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Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy最新文献

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Frege's Choice 弗雷格的选择
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-05-28 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I5.4337
Junyeol Kim
{"title":"Frege's Choice","authors":"Junyeol Kim","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I5.4337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I5.4337","url":null,"abstract":"I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given this vicious regress, Frege chooses to reject that truth is a property of truth-bearers. Frege’s choice leads to a unique version of the Fregean conception of judgment. His unique conception of judgment can cope with Hanks’s recent criticisms against the Fregean conception.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43744887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Review of Irad Kimhi, Thinking and Being Irad Kimhi思想与存在述评
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-05-28 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I5.4676
Jean-Philippe Narboux
{"title":"Review of Irad Kimhi, Thinking and Being","authors":"Jean-Philippe Narboux","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I5.4676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I5.4676","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43587099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts “误导性的类比”：维特根斯坦论心理学中的概念混淆与心理概念的语义学
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-04-19 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4683
Stefan Majetschak
{"title":"“A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts","authors":"Stefan Majetschak","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4683","url":null,"abstract":"After 1945, when the Philosophical Investigations were largely finished, Wittgenstein spent his final years undertaking an intensive study of the grammar of our psychological concepts and the philosophical misinterpretations we often assign to them.\u0000In the article at hand I do not claim to fathom the full range of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology even in the most general way. Rather it is my intention to shed some light on a diagnosis which he made for the psychology of his time. In Section 2 of this paper I would like to provide a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology and to suggest why he did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. In Section 3 I’ll attempt to analyze how psychological concepts, according to Wittgenstein, might be construed in order to avoid any type of conceptual confusion.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42321518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Critical Discussion of the “Memory-Challenge” to Interpretations of the Private Language Argument “记忆挑战”对私人语言争论解释的批判性探讨
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-04-19 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4688
Zhao Fan
{"title":"A Critical Discussion of the “Memory-Challenge” to Interpretations of the Private Language Argument","authors":"Zhao Fan","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4688","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper, Francis Y. Lin proposes a “memory-challenge” to two main interpretations of Wittgenstein’s private language argument: the “no-criterion-of-correctness” interpretation and the “no-stage-setting” interpretation. According to Lin, both camps of interpretation fail to explain why a private language is impossible within a short time period. To answer the “memory-challenge”, Lin motivates a grammatical interpretation of the private language argument. In this paper, I provide a critical discussion of Lin’s objection to these interpretations and argue that Lin’s objection fails. In the case of the “no-stage-setting” interpretation, Lin suggests that the private language user can establish a stage within a short time period. However, I show that this stage is insufficient for a private language to be used correctly. In the case of the “no-criterion-of-correctness” interpretation, Lin believes that since memory is reliable within a short period, no criterion is needed for the correct use of a private language. However, I argue that his objection attacks a strawman, since the interpretation concerns the structure of justification, rather than the weakness of memory itself. I conclude with a critical discussion on memory and primitive expressions, the latter of which are crucial to Wittgenstein’s approach to public language. This discussion will help to draw a sharp line between private language and public language, and cast some doubt on Lin’s grammatical interpretation.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45322366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Philosophical Concepts, the Ideal of Sublimation, and the “Unpredictability of Human Behaviour” 哲学概念、升华理想与“人类行为的不可预测性”
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-04-19 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i4.4684
Anja Weiberg
{"title":"Philosophical Concepts, the Ideal of Sublimation, and the “Unpredictability of Human Behaviour”","authors":"Anja Weiberg","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i4.4684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i4.4684","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein famously criticizes the philosophical practice of analyzing the meaning of words outside their ordinary use in everyday language, whereby often self-made pseudo-problems arise. In order to shed further light on Wittgenstein’s critique, this article makes use of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. First, starting from the remark in Vol. I, §52, his criticism of the philosophical method of selection and generalization is explained in detail. Next, I give a brief outline of Wittgenstein’s own way of philosophizing by reference to a selection of comments concerning the use of psychological words in everyday language, which will also further elucidate his critique. Finally, I enter into the question which (kind of) significance everyday language according to Wittgenstein has for philosophy.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45251806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology 维特根斯坦与民间心理学
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-04-19 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4685
Yian Jiang
