发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Fox: Finance (Topic)最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Information Aggregation and P-hacking 信息聚合与p -黑客
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2858619
O. Rytchkov, Xun Zhong
{"title":"Information Aggregation and P-hacking","authors":"O. Rytchkov, Xun Zhong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2858619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858619","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the interplay between information aggregation and p-hacking in the context of predicting stock returns. The standard information-aggregation techniques exacerbate p-hacking by in...","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121096854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Aggregation of Information About the Cross Section of Stock Returns: A Latent Variable Approach 股票收益横截面信息的聚合:一种潜在变量方法
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2307563
Nathaniel Light, D. Maslov, O. Rytchkov
{"title":"Aggregation of Information About the Cross Section of Stock Returns: A Latent Variable Approach","authors":"Nathaniel Light, D. Maslov, O. Rytchkov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2307563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307563","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new approach for estimating expected returns on individual stocks from a large number of firm characteristics. We treat expected returns as latent variables and apply the partial least squares (PLS) estimator that filters them out from the characteristics under an assumption that the characteristics are linked to expected returns through one or few common latent factors. The estimates of expected returns constructed by our approach from 26 firm characteristics generate a wide cross-sectional dispersion of realized returns and outperform estimates obtained by alternative techniques. Our results also provide evidence of commonality in asset pricing anomalies.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121019053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 89
Co-opted Boards 参与董事会
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1699272
J. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, L. Naveen
{"title":"Co-opted Boards","authors":"J. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, L. Naveen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1699272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699272","url":null,"abstract":"We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board monitoring decreases: turnover-performance sensitivity diminishes, pay increases (without commensurate increase in pay-performance sensitivity), and investment increases. Non-Co-opted Independence—the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed before the CEO—has more explanatory power for monitoring effectiveness than the conventional measure of board independence. Our results suggest that not all independent directors are effective monitors.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"259 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115881288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 625
Does a Cash Squeeze Affect Competitive Outcomes of Firms and Their Rivals? 现金短缺是否影响企业及其竞争对手的竞争结果?
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1743074
Tilan Tang
{"title":"Does a Cash Squeeze Affect Competitive Outcomes of Firms and Their Rivals?","authors":"Tilan Tang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1743074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1743074","url":null,"abstract":"Using a tax-induced negative shock to expected cash flows in the tobacco industry as a natural experiment, I find significant positive returns to rivals who compete with non-tobacco segments in tobacco firms and a significant change in output behavior of those non-tobacco segments after the shock. This suggests that a firm's cash flow has an important effect on its competitive outcomes in the product market. The effects are robust to a number of estimation issues and identification choices. Since the shock is exogenous to the investment opportunities of non-tobacco industries, my evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a causal relation between a firm's cash flow and its product market behavior. Moreover, I find that the connection between cash flow and competitive performance is magnified in competitive industries and when cash-constrained firms only have a small market share.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132187046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Inside Directors, Managerial Competition, and the Asymmetric Information Problem 内部董事、管理竞争与信息不对称问题
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.674082
Anwar S. Boumosleh, D. Reeb
{"title":"Inside Directors, Managerial Competition, and the Asymmetric Information Problem","authors":"Anwar S. Boumosleh, D. Reeb","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.674082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.674082","url":null,"abstract":"We posit that placing insiders on the board facilitates information flows to outside directors, mitigates the CEO's role as information gatekeeper, and allows managers to be more independent of the CEO. We find that inside directors are more prevalent in environments of greater information asymmetry. Further tests indicate that the percentage of insiders is associated with lower CEO pay, lower CEO influence, and higher use of accounting-based performance measures. However, these counterbalancing effects are diminishing in the number of insiders on the board. We conclude that insiders improve information flow to the board, foster managerial competition, and enhance board power.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123500292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers? 股票并购能为收购方创造价值吗?
