{"title":"5. The Emergence of Multilateral AEI","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501748035-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501748035-009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":356523,"journal":{"name":"The Hypocritical Hegemon","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130191805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The BEPS Project","authors":"Lukas Hakelberg","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reveals the US government's struggles in assuming its usual leadership position in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) initiatives. This happened for entirely domestic reasons: the Obama administration's inability to implement its preferred solution to BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting)—a tightening of controlled foreign company (CFC) rules—in the face of opposition by US multinationals, paired with the administration's strong political commitment to tax fairness, which prevented the administration from abandoning the initiative altogether. The administration's lack of purpose initially opened agenda space for other governments. Between the release of a first set of discussion drafts and the final BEPS reports, however, the United States fought a successful rearguard battle, retrenching attempts at expanding the taxing rights of source countries and essentially preserving the status quo. This success occurred despite the inclusion of the Group of 20 (G20) emerging economies, which could be expected to shift the power balance away from the United States, and in accordance with the preferences of US multinationals. The diffusion of unilateral initiatives by source countries, which are still subject to political conflict, confirms their frustration with the outcome of the BEPS project.","PeriodicalId":356523,"journal":{"name":"The Hypocritical Hegemon","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125326562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"6. The BEPS Project: Long Live Arm’s Length","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501748035-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501748035-010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":356523,"journal":{"name":"The Hypocritical Hegemon","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124977393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Power in International Tax Politics","authors":"Lukas Hakelberg","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops a theory of power in international tax politics. This theory identifies market size and regulatory capacity as the decisive resources enabling governments to issue credible threats and inducements with a view toward making other governments do what they would not otherwise do. A lack of regulatory capacity explains why the European Union has not wielded the same power in negotiations over global tax policy as the United States despite the EU's similarly sized internal market. In fact, taxation remains an exclusive member state competence. Therefore, the European Commission has no administrative authority to impose penalties on third states or foreign firms not complying with tax good governance standards applicable within the union. At the same time, the principle of nondiscrimination enshrined in EU law prevents individual EU countries from passing sanctions against other member states abetting tax evasion and avoidance. Because of the lack of regulatory centralization in the EU, the US can act as a hegemon in international tax politics. Accordingly, US preferences determined by domestic politics decisively shape the content of global tax policy. The preferences of other governments merely affect the US administration's enforcement strategy.","PeriodicalId":356523,"journal":{"name":"The Hypocritical Hegemon","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128694211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Hegemony to Transatlantic Tax Battle?","authors":"Lukas Hakelberg","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the most recent developments in transatlantic bargaining over countermeasures to financial secrecy and corporate profit-shifting, and sketches several future scenarios based on the theory developed in Chapter 2. It shows that dissatisfaction with nonreciprocal automatic exchange of information (AEI) and the BEPS project's failure to limit tax avoidance in the common market has motivated the European Commission and several member states to push for a common reaction. The European Union has since produced an integrated blacklist of third countries not complying with its tax good governance standards and ordered several member states to claw back taxes lost to sweetheart deals granting selective advantages to individual firms. Moreover, finance ministers debate the introduction of a digital services tax and a common consolidated corporate tax base to curb profit-shifting in the common market. Finally, the chapter presents some overall conclusions drawn from the research presented in this volume.","PeriodicalId":356523,"journal":{"name":"The Hypocritical Hegemon","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114208788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Swift Return of Tax Competition","authors":"Lukas Hakelberg","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501748011.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter demonstrates that the Bush administration was critical of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) harmful tax competition initiative from the outset of the administration's first term and therefore had an open ear for the anti-OECD narrative proposed by libertarian advocacy groups. Despite recurrent exchanges between senior Bush appointees and these lobbyists, however, the US Treasury did not fully embrace their requests. Much to their chagrin, it merely removed the anti-tax avoidance elements from the project, while still providing nominal support to its anti-tax evasion measures. The Bush administration's policy was thus more in line with the position of US multinationals represented by the United States Council for International Business (USCIB) than with the fundamental libertarian critique of tax cooperation in general. The administration's ability to transform this position into actual OECD policy despite being isolated within the Group of Seven (G7) is testimony to US power in international bargaining over tax matters.","PeriodicalId":356523,"journal":{"name":"The Hypocritical Hegemon","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126435120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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