{"title":"Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology","authors":"Yian Jiang","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I4.4685","url":null,"abstract":"Various writings by the later Wittgenstein on the philosophy of psychology, published posthumously, express his basic critical attitude toward certain concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology. His attitude towards folk psychology is negative in principle, leaving him opposed to the foundation of current psychological research. This critique of folk psychology and of the philosophy of psychology in general is in accord with the general method of his later philosophy, that is, dealing with philosophical problems by dissolving them. However, his critical attitude towards folk psychology has been less influential in the development of contemporary philosophy, and is in opposition to the philosophy of psychology and folk psychology as practiced today. In this paper I will analyze Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept of psychology, offering a different interpretation from that of other scholars, and explain why and how contemporary philosophers of psychology misunderstand Wittgenstein.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44932267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kripke’s Wittgenstein and Semantic Factualism 克里普克的维特根斯坦与语义事实主义
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-19 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i3.4370
Milos Sumonja
{"title":"Kripke’s Wittgenstein and Semantic Factualism","authors":"Milos Sumonja","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i3.4370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i3.4370","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, two new portrayals of Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) have emerged. Both understand KW as targeting the Tractarian picture of semantic fact as a speaker’s mental representation of the truth-conditions of the sentences he uses. According to the factualist interpretation, KW holds that meaning ascriptions are legitimate descriptions because semantic facts are not entities that explain people’s linguistic behavior. The second, Alex Miller’s non-standard non-factualist interpretation, sees KW as claiming that because no fact can explain our linguistic behavior, meaning ascriptions express a speaker’s attitudes towards his interlocutors rather than stating what they mean. This paper advances the minimal factualist interpretation by elaborating two points: that Miller’s reading of the skeptical argument contradicts semantic non-factualism; and that KW’s view of meaning is based on a primitivist rendition of the skeptic’s insight that nothing justifies our use of language, which allows him to assert that semantic facts exist simply because we ordinarily say so.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41382705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Cheryl Misak, Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers 谢丽尔·米萨克，《弗兰克·拉姆齐:权力过剩》
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-02-23 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i2.4642
Matthew Simpson
{"title":"Cheryl Misak, Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers","authors":"Matthew Simpson","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i2.4642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i2.4642","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45056558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transfinite Number in Wittgenstein's Tractatus 维特根斯坦《论》中的超有限数
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-02-23 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i2.4029
James R Connelly
{"title":"Transfinite Number in Wittgenstein's Tractatus","authors":"James R Connelly","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i2.4029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i2.4029","url":null,"abstract":"In his highly perceptive, if underappreciated introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Russell identifies a “lacuna” within Wittgenstein’s theory of number, relating specifically to the topic of transfinite number. The goal of this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that Russell’s concerns cannot be dismissed on the grounds that they are external to the Tractarian project, deriving, perhaps, from logicist ambitions harbored by Russell but not shared by Wittgenstein. The extensibility of Wittgenstein’s theory of number to the case of transfinite cardinalities is, I shall argue, a desideratum generated by concerns intrinsic, and internal to Wittgenstein’s logical and semantic framework. Second, I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s theory of number as espoused in the Tractatus is consistent with Russell’s assessment, in that Wittgenstein meant to leave open the possibility that transfinite numbers could be generated within his system, but did not show explicitly how to construct them. To that end, I show how one could construct a transfinite number line using ingredients inherent in Wittgenstein’s system, and in accordance with his more general theories of number and of operations.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46277063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rudolf Carnap and David Lewis on Metaphysics 鲁道夫·卡纳普与大卫·刘易斯谈形而上学
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-25 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i1.4443
F. MacBride
{"title":"Rudolf Carnap and David Lewis on Metaphysics","authors":"F. MacBride","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i1.4443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i1.4443","url":null,"abstract":"In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted ‘the metaphysician Carnap (not to be confused with the anti-metaphysician Carnap, who is better known)’ amongst his historical ancestors. Here I provide a novel interpretation of the Aufbau that allows us to make sense of Lewis’s claim. Drawing upon Lewis’s correspondence, I argue it was the Carnap of the Aufbau whom Lewis read as a metaphysician, because Carnap’s appeal to the notion of founded relations in the Aufbau echoes Lewis’s own appeal to the metaphysics of natural properties. I further maintain that Lewis was right to read Carnap this way and that the notion of a founded relation has a legitimate claim to be both logical and metaphysical. I also argue that Carnap’s initial response to Goodman’s puzzle about ‘grue’ relies upon a metaphysics of simple properties which also prefigures Lewis’s own response to Goodman invoking natural properties.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":"7 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41261552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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