{"title":"Is the Federal Debt Raising Corporate Profits and Reducing Labor's Share of National Income?","authors":"J. E. Golob","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2151455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2151455","url":null,"abstract":"The federal debt-to-GDP ratio has accelerated in recent years to levels unseen in the U.S. since the post-World War II decline. At the same time, the profit share of national income is at post-war highs and the employee compensation share of national income is at 40-year lows. The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that these facts are related. The paper provides evidence that government debt has crowded out business investment, which has led to a rising profit share and declining employee compensation share of income. This result suggests that the federal debt is contributing to income inequality. On the other hand, to the extent that the rise in profit share can be traced to economic fundamentals, it is likely to be more persistent than the rise in the mid-2000s, which was boosted by illusory profits in the financial sector.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121489171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpreting the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: It's All Hebrew (and Aramaic) to Me","authors":"Mark L. J. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2432671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2432671","url":null,"abstract":"In this comment, we take a helicopter tour of the history of notions of ?equality? and ?justice? in sovereign debt restructuring in particular, and in the division of property more generally, and show that these concerns have existed for centuries, if not millennia. We argue that the issue at stake in the interpretation of the pari passu clause is not so much the treatment of holders of identical claims?it is now customary to treat them identically?but whether the holders of different claims should be treated differently. We show that exists a customary ?principle of differentiation? that allows creditors with claims that differ in specific ways to be treated preferentially. One of these specific differences concerns debts that have been reduced in value during a previous debt restructuring or default, and based on this principle we conclude that the New York court has, if not completely misinterpreted the meaning of the pari passu clause, then at least misapplied it.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129491495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"External Balances, Trade Flows and Financial Conditions","authors":"Martin D. D. Evans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2647620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2647620","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how changing expectations concerning future trade and financial conditions are reflected in international external positions. In the absence of Ponzi schemes and arbitrage opportunities, the net foreign asset position of any country must, as a matter of theory, equal the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits, discounted at the cumulated world stochastic discount factor (SDF) that prices all freely traded financial assets. I study the forecasting implications of this theoretical link in 12 countries (Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The United Kingdom) between 1970 and 2011. I find that variations in the external positions of most countries reflect changing expectations about trade conditions far into the future. I also find the changing forecasts for the future path of the world SDF are reflected in the dynamics of the U.S. external position.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126724782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Honoring Sovereign Debt or Bailing Out Domestic Residents: A Theory of Internal Costs of Default","authors":"Eric Mengus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2417330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2417330","url":null,"abstract":"The internal cost of default, an important driver of sovereign debt repayment, increases with domestic portfolios' home bias. And so, when using capital controls or other instruments to steer these portfolios, a country faces a trade-off between commitment to repay and diversification. But why does a borrowing country not eschew the internal cost of default through domestic sector bailouts? And why does their sovereign not intermediate the diversification through swaps and other hedging devices? Answering these two questions is key to fathom the nature of internal costs of default. This paper investigates sovereign debt sustainability in a model where domestic and foreign investors optimally select their portfolios and the sovereign optimizes over its debt, default and bailout policies. It derives conditions under which internal bailouts do not preclude sovereign borrowing and establishes when, despite their disciplining benefits, capital controls are undesirable.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114493505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Structure of Sub-National Public Debt: Liquidity vs Credit Risks","authors":"Javier J. Pérez, Rocío Prieto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2397154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397154","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse the determinants of the structure of public debt in the case of Spain, from a sub-national perspective. The endogenous shift in the composition of debt (among shortvs long-term instruments, and loans vs securities) depends on observable measures of credit and liquidity risks. To discriminate among competing potential determinants, we set out empirical models that incorporate financial, economic and institutional variables. We estimate the models by GMM and make use of a new quarterly dataset of Spanish regional governments’ debt structure for the period 1995Q1-2012Q4. Our results show that the most robust determinants of regional public financial management decisions, as reflected by the structure of debt, are rollover risks and the expectation of central government support (as measured by the dynamics of transfers).","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114358038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Baird, Nicole Bollen, L. Buchheit, G. Gulati, A. Krueger, F. M. Baldursson, R. K. Rasmussen, D. Skeel, S. Storchak, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
