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Crude Meaning, Brute Thought (or: What Are They Thinking?!) 粗鲁的意思，野蛮的想法(或者:他们在想什么?!)
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-03-20 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3483
Dorit Bar-On
{"title":"Crude Meaning, Brute Thought (or: What Are They Thinking?!)","authors":"Dorit Bar-On","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3483","url":null,"abstract":"I address here the question what sense to make of the idea that there can be thought prior to language (both in ontogeny and among nonlinguistic animals). I begin by juxtaposing two familiar and influential philosophical views, one associated with the work of Paul Grice, the other associated with the work of Donald Davidson. Grice and Davidson share a broad, rationalist perspective on language and thought, but they endorse conflicting theses on the relation between them. Whereas, for Grice, thought of an especially complex sort is a precondition of linguistic meaning, for Davidson, there can be no genuine thought without language. I argue that both views present us with unpalatable alternatives concerning our understanding of the natural origins of objective thought and meaningful language. Drawing on what I take to be key insights from Grice and Davidson, I then lay out some broad desiderata for an intermediate position. I finally turn to a certain form of nonlinguistic communication of the sort of which both prelinguistic children and languageless animals are capable, viz., expressive communication. I propose that a proper appreciation of the character and function of expressive communication can help us trace the outlines of the desired intermediate position.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42692712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Davidson’s Meta-Normative Naturalism 戴维森的元规范自然主义
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-03-20 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3484
R. H. Myers
{"title":"Davidson’s Meta-Normative Naturalism","authors":"R. H. Myers","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3484","url":null,"abstract":"Although Donald Davidson is best known for his account of motivating reasons, towards the end of his life he did write about normative reasons, arguing for a novel form of realism we might call anomalous naturalism: anomalous, because it is not just non-reductive but also non-revisionary, refusing to compromise in any way on the thought that the prescriptive authority of normative reasons is objective and reaches to all possible agents; naturalism, because it still treats normative properties as perfectly ordinary causal properties, and thus avoids many of the epistemological problems that bedevil realisms of the sort recently advanced by Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and T. M. Scanlon. \u0000In the first section of the paper, I discuss Davidson’s understanding of objective prescriptivity and one important challenge that it faces. In the second section, I show how an answer to this challenge can be found in Davidson’s holism of the mental. As we shall see, Davidson’s holism of the mental makes the possibility of strongly prescriptive properties much easier to take seriously. In the final section of the paper, I take up various grounds for doubting that such properties could also be causal.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47075125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Davidson, Reasons, and Causes: A Plea for a Little Bit More Empathy Davidson，原因和原因：多一点同理心的恳求
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-03-20 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3486
K. Stueber
{"title":"Davidson, Reasons, and Causes: A Plea for a Little Bit More Empathy","authors":"K. Stueber","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V7I2.3486","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I will suggest ways of improving on Davidson’s conception of the explanatory autonomy of folk psychological explanations. For that purpose, I will appeal to insights from the recent theory of mind debate emphasizing the centrality of various forms of empathy for our understanding of another person’s mindedness. While I will argue that we need to abandon Davidson’s position of anomalous monism, I will also show that my account is fully compatible with Davidson’s non-reductive and interpretationist account of meaning and mental content. Indeed, my account does more justice to the empathic capacities underlying our interpretive capacities, which Davidson himself has to acknowledge in thinking about the constitutive features of thought and meaning. More specifically, I will propose a new way of philosophically safeguarding the causal-explanatory autonomy of our ordinary action explanations by showing how our empathic capacities are involved in epistemically delineating the domain of rational agency.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42088714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Sellars's Argument for an Ontology of Absolute Processes Sellars关于绝对过程本体论的论证
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-03-11 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V7I1.3399
D. Landy
{"title":"Sellars's Argument for an Ontology of Absolute Processes","authors":"D. Landy","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V7I1.3399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V7I1.3399","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have rejected Wilfrid Sellars’s argument for an ontology of absolute processes on the grounds that it relies on a dubious and dogmatic appeal to the homogeneity of color. Borrowing from Rosenthal’s recent defense, but ultimate rejection of homogeneity, I defend this claim on Sellarsian/Kantian transcendental grounds, and reconstruct the remainder of his argument. I argue that Sellars has good reason to suppose that homogeneity is a necessary condition of any possible experience, including indirect experience of theoretical-explanatory posits, and therefore good reason to hold that Reductive Materialism, as he conceives it, is an untenable account of color. The remainder of his argument aims to answer the question of what the metaphysical relation is between the state of an experiencing subject that we take color to be and the colorless microphysical particles that we take to constitute that subject. After rejecting Substance Dualism, Epiphenomenalism, and Wholistic or Emergent Materialism as explanatorily inadequate, Sellars proposes that both color-states and micro-physical particles should be understood as manifestations of an underlying ontology on absolute processes.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42758469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Samuel Lebens. Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: A History and Defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement 撒母耳酸奶。伯特兰·罗素与命题的本质:判断的多重关系理论的历史与辩护
