Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy最新文献_第4页

Logic and Voice 逻辑和声音

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4918

Espen Hammer

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引用次数: 0

Stanley Cavell on What We Say 斯坦利·卡维尔《我们说什么

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4915

Arata Hamawaki

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引用次数: 0

Cavell and the "History of the Rejection of the Human" 卡维尔与“人类的拒斥史”

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4913

Edward Guetti

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引用次数: 1

Cavell’s Method 卡维尔方法

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4916

Sandra Laugier

引用次数: 0

Introduction to the Special Issue 特刊简介

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4912

Edward Guetti

引用次数: 0

Notions of Existence in Frege 弗雷格的存在概念

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I8.4782

Dolf Rami

引用次数: 0

An Argument for Completely General Facts 一个关于完全一般事实的论证

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-08-25 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I7.4439

Landon D. C. Elkind

引用次数: 0

Review of Gottfried Gabriel & Sven Schlotter, Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie 戈特弗里德·加布里埃尔、斯文·施洛特、弗雷格与分析哲学的大陆起源述评

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-08-25 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I7.4861

Günther Eder

引用次数: 0

Review of José Zalabardo, Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus 评若泽·扎拉巴多、维特根斯坦《拖拉机》中的表现与现实

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i6.4818

Joshua Eisenthal

引用次数: 0

Epistemic Realism in Bradley and Early Moore 布拉德利与早期摩尔的认识论现实主义

Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I6.4294

Francesco Pesci

引用次数: 0