{"title":"The Role of the IMF in Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings","authors":"D. Baird, Nicole Bollen, L. Buchheit, G. Gulati, A. Krueger, F. M. Baldursson, R. K. Rasmussen, D. Skeel, S. Storchak, Jeromin Zettelmeyer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2360274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2360274","url":null,"abstract":"A meeting of international finance and insolvency experts was held on November 2, 2013 at the Annenberg House in Santa Monica, California. The meeting was co-hosted by the USC Law School and the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands. The goal was to solicit the views of experts on the implications of the IMF’s April 26, 2013 paper captioned “Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”. The April 26 paper may signal a shift in IMF policies in the area of sovereign debt workouts. Although the Expert Group discussed a number of the ideas contained in the April 26 paper, attention focused on paragraph 32 of that paper. That paragraph states in relevant part: “There may be a case for exploring additional ways to limit the risk that Fund resources will simply be used to bail out private creditors. For example, a presumption could be established that some form of a creditor bail-in measure would be implemented as a condition for Fund lending in cases where, although no clear-cut determination has been made that the debt is unsustainable, the member has lost market access and prospects for regaining market access are uncertain.”This Report summarizes the consensus views of the Expert Group on the practical implications of the suggestions contained in paragraph 32 of the April 26 paper.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"40 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123606355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chapitre 4 -- La dette externe (Chapter 4 -- External Debt)","authors":"Philippe Darreau","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2360195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2360195","url":null,"abstract":"Ce chapitre etudie le probleme de la dette externe en utilisant les modeles OLG et RA en economie ouverte. La section 1 decrit le cadre comptable et la contrainte intertemporelle d'un pays. La section 2 s'interroge sur les avantages de l'ouverture du marche des capitaux. Dans le modele RA l'ouverture est toujours une amelioration au sens de Pareto. Dans le modele OLG l'ouverture est exceptionnellement une amelioration au sens de Pareto. En general le pays preteur perd a l'ouverture du marche des capitaux. En inefficience dynamique les \"global imbalances\" peuvent durer. La section 3 est consacree aux \"global imbalances\" et a la dette des USA.This chapter examines the problem of external debt using the OLG and RA models in an open economy. Section 1 describes the accounting framework and the intertemporal constraint of a country. Section 2 examines the benefits of open capital market. In the RA model, opening is always a Pareto improvement. In the OLG model, opening is exceptionally a Pareto improvement. In general, the lender country loses to the opening of the capital market. In dynamic inefficiency the global imbalances can last in steady state. Section 3 is devoted to global imbalances and the U.S. debt.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123850285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sovereign Debt Maturity Structure Under Asymmetric Information","authors":"D. Perez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2383640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2383640","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the optimal choice of sovereign debt maturity when investors are unaware of the government's willingness to repay. Under a pooling equilibrium there is a wedge between the borrower's true default risk and the default risk priced in debt, and its size differs with the maturity of debt. Safe borrowers tilt their debt maturity towards short-term – relative to the optimal choice under perfect information – since long-term debt pools more default risk that is not inherent to them. Risky borrowers mimic their behavior of safe borrowers to preclude the market from identifying their type. In times of financial distress, spreads increase and the default risk wedge of long-term debt relative to short-term debt increases, which makes borrowers shorten their debt maturity. Data on bond issuances for a panel of countries show that, consistent with the model, maturities co-vary negatively with spreads and that this co-movement is stronger in those situations in which informational asymmetries are larger.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115860432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Test for Debt Sustainability? Some Theoretical Reflections on an Empirical Test","authors":"Alfred Greiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2324678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324678","url":null,"abstract":"Testing the reaction of the primary surplus to variations in public debt, relative to GDP respectively, has been frequently resorted to in order to test for sustainability of a given debt policy. In this contribution, we analyze theoretically under which condition a positive reaction of the primary surplus to variations in debt implies a sustainable debt policy. We demonstrate that the evolution of the debt to GDP ratio plays a decisive role as concerns the validity of the test outcome. In addition, we demonstrate that a positive reaction coefficient does not guarantee sustainability unless it exceeds at least the difference between the interest rate on public debt and the GDP growth grate. Thus, this test allows judgements about sustainability of public debt policies only if the interest rate and the GDP growth rate are known.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123996883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assessing the Impact and Phasing of Multi-Year Fiscal Adjustment: A General Framework","authors":"Ran Bi, Haonan Qu, J. Roaf","doi":"10.5089/9781484318669.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484318669.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a general framework to assess the output and debt dynamics of an economy undertaking multi-year fiscal adjustment. The framework allows country-specific assumptions about the magnitude and persistence of fiscal multipliers, hysteresis effects, and endogenous financing costs. In addition to informing macro projections, the framework can also shed light on the appropriate phasing of fiscal consolidation - in particular, on whether it should be front- or back-loaded. The framework is applied to stylized advanced and emerging economy examples. It suggests that for a highly-indebted economy undertaking large multi-year fiscal consolidation, high multipliers do not always argue against frontloaded adjustment. The case for more gradual or back-loaded adjustment is strongest when hysteresis effects are in play, but it needs to be balanced against implications for debt sustainability. Application to actual country examples tends to cast doubt on claims that very large multipliers have been operating post-crisis. It seems that the GDP forecast errors for Greece may have been due more to over-optimism on potential growth estimates than to underestimating fiscal multipliers.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124365123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}