CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Corporate and NGOs' Voluntary Disclosure on Collaboration. Evidence from Poland","authors":"Halina Waniak‑Michalak, J. Michalak","doi":"10.5755/J01.EE.27.1.9338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5755/J01.EE.27.1.9338","url":null,"abstract":"Collaboration between NGOs and corporations is an expanding research area that brings up new questions.  The paper seeks to establish the scope of information on philanthropic cooperation revealed by corporations and charitable organizations in a transition country (Poland) and its determinants. The necessary data were obtained from the websites of corporations and foundations and from the reports on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The content analysis focused on the disclosures made by 41 corporations and 82 foundations. A total of 131 collaboration cases available on the websites and 95 cases disclosed in relation to CSR were examined. The research allowed the key factors determining the amount of information on philanthropic partnerships displayed by corporations and charities on their websites and in CSR reports to be identified. In the case of corporations, the NGO being a corporate foundation and belonging to the group of biggest donors were the most important factors. As far as NGOs are concerned, the major factors were the NGO being, or not, a corporate foundation and the amount of donations as a percentage of its total revenue. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.ee.27.1.9338","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"333 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122847998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impact of Firm Size on Earnings Management: A Study of Textile Sector of Pakistan","authors":"Usman Ali, Muhammad Noor, Muhammad Kashif Khurshid, Akhtar Mahmood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698317","url":null,"abstract":"The study was conducted to evaluate the impact of firm size on earnings management for the textile sector of Pakistan. For this purpose annual ten years data was obtained from 2004 to 2013 for fifty selected firms from the textile sector of Pakistan. Natural logarithm of total assets was used as the proxy of firm size. On the other hand earning management was the dependent variable of this study. Earnings management was measured through discretionary accruals by using modified Jones model. Descriptive statistics, correlation and panel data analysis was used for capturing the impact of firm size on earnings management. The statistical results of this study revealed that there is positive and significant impact of firm size on earnings management.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115578908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting in Staggered and Non-Staggered Boards: The Case of Audit Committee Elections","authors":"Ronen Gal-Or, Rani Hoitash, Udi Hoitash","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2511480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2511480","url":null,"abstract":"SUMMARY: We examine whether shareholder votes can influence the audit committee and whether this influence is uniform across non-staggered and staggered boards. We find that through voting, shareho...","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130064509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Fundamental Agency Problem: Ownership, Monitoring, and Voluntary Disclosure","authors":"Håkan Jankensgård","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2664259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2664259","url":null,"abstract":"Combining databases with unique strengths I show that stray firms, i.e. those lacking a controlling owner, have lower disclosure in financial reports. This finding illustrates managers’ preference to withhold information (“the fundamental agency problem”). I contribute to the literature by showing that, while monitoring by blockholders initially increases disclosure, disclosure decreases at high levels of block ownership. At high levels blockholders appear to lose interest in public disclosure as their access to information is virtually guaranteed. Moreover, I report findings on the impact of institutional, foreign, under-diversified, and controlling minority-owners, concluding that ownership structure has major implications for voluntary disclosure.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133309053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asymmetric Reporting","authors":"C. Armstrong, Daniel J. Taylor, Robert E. Verrecchia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2575906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2575906","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the CAPM to a setting where a firm reports earnings prior to selling shares to investors. We show that an entrepreneur, as representative of a firm's initial owners, will choose to report earnings that asymmetrically reflect future cash flow. In modeling the entrepreneur's reporting choice, we deliberately abstract away from the stewardship role of accounting. In our model, the sole purpose of reported earnings is to facilitate valuation by the firm's equity investors. Nevertheless, we show that a firm's earnings will reflect future cash flow to a greater (lesser) extent in bad states (good states) –– when that cash flow is anticipated to be low (high). Importantly, we also show that the asymmetry in reporting generates asymmetry in the firm's systematic risk. When a firm's earnings reflect future cash flow to a greater extent in bad states, the firm's covariance with the market portfolio will be lower in bad states.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123392110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement of Significant Audiences and Materiality","authors":"R. Eccles, Tim Youmans","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2654199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2654199","url":null,"abstract":"Materiality is an elusive, but fundamentally important concept in corporate reporting of all kinds—not only in traditional financial reporting, but in sustainability and integrated reporting as well. In the end, materiality is entity‐specific and based on judgment. Moreover, it is a judgment that should ultimately be made by a company's board of directors, which makes materiality as much a governance as a reporting issue.Whether a given ESG issue is material is in large part a function of the corporate stakeholders, or “audiences,” that the company's board of directors deems to be “significant”—that is, important to the company's ability to create value over the short, medium, and long term. The identification of such audiences—together with the time frames the board uses to evaluate the impact of the company's decisions on these audiences—provides the basis for determining the sustainability issues that corporate management must focus on for performance and reporting purposes.To help ensure that decisions about materiality receive the attention they deserve, the authors propose that corporate boards articulate their views in an annual “Statement of Significant Audiences and Materiality.” Contrary to the prevailing belief that the fiduciary duty of the board is to place shareholders’ interests first, nothing precludes corporate boards from issuing such a statement. Recent research, including the compilation of legal memos on fiduciary duty and nonfinancial reporting for all G20 countries, makes it clear that the board's fiduciary duty is to “the corporation itself.” In exercising this duty, directors have full discretion, under the business judgment rule and other authorities, to decide which audiences, along with the company's shareholders, should be deemed significant.