinion that they fully deserve this title by showing that philosophical reflection on history is something that is sorely needed today, in an age of multiple contradictory diagnoses and radical prophecies.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43519473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hypothetical structuralism","authors":"Marcin Czakon","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.024","url":null,"abstract":"M. Resnik (2019) suggests a new version of structuralism which he calls non-ontological structuralism. In the present short article I discuss this view-point in the context of the Frege-Hilbert controversy about meaning of primitive notions in deductive theory, with special regard to the original views of K. Ajdukiewicz, Hilbert’s student. Following the proposed differentiations, I introduce a new type of structuralism which I call hypothetical structuralism, close to Resnik’s non-ontological structuralism.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42931806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant and Zetetic Scepticism","authors":"Dariusz Kubok","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.020","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines Immanuel Kant’s criticism from the perspective of the preceding tradition of critical thought, with particular emphasis on Greek philosophy. Kant himself views criticism as a way to go beyond dogmatism and scepticism. On the other hand – as many researchers point out – Kant’s philosophy develops certain themes present in ancient scepticism. In the literature, there are numerous studies demonstrating Kant’s debt to the Pyrrhonian scepticism characteristic of Sextus Empiricus (ephecticism and epechism). In this article, I try to show that two different interpretations of scepticism can be formed on the basis of Sextus’ writings: zetetic scepticism and ephectic scepticism. Theinterpretation considers ἐποχή and ἰσοσθένεια as key ideas for scepticism and it is this latter option that is recognized in Kant’s thought by scholars, especially by Michael Forster. In my opinion, however, it is the first interpretation, not yet sufficiently recognized, that constitutes at least an equally strong complement to the first and may even be regarded as the proper source of Kant’s critical philosophy.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44724242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nicolai Hartmann’s ethics. Feeling and cognition of values: between emotionalism and rationalism","authors":"Leszek Kopciuch","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.022","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to identify the most important elements of Hartmann’s understanding of “feeling of value” and to point out the ambiguities associated with this notion. The most important stages in the formation of this concept are delineated by the publications: Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Ethik, Vom Wesen sittlicher Forderungen.[1] In all of these texts, Hartmann treats feeling of value as a proper way of knowing value, in relation to which philosophical cognition of value is only secondary and dependent. Hartmann’s understanding of feeling of value in ethics is, however, very broad, so that it somewhat loses the subtle divisions that were characteristic of the views of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. At the same time, however, Hartmann’s concept introduces several new elements that are important for the understanding of the nature of the feeling of value, such as, among others, the limited capacity of the axiological consciousness, the shifting horizon of values, or the relational reference of values to the person as the subject and addressee of an action and the reference to the situation in which a given action is taken. Moreover, to a greater extent than Scheler and von Hildebrand, Hartmann develops a field for the presence of rationalistic elements in the cognition of values. ","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42818925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}