{"title":"The Place of Naïve Realism in Russell’s Changing Accounts of Perception","authors":"Leopold Stubenberg","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.2","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy (1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a sense-datum version of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the “everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from 1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. (5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"13 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140375623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is Real in Virtual Reality?","authors":"P. Grabarczyk","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.5","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the thesis of virtual realism presented by David Chalmers in his paper “The Virtual and the Real” (2017). Here, I suggest an even stronger version of the claim that I call “virtual physicalism”. According to this view, virtual objects are not only real but physical as they are identical to the physical states of computers that run VR software. I suggest that virtual objects should have a similar ontological status to toys—they should be treated as models or simplifications of ordinary objects. Just like toys, virtual objects can sometimes be good enough to be used instead of their ordinary counterparts. In these cases, virtual objects start to be treated as instantiations of the same kind. In the last part of the paper, I use Johan Huizinga’s notion of a “magic circle” to suggest how different objects could be successfully “virtualized”, that is, moved into a digital realm while remaining objects of the same kind as their non-virtual counterparts. I suggest this will happen once virtual reality becomes permanent and causally connected with non-virtual reality. I finish the paper by looking at examples of natural kind objects and individuals, which seem to be the hardest cases for successful virtualization.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140377602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Czy mówienie o „demokracji” ma sens? O inżynierii pojęciowej w praktyce","authors":"Artur Kosecki","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"58 27","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Radical Conventionalism and Hinge Epistemology","authors":"Adam Grobler","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.4","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper I explore some hints one can find in an updated version of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism that may help to resolve some controversies within hinge epistemology, i.e. a family of positions that invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of groundless grounds of knowledge. In particular I put into doubt whether there is a real difference between pragmatic and transcendental justification of hinges, I reject epistemological disjunctivism, and I argue for anti-realistic reading of truth in a context determined by particular hinges while retaining the classical notion of truth as a regulative idea of knowledge that governs the possible revisions of hinges.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"53 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Realność wolnej woli","authors":"Saul Smilansky","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.6","url":null,"abstract":"Is free will real? Is there really free will? That of course depends on what “free will” is. And, on what “real” is. I begin from the free will problem as it appears in the contemporary free will debate, and set out to explore how my view on it affects various senses of reality. The picture that emerges is complex, pluralistic, multi-faceted, and paradoxical. In some sense free will is real, in another sense it is not, and both greatly matter. The sense that is unreal creates a reality of shallowness and tragedy. Finally, both ethically and pragmatically, we require illusion in order to create reality, in creating our moral and personal selves.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"22 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Putnam’s Natural Realism and Its Problems","authors":"Tadeusz Szubka","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.3","url":null,"abstract":"Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"7 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on the Real Object of Philia and Aretē","authors":"Maciej Smolak","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.7","url":null,"abstract":"In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē—the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē—qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"9 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jacka Wojtysiaka krytyka probabilistycznego argumentu ze zła za nieistnieniem boga","authors":"Dariusz Łukasiewicz","doi":"10.18290/rf23714.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf23714.10","url":null,"abstract":"W artykule rozważam sformułowaną przez Jacka Wojtysiaka krytykę probabilistycznego argumentu z istnienia wielkiego faktu zła za nieistnieniem Boga. Sugeruję, że proponowana przez J. Wojtysiaka krytyka tego argumentu powinna zostać zmodyfikowana w taki sposób, aby nie prowadziła ona do wniosku, że Bóg jest przyczyną zła. Proponuję korektę dotycząca koncepcji Bożej przyczynowości. Wskazuję również na inny sposób osłabienia argumentu probabilistycznego ze zła niż ten wybrany przez J. Wojtysiaka. Proponuję podważyć przesłankę głoszącą, że zło istnieje, przy założeniu naturalizmu. Sygnalizuję krótko trudności naturalistycznego realizmu moralnego i wskazuję na ewolucyjne argumenty podważające moralny realizm. W kontekście tych trudności rozważam stanowisko Paula Drapera, pioniera probabilistycznego (Baysowskiego) argumentu ze zła za ateizmem, i staram się pokazać niektóre słabości jego poglądów. Następnie formułuję teistyczny argument dedukcyjny z istnienia zła i sugeruję, że ze względu na prostotę należy preferować argumentację dedukcyjną, a nie probabilistyczną na rzecz teizmu.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"349 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139149151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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