International Journal of Nuclear Security最新文献_第6页

EUSECTRA: European Nuclear Security Training Centre providing hands-on training and education in Nuclear Security and Safeguards EUSECTRA:欧洲核安全培训中心，提供核安全和保障方面的实践培训和教育

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060207

W. Janssens, V. Berthou, Abbas Kamel, J. Galy, K. Luetzenkirchen, K. Mayer, S. Nonneman

{"title":"EUSECTRA: European Nuclear Security Training Centre providing hands-on training and education in Nuclear Security and Safeguards","authors":"W. Janssens, V. Berthou, Abbas Kamel, J. Galy, K. Luetzenkirchen, K. Mayer, S. Nonneman","doi":"10.7290/ijns060207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060207","url":null,"abstract":"The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) was inaugurated under this global name about 10 years ago and is operated by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), located both on the Karlsruhe (Germany) and Ispra (Italy) sites. It includes a large variety of capacity building and professional development activities, which span from the hands-on training for nuclear security and safeguards actors (e.g. respectively, border guards or customs and nuclear inspectors) to educational efforts in both nuclear security and safeguards. Whereas the first ones, which gave rise to the new name, focus mainly on detection, on-site assistance, crime-scene management, technical reach-back, and nuclear forensics capabilities, the second includes all aspects of nuclear safeguards analytical measurements, containment and surveillance, verification technologies and methodologies, etc. This paper provides an overview of the most salient developments in these areas of both technical and academic teaching engagement in the last decade and includes some hints to the potential for enhanced collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Educational Network (INSEN).","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47571330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Parking Garage Measurements Indicating a Gamma Spectrometer-Neutron Counter Background Correlation 表明伽马能谱-中子计数器背景相关的停车场测量

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060106

J. N. Wagner, C. Marianno, T. McCullough

{"title":"Parking Garage Measurements Indicating a Gamma Spectrometer-Neutron Counter Background Correlation","authors":"J. N. Wagner, C. Marianno, T. McCullough","doi":"10.7290/ijns060106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060106","url":null,"abstract":"Gamma spectroscopy and gross neutron counting systems are commonly employed together during nuclear security operations, particularly mobile searches. The data from these systems are typically analyzed independently; however, operational data suggest a relationship between the background signals from both systems. This relationship appears to occur between the neutron count rate and the high energy (greater than 3 MeV) gamma spectrometer count rate for background conditions. To verify the presence of this correlation, high energy gamma ray and neutron count rates were measured in five parking garages on the Texas A&M University campus. These measurements employed one 4” x 4” x 16” NaI detector with an Ortec digiBASE MCA, four moderated 1” x 18” He tubes (part of the Ortec NAI-SS system), and two unmoderated 2” x 15” He tubes (part of a Thermo PackEye system). The NaI detector was calibrated to a 50 MeV scale and ignored signals less than 4 MeV. Results show a decrease in the count rate of each detector as the systems were moved further below the roof of each garage. These decreases appear linear, but exponential relationships are plausible. More importantly, the data also show that the count rates from the two different detector types are linearly related. The linear relationships are strong, and the slopes vary depending on which neutron counter is considered against the gamma spectrometer. While it is possible that these relationships are the result of the NaI system detecting 4-50 MeV (or even higher energy) gamma rays, it is more likely that this system is detecting charged particles: muons generated by cosmic ray interactions with the atmosphere or protons produced by the decay of free neutrons. All three of these particles would be produced proportionally to the neutrons that the He tubes would detect, either from the decay of the neutrons themselves or by being produced from the same cosmic ray interactions that produce the neutrons.","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41780965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Sunken Efforts? Legal Hurdles to Stemming Maritime CBRNE Proliferation 沉没的努力？遏制海上CBRNE扩散的法律障碍

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060102

Arjun Banerjee

{"title":"Sunken Efforts? Legal Hurdles to Stemming Maritime CBRNE Proliferation","authors":"Arjun Banerjee","doi":"10.7290/ijns060102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060102","url":null,"abstract":"For four centuries, the law of the sea has rested on the principle of mare liberum or the freedom of the high seas. The oceans have traditionally been regarded as areas over which no state could claim dominion or sovereignty. Nations desirous of countering security threats have found that their efforts are curtailed by the traditional paradigm. The foreign vessel still tends to remain sacrosanct primarily because of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Several extant laws, however, aim to contain the spread of CBRNE material through a variety of measures. Typically, merchant vessels in the open seas may only be stopped and searched without flag state consent in rare circumstances. In light of the scourge of a terrorist CBRNE attack hanging like a Damocles’ sword upon the world today, this article seeks to discern whether a state possesses the right to interdict and search vessels of another state suspected of ferrying CBRNE material in international waters. Countering the kind of faceless non-state actor threats of the 21st Century would require curtailing some of those freedoms earlier enjoyed in the open seas, while at the same time infringing upon the rights of another sovereign state without permission is questionable. Where does one strike a balance? This paper argues that a better integration of maritime laws, such as the relevant sections of the UNSCR 1540, the PSI and the SUA 2005 with the UNCLOS, is of the essence.","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45040350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat Information with Radioactive Materials Operators 与放射性材料运营商共享威胁信息的挑战和机遇

