Co-opted Boards

J. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, L. Naveen
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引用次数: 625

Abstract

We develop two measures of board composition to investigate whether directors appointed by the CEO have allegiance to the CEO and decrease their monitoring. Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. As Co-option increases, board monitoring decreases: turnover-performance sensitivity diminishes, pay increases (without commensurate increase in pay-performance sensitivity), and investment increases. Non-Co-opted Independence—the fraction of directors who are independent and were appointed before the CEO—has more explanatory power for monitoring effectiveness than the conventional measure of board independence. Our results suggest that not all independent directors are effective monitors.
参与董事会
我们制定了两种董事会构成的衡量标准,以调查CEO任命的董事是否忠诚于CEO,并减少对其的监督。Co-option是指在CEO上任后任命的董事会成员。随着增购期权的增加,董事会监控减少:人员流动-绩效敏感性降低,薪酬增加(薪酬-绩效敏感性没有相应增加),投资增加。非增选独立性——在ceo之前被任命的独立董事的比例——在监督有效性方面比传统的董事会独立性指标更具解释力。我们的研究结果表明,并非所有的独立董事都是有效的监督者。
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