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115392511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Strategic Timing of Management Forecasts","authors":"J. Doyle, Matthew Magilke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1479867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1479867","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we examine the strategic intraday and intraweek timing of management forecast announcements based on whether they contain good or bad news. In contrast to past research using highly visible earnings announcements, unscheduled voluntary management forecasts provide a setting in which there may be greater benefits to strategic announcement timing. We find strong evidence that bad news tends to be strategically released after the market closes and on Fridays. In addition, we find evidence that strategically timed bad news forecast announcements that are released after the market closes are associated with less negative market returns, less trading volume, and less market volatility. Thus, our results suggest that the strategic timing of bad news forecasts during times of lower investor attention is successful at mitigating negative market reactions.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125448786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Use of Z-Score in Detection of Revenue Manipulations","authors":"I. Pustylnick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2577473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2577473","url":null,"abstract":"The companies charged by U.S. SEC with earnings manipulations offences appear to have lower Z-Score than the rest of the companies. This study attempts to justify that Z-Score limits set by Altman for determination of bankruptcy state will also work in detection of earnings manipulations. The paper examines the validity of using Z-Score in establishing the sample of non-manipulating companies. It also offers the proof that the signs of earnings manipulations and earnings management coincide within the statements of the same company. The research provides the attempt to give a numeric criterion for establishing presence of earnings manipulation based on Z-Score.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"127 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131355262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effect of Analyst Forecasts During Earnings Announcements on Investor Responses to Reported Earnings","authors":"Gerald J. Lobo, Minsup Song, M. Stanford","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2443623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443623","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Despite the increased frequency of analyst forecasts during earnings announcements, empirical evidence on the interaction between the information in the earnings announcement and these forecasts is limited. We examine the implications of reinforcing and contradicting analyst forecast revisions issued during earnings announcements (days 0 and +1) on the market response to unexpected earnings. We classify forecast revisions as reinforcing (contradicting) when the sign of analyst forecast revisions agrees (disagrees) with the sign of unexpected earnings. We document larger (smaller) earnings response coefficients for announcements accompanied by reinforcing (contradicting) analyst forecast revisions. Analyses of management forecasts suggest that analyst revisions and management forecasts convey complementary information. Cross-sectional tests show that investors react more to earnings announcements accompanied by analyst forecast revisions when there is greater consensus among analysts (lower dispe...","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124001375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Firm Incentives, Institutional Factors and Accounting Quality: The IFRS Adoption in Brazil","authors":"Ana Gisbert, B. Salotti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2565533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565533","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the role of firm-specific factors that influence the company decision to improve the level of accounting quality after the IFRS adoption. Particularly, we focus on an emerging market economic with an institutional setting characterized by weak governance mechanisms and low-speed institutional changes. The chosen setting allows to contribute with further evidence to the current literature relative to the role of institutional vs. firm-specific factors on reporting incentives and therefore, on the financial reporting decisions. Changing the accounting system is not enough to improve the context of financial opacity across emerging markets, as any new accounting regulation must be simultaneously accompanied by significant institutional changes that strength the enforcement mechanisms in place (Fan et al., 2011, Ball et al., 2000). When these “formal” institutional changes do not take place, companies may be force to establish a firm-specific commitment towards the appropriate enforcement of the new accounting system, in order to obtain the attained benefits of a accounting regulatory change. Consistent with this idea, we look at the impact of a set of firm-specific variables that may affect the financial reporting decision and therefore, the degree of accounting quality. Particularly, we focus a set of variables related to (a) the ownership structure, (b) a set of governance mechanisms: auditor and listing status; (c) the degree of internationalization, and (d) other financial characteristics. The results provide evidence on the relevance of a set of firm-specific characteristics on the level of earnings quality increase. Particularly, internationalization and growth opportunities are clear determinants of increases in earnings quality. Consistent with the previous literature, the ownership concentration reveals as a limiting factor to increases in earnings quality after the IFRS adoption. Finally, the results also suggest the lack of strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms compared to other institutional settings may harm the expected role of the auditors or alternative governance mechanisms such as the capital markets listing categories.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133518810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}