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060108

Raphael Duguay

引用次数: 1

The Future of Nuclear Security in the Asia-Pacific: Expanding the Role of Southeast Asia 亚太地区核安全的未来:扩大东南亚的作用

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060208

J. Trajano, Mely Caballero-Anthony

{"title":"The Future of Nuclear Security in the Asia-Pacific: Expanding the Role of Southeast Asia","authors":"J. Trajano, Mely Caballero-Anthony","doi":"10.7290/ijns060208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060208","url":null,"abstract":"The nature of regional cooperation on capacity building taking place in Southeast Asia certainly provides a good foundation to pursue a more robust collaborative framework for nuclear security in the wider AsiaPacific region. A step in this regard is to have a regional action plan/roadmap for nuclear security in the Asia-Pacific that could institutionalize cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other countries in the wider region, fostering closer collaboration. This paper recommends three practical mechanisms to expand cooperation frameworks in Southeast Asia to the broader AsiaPacific region: (1) strengthening regional capacity building in nuclear security; (2) establishing an ASEAN-Northeast Asia network of nuclear security centers of excellence (COEs) and knowledge centers; and (3) enhancing regional nuclear emergency preparedness and response. The article also explores the future of collaboration among International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) members in the Asia-Pacific region, with Southeast Asian members as key drivers, to further strengthen regional nuclear security governance through sustainable nuclear security education.","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43979286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Regulatory Perspective on Nuclear Cyber Security: The Fundamental Issues 监管视角下的核网络安全：根本问题

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060103

U. Arinze, O. Longe, Agozie Eneh

{"title":"Regulatory Perspective on Nuclear Cyber Security: The Fundamental Issues","authors":"U. Arinze, O. Longe, Agozie Eneh","doi":"10.7290/ijns060103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060103","url":null,"abstract":"We are living in a digital and information-driven age and need to store information related to virtually every aspect of our lives, nuclear information included. For computer system to be reliable and secure in nuclear facilities, unauthorized event changes must be prevented (which means maintaining confidentiality), field device inputs and outputs must remain immutable throughout their usable lifetime (which means maintaining integrity), and all component parts should remain in an operable state (which means maintaining availability).The dynamic and complex nature of cyber threats has made it a serious challenge to secure computer systems in nuclear facilities. A number of varied cyber security services, policies, mechanisms, strategies and regulatory frameworks have been adopted , including: confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, encipherment, defense-in-depth (DID), design basis threat (DBT), IAEA technical guidance documents such as: GS-R-1, GS-R-2, GS-R-3, GS-G-3.13.5, NSS20, NSS23-G, NSS13, NSS17, NST036, NST045, and NST047, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-2010, NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-82, NEI 04-04, NEI 08-09 and country-specific requirements such as: 10 CFR 73.54, RG 5.71 (U.S.NRC), KINS/RG-N08.22 (South Korea). However, threats remain persistent. This paper is aimed at providing a regulatory perspective on nuclear cyber security, its relationship to nuclear safety and security, regulatory requirements and global best practice recommendations for nuclear cyber security, and strategies to prevent and counteract threats. This study is imperative as Nigeria prepares to join the league of countries with operational nuclear power plants and research reactors 1 Arinze et al.: Regulatory Perspective on Nuclear Cyber Security: The Fundamental Issues","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48577066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Coordination of Inter-Agency Action for Nuclear Security in Uganda 协调乌干达核安全机构间行动

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060105

Richard Sseggane

引用次数: 0

Consideration of Administrative Monetary Penalties in Nuclear Safety and Security 核安全与核安保中的行政处罚思考