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-03-11 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V7I1.3874
R. Carey
{"title":"Samuel Lebens. Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: A History and Defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement","authors":"R. Carey","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V7I1.3874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V7I1.3874","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by Rosalind Carey.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43005256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Curious Calculi of Wittgenstein and Spencer Brown 论维特根斯坦和斯宾塞·布朗的奇特微积分
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-09 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V6I10.3400
G. Landini
{"title":"On the Curious Calculi of Wittgenstein and Spencer Brown","authors":"G. Landini","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V6I10.3400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V6I10.3400","url":null,"abstract":"In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein sets out what he calls his N-operator notation which can be used to calculate whether an expression is a tautology. In his Laws of Form, George Spencer Brown offers what he calls a “primary algebra” for such calculation. Both systems are perplexing. But comparing two blurry images can reduce noise, producing a focus. This paper reveals that Spencer Brown independently rediscovered the quantifier-free part of the N-operator calculus. The comparison sheds a flood light on each and from the letters of correspondence we shall find that Russell, as one might have surmised, was a catalyst for both.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47976473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Truth, Meaning, and Interpretation: A Reconsideration of Davidson’s Program 真理、意义与诠释:对戴维森纲领的再思考
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-11-02 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v6i9.3148
Arpy Khatchirian
{"title":"Truth, Meaning, and Interpretation: A Reconsideration of Davidson’s Program","authors":"Arpy Khatchirian","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v6i9.3148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v6i9.3148","url":null,"abstract":"On a common reading of Davidson, the motivation for his proposal that a meaning theory is to take the form of a truth theory is at least partly guided by concern with the ends and means of interpretation. At the same time, the consensus seems to be that this proposal faces a particularly stubborn justificatory burden. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to suggest that there is a promising route to discharging this burden, albeit one that is visible only once we shift our attention away from the so-called ‘problem of interpretation’; second, to make the case that, contrary to initial appearances, the line of justification offered here gives us a plausible interpretation of Davidson’s own goals. ","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41647937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo, Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance 加拉瓦索、瓦萨罗:《弗雷格论思维及其认识论意义》
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-10-01 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V6I8.3659
Rasa Davidavičiūtė
{"title":"Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo, Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance","authors":"Rasa Davidavičiūtė","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V6I8.3659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V6I8.3659","url":null,"abstract":"Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. \u0000125 + viii pages. $87 Hardcover. ISBN 978-0-739-17838-6. \u0000Reviewed by Rasa Davidaviciute.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43478071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three Positivist Disputes in the 1960s 20世纪60年代的三次实证主义争论
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-09-26 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V6I8.3237
Carl-Goran Heidegren
{"title":"Three Positivist Disputes in the 1960s","authors":"Carl-Goran Heidegren","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V6I8.3237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V6I8.3237","url":null,"abstract":"The West German positivist dispute in the 1960s is well known and thoroughly studied. At about the same time positivist disputes also took place in two Scandinavian countries: one in Norway and one in Sweden. What did the front lines in the debate look like in the three countries? What was the outcome of the different disputes? The main focus in the article is on the Swedish case, but some comparative perspectives relating to the three disputes will also be presented. The Swedish positivist dispute originated with Gerard Radnitzky’s doctoral dissertation in theory of science, defended at the University of Gothenburg in May 1968, Contemporary Schools of Metascience (2 volumes). The dissertation caused a stir of controversy. It meant a challenge to the Swedish philsophical establishment because it leaned heavily on continental philosophers such as Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, who at the time were more or less unknown in Sweden. The controversy was continuated in the following years, most notably in the leftist journal Häften för kritiska studier (Notebooks for Critical Studies).","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46238982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Collections in Early Bolzano 博尔扎诺早期的收藏品
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-06-26 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v6i7.3214
Stefania Centrone, M. Siebel
{"title":"Collections in Early Bolzano","authors":"Stefania Centrone, M. Siebel","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v6i7.3214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v6i7.3214","url":null,"abstract":"There are quite a few studies on late Bolzano’s notion of a collection (Inbegriff). We try to broaden the perspective by introducing the forerunner of collections in Bolzano’s early writings, namely the entities referred to by expressions with the technical term ‘et’. Special emphasis is laid on the question whether these entities are set-theoretical or mereological plenties. Moreover, similarities and differences to Bolzano’s mature conception are pointed out.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45243810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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