The Effect of Analyst Forecasts During Earnings Announcements on Investor Responses to Reported Earnings

Gerald J. Lobo, Minsup Song, M. Stanford
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引用次数: 23

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Despite the increased frequency of analyst forecasts during earnings announcements, empirical evidence on the interaction between the information in the earnings announcement and these forecasts is limited. We examine the implications of reinforcing and contradicting analyst forecast revisions issued during earnings announcements (days 0 and +1) on the market response to unexpected earnings. We classify forecast revisions as reinforcing (contradicting) when the sign of analyst forecast revisions agrees (disagrees) with the sign of unexpected earnings. We document larger (smaller) earnings response coefficients for announcements accompanied by reinforcing (contradicting) analyst forecast revisions. Analyses of management forecasts suggest that analyst revisions and management forecasts convey complementary information. Cross-sectional tests show that investors react more to earnings announcements accompanied by analyst forecast revisions when there is greater consensus among analysts (lower dispe...
收益公告期间分析师预测对投资者对报告收益反应的影响
摘要:尽管分析师在财报发布期间预测的频率有所增加,但关于财报信息与预测之间相互作用的实证证据有限。我们研究了在收益公告(第0天和第1天)期间发布的强化和矛盾的分析师预测修正对市场对意外收益的反应的影响。当分析师预测修正的信号与意外收益的信号一致(不一致)时,我们将预测修正分类为强化(矛盾)。我们记录了伴随着强化(矛盾)分析师预测修正的公告的较大(较小)收益反应系数。对管理层预测的分析表明,分析师修正和管理层预测传达了互补的信息。横断面测试表明,当分析师之间的共识更大时,投资者对伴随着分析师预测修正的收益公告反应更强烈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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