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060107

J. Vucicevic, E. Waller

{"title":"Consideration of Administrative Monetary Penalties in Nuclear Safety and Security","authors":"J. Vucicevic, E. Waller","doi":"10.7290/ijns060107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060107","url":null,"abstract":"An Administrative Monetary Penalty (AMP) is a penalty imposed by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), without court involvement for a violation of a regulatory requirement. An AMP can be applied against any individual or corporation subject to the Nuclear Safety Control Act, which regulates the development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production, possession and use of nuclear and radioactive material. However, AMPs are not the same as criminal offences. They are civil sanctions which try to secure compliance through the application of monetary penalties for noncompliance with regulatory requirements. The AMP program was introduced in 2013 in Canada and to this date over 30 penalties have been issued. In all of these cases, the violations were related to handling and security of radioactive material. Based on these issued penalties investigations were conducted to discover pros and cons of the AMP system and to propose potential improvements for future implementation. This paper also addresses some of the complicated issues of the system, such as the economic aspect of the process, and the subjectivity and relative ease of issuing these penalties. In order to improve nuclear security and safety in Canada, the regulator must be aware of possible violations of the Nuclear Safety Control Act and work on prevention of these violations. It is postulated that current AMP policy may not motivate individuals or corporations to report violations. The paper gives recommendations on modifications which could be implemented to motivate self-identification of violation and give significant benefit to the AMP system. Other than the issued AMPs, the paper will analyze data obtained through the survey conducted on human readiness to selfidentify violations in the nuclear industry under different circumstances. This confirms that the modified AMP policy would improve the body of knowledge and provide significant information on violations of the Nuclear Safety Control Act and improve nuclear security.","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41334768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Human Dimension of Nuclear Security: Legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit 核安全的人的层面:核安全峰会的遗产

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns060205

F. Padoani

{"title":"The Human Dimension of Nuclear Security: Legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit","authors":"F. Padoani","doi":"10.7290/ijns060205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns060205","url":null,"abstract":"The “human dimension” of nuclear security is a fundamental component of a robust and sustainable nuclear security regime and is based on adequate human resources, international cooperation, networks, and on a strong nuclear security culture. The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, through the Communiqués, Work Plan, and Action Plans, together with a series of commitments in the form of “house gifts” and “gift baskets,” has played a key role in ensuring the development of the human dimension. The achievements of the Nuclear Security Summits have the potential to be the cornerstone for the consolidation and the sustainability of the many capacity-building initiatives generated by the NSS process. I. The Human Dimension and Nuclear Security Summit Process A deeply rooted nuclear security culture and adequate human resources at all levels – involving regulators, law enforcement agencies, academia, and industry – are universally recognized as the prerequisites of a robust and sustainable nuclear security regime, both national and global. International cooperation and networks are fundamental elements in ensuring the development and sustainability of what may be called the “human dimension” of nuclear security, and the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has played a fundamental role in their consolidation. Since the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. in 2010, the human dimension has attracted increasing attention as shown in the official documents of the NSS process (Communiqués, Work Plans, and five Action Plans) and in the further commitments made at the four Summits by States or groups of States (known as “house gifts” and “gift baskets”).","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71081256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An Overview of Approaches to Nuclear Security in Ghana 加纳核安全方法概述

International Journal of Nuclear Security Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.7290/ijns07p55h

R. Agalga, P. Amoah, D. Adjei, Daniel Frederick Charles, E. Darko

{"title":"An Overview of Approaches to Nuclear Security in Ghana","authors":"R. Agalga, P. Amoah, D. Adjei, Daniel Frederick Charles, E. Darko","doi":"10.7290/ijns07p55h","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns07p55h","url":null,"abstract":"Ghana has significantly improved its nuclear security infrastructure over the years. However, as threats increase by the day and new applications of nuclear and radiological technology are designed and implemented, Ghana must develop a rigid and comprehensive approach to mitigating the negative impacts on its nuclear security while improving prevention, detection, and deterrence of nuclear and radiological terrorism within its geographical space. This paper overviews the approaches adopted by Ghana to build a strong nuclear security regime within the past decade. These include improving legal frameworks for nuclear security by establishing an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority; assessing nuclear security culture in facilities; strengthening nuclear security capabilities at facilities that hold radioactive materials by improving physical protection systems for deterrence and detection; and building strong and effective collaboration and cooperation with various stakeholders, both locally and internationally, to distribute responsibility and provide technical and logistic support to build a stronger nuclear security regime. Ghana also identified developments in human capacity in areas of nuclear security as a relevant approach to improving its nuclear security and has thus collaborated with the IAEA and the University of Ghana to establish a graduate school for training Ghanaians and Africans in nuclear-related disciplines.","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71082539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0