{"title":"O kultuře, kulturní antropologii, antropolozích a společenských vědách. Odpověď Nikolovi Balašovi","authors":"M. Paleček","doi":"10.46938/tv.2019.481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.481","url":null,"abstract":"Discussion paper dedicated to the paper Nikola Balaš, „Kdo je tu v pasti?“ Teorie vědy / Theory of Science 41, no. 1 (2019): 133–49.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127732640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Článek Fenomenologie pro Encyclopædia Britannica","authors":"Aleš Novák","doi":"10.46938/tv.2019.403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.403","url":null,"abstract":"This is a Czech translation of the Edmund Husserl's entry \"Phenomenology\" written for the 14th edition of Encyclopædia Britannica.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126284152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Antropologové v pasti?","authors":"Nikola Balaš","doi":"10.46938/tv.2019.405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.405","url":null,"abstract":"Discussion paper dedicated to the book Martin Paleček, Antropologové v pasti? Mezi přírodou a kulturou. Červený Kostelec: Pavel Mervart, 2017, 257 pages.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114528616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jakým relacionalistou byl Leibniz?","authors":"Kateřina Lochmanová","doi":"10.46938/tv.2019.407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.407","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I am trying to challenge the mainstream interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics of space, introduced in his letters to an English scholar Samuel Clarke. Based on the correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz’s metaphysics of space is usually considered to be a sharp counterpart to Clarke’s as well as Newton’s one. However, in this paper I am pointing out that this interpretation becomes untenable, especially considering Leibniz’s geometry called “analysis situs”. Leibniz did not defend a typically relational conception of space.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125564764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Naturalness of Properties and Simplicity of Theories","authors":"Matej Drobňák","doi":"10.46938/tv.2019.408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.408","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I discuss a specific approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theories that is based on Lewis’s notion of fundamental properties. In particular, I discuss the criterion of simplicity as stated by Williams. According to Williams, the best candidate for a theory is the one which has the shortest definition in terms of fundamental properties. The aim of this paper is to show that the criterion thus specified has two constraints. First, the criterion is not applicable to cases in which candidates for theories that specify fundamental properties are compared. Secondly, the applicability of the criterion in social sciences seems to be unwarranted.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128513598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Paradox of Moralistic Fallacy: A Case against the Dangerous Knowledge","authors":"Tomáš Ondráček","doi":"10.46938/tv.2018.414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2018.414","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the concept of moralistic fallacy introduced by B. D. Davis is elaborated on in more detail. The main features of this fallacy are discussed, and its general form is presented. The moralistic fallacy might have some undesirable outcomes. Some of them might even be in direct conflict to the original moral position. If this occurs, it is possible to characterize it as a paradox of moralistic fallacy. The possibility of this paradox provides a further reason not to prevent any scientific inquiries and not to depict any knowledge as dangerous.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128532938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Místo myšlenkových experimentů ve filosofii","authors":"Filip Tvrdý","doi":"10.46938/tv.2018.404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2018.404","url":null,"abstract":"Thought experiments are popular tools of argumentation in science and philosophy. The criticism of these experiments from naturalized and experimental philosophers has led to the formation of deflationary and minimalist approaches that weaken the epistemic power of thought experiments and reconcile them with empiricism. This paper aims to demonstrate that these attempts do not overcome the main problems encountered by thought experiments in philosophy. The limits of human rationality and imagination prevent experimenters from solving unrealistic scenarios in a reliable way. Thought experiments in philosophy are different from science because the real ones usually cannot be implemented and are not open to the possibility of empirical falsification. Moreover, they are based on defective analogies and they shift the burden of proof unfairly. The persuasive success of thought experiments is very low; therefore, they cannot contribute to the solution of philosophical problems. The paper concludes that the most common types of thought experiments should be removed from the set of philosophical methods.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121566687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science","authors":"Miroslav Vacura","doi":"10.46938/tv.2018.413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2018.413","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Therefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. After briefly defining the notion of value I highlight which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a firm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the differentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Then I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey’s value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125128432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Structuralism in Social Science: Obsolete or Promising?","authors":"Josef Mensík","doi":"10.46938/tv.2018.412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2018.412","url":null,"abstract":"The approach of structuralism came to philosophy from social science. It was also in social science where, in 1950–1970s, in the form of the French structuralism, the approach gained its widest recognition. Since then, however, the approach fell out of favour in social science. Recently, structuralism is gaining currency in the philosophy of mathematics. After ascertaining that the two structuralisms indeed share a common core, the question stands whether general structuralism could not find its way back into social science. The nature of the major objections raised against French structuralism – concerning its alleged ahistoricism, methodological holism and universalism – are reconsidered. While admittedly grounded as far as French structuralism is concerned, these objections do not affect general structuralism as such. The fate of French structuralism thus does not seem to preclude the return of general structuralism into social science, rather, it provides some hints where the difficulties may lie.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127423502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics: Several Tasks for Social Scientists","authors":"Michael Müller","doi":"10.46938/tv.2018.410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2018.410","url":null,"abstract":"Neuroscience is a fascinating discipline – its dynamic progress has led to the emergence of new interdisciplinary research programmes with great potential. One of these research areas is neuroeconomics. As will be shown in this article, this discipline, which is difficult to clearly characterize and define, is faced with many problems. This paper argues that social scientists should be interested in the problems and tendencies in social neuroscience for several reasons. Neuroeconomics, and other disciplines inspired by neuroscience, will compete with their parent disciplines in many fields of interest. On one hand it will be necessary for scientists to define and defend the irreplaceable roles of their disciplines, but also critically evaluate the potential of new approaches on the other. In the context of this discussion, which reopens questions about the scientific status of economics and its roles, this paper introduces the main problems related to neuroeconomics. This paper concludes that these problems represent a wide domain for social scientists and methodologists of science.","PeriodicalId":349992,"journal":{"name":"Teorie vědy / Theory of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129991425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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