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-08-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.881513
Pavel Savor, Qingchun Lu
{"title":"Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers?","authors":"Pavel Savor, Qingchun Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.881513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881513","url":null,"abstract":"This paper finds support for the hypothesis that overvalued firms create value for long-term shareholders by using their equity as currency. Any approach centered on abnormal returns is complicated by the fact that the most overvalued firms have the greatest incentive to engage in stock acquisitions. We solve this endogeneity problem by creating a sample of mergers that fail for exogenous reasons. We find that unsuccessful stock bidders significantly underperform successful ones. Failure to consummate is costlier for richly priced firms, and the unrealized acquirer-target combination would have earned higher returns. None of these results hold for cash bids.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121463380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea 外部董事的价值:来自韩国公司治理改革的证据
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0022109000003458
Sae-Won Park, J. Choi, S. Yoo
{"title":"The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea","authors":"Sae-Won Park, J. Choi, S. Yoo","doi":"10.1017/S0022109000003458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000003458","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the valuation impacts of outside independent directors in Korea, where a regulation requiring outside directors was instituted after the Asian financial crisis. In contrast to studies of U.S. firms, the effects of independent directors on firm performance are strongly positive. Foreigners also have positive impacts. The effects of indigenous institutions such as chaebol or family control are insignificant or negative. This implies that the effect of outsiders depends on board composition as well as the nature of the market in which the firm operates.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121370918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 468
Investment Restrictions and the Cross-Border Flow of Information: Some Empirical Evidence 投资限制与信息跨境流动:一些经验证据
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2004-06-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.267242
W. Bailey, Connie X. Mao, Kulpatra Sirodom
{"title":"Investment Restrictions and the Cross-Border Flow of Information: Some Empirical Evidence","authors":"W. Bailey, Connie X. Mao, Kulpatra Sirodom","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.267242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267242","url":null,"abstract":"We examine market responses to earnings announcements in Singapore and Thailand, where shares restricted to local investors trade alongside otherwise identical shares available to foreigners. Our evidence is consistent with foreigners having superior information processing ability, rather than locals having pre-announcement private information. A small sample of Thai data that identifies trader nationality shows reduced foreign trading in the pre announcement period and increased buying afterwards, suggesting that foreigners rely on their information processing skills rather than pre announcement information.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117043565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 72
Corporate Use of Interest Rate Swaps: Theory and Evidence 企业使用利率掉期:理论与证据
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2003-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.327422
Connie X. Mao, Haitao Li
{"title":"Corporate Use of Interest Rate Swaps: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Connie X. Mao, Haitao Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.327422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.327422","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a simply theory on interest rate swaps based on the difference between bank loans and public debts. While restrictive covenants of bank loans help reduce agency costs, banks also have natural disadvantages in bearing interest rate risk due to their floating liabilities. A firm that wants a fixed-rate loan can borrow a floating-rate loan from a bank and enter an interest rate swap to hedge the interest rate risk. Consistent with our theory, we find empirically that fixed-rate swap payers generally have lower credit ratings, higher leverage ratios, higher percentages of long-term floating-rate loans, and are more likely to use bank loans than floating-rate swap payers.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129286815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Differences in Conservatism between Big Eight and Non-Big Eight Auditors 八大会计师事务所与非八大会计师事务所的保守性差异
Fox: Finance (Topic) Pub Date : 2001-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2428836
Sudipta Basu, Lee-Seok Hwang, C. Jan
{"title":"Differences in Conservatism between Big Eight and Non-Big Eight Auditors","authors":"Sudipta Basu, Lee-Seok Hwang, C. Jan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2428836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2428836","url":null,"abstract":"Auditors’ incentives to be conservative are likely to vary both cross-sectionally and over time based on their legal liability exposure. We predict that Big Eight (Six/Five) auditors are likely to be more conservative than non-Big Eight Auditors. We show that the earnings reported by Big Eight auditees are more conservative than the earnings of non-Big Eight auditees, utilizing several measures from Basu (1997). The difference in conservatism between Big Eight and non-Big Eight auditees is higher in periods of high auditor liability exposure, consistent with Big Eight auditors being relatively more conservative when exposed to greater legal liability.","PeriodicalId":352516,"journal":{"name":"Fox: Finance (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132961393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 146
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信