Regulatory Perspective on Nuclear Cyber Security: The Fundamental Issues

We are living in a digital and information-driven age and need to store information related to virtually every aspect of our lives, nuclear information included. For computer system to be reliable and secure in nuclear facilities, unauthorized event changes must be prevented (which means maintaining confidentiality), field device inputs and outputs must remain immutable throughout their usable lifetime (which means maintaining integrity), and all component parts should remain in an operable state (which means maintaining availability).The dynamic and complex nature of cyber threats has made it a serious challenge to secure computer systems in nuclear facilities. A number of varied cyber security services, policies, mechanisms, strategies and regulatory frameworks have been adopted , including: confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, encipherment, defense-in-depth (DID), design basis threat (DBT), IAEA technical guidance documents such as: GS-R-1, GS-R-2, GS-R-3, GS-G-3.13.5, NSS20, NSS23-G, NSS13, NSS17, NST036, NST045, and NST047, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-2010, NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-82, NEI 04-04, NEI 08-09 and country-specific requirements such as: 10 CFR 73.54, RG 5.71 (U.S.NRC), KINS/RG-N08.22 (South Korea). However, threats remain persistent. This paper is aimed at providing a regulatory perspective on nuclear cyber security, its relationship to nuclear safety and security, regulatory requirements and global best practice recommendations for nuclear cyber security, and strategies to prevent and counteract threats. This study is imperative as Nigeria prepares to join the league of countries with operational nuclear power plants and research reactors 1 Arinze et al.: Regulatory Perspective on Nuclear Cyber Security: The Fundamental Issues