PSN: Income Inequality (Topic)最新文献_第2页

Inequality, Relative Deprivation and Financial Distress - Evidence from Swedish Register Data 不平等、相对剥夺和财务困境——来自瑞典登记数据的证据

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3746651

P. Roth

引用次数: 1

Institutional Design and Spatial (In)equality – The Janus Face of Economic Integration 制度设计与空间平等——经济一体化的两面

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3675371

Ingrid Ott, S. Soretz

{"title":"Institutional Design and Spatial (In)equality – The Janus Face of Economic Integration","authors":"Ingrid Ott, S. Soretz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3675371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3675371","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to economic integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments’ decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the inter-regional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.","PeriodicalId":346888,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Income Inequality (Topic)","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133825420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

What Do Divided Cities Have in Common? An International Comparison of Income Segregation 分裂的城市有什么共同点?收入隔离的国际比较

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3685834

P. Veneri, A. Comandon, Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López, Michiel N. Daams

引用次数: 20

Tax-Induced Inequalities in the Sharing Economy 共享经济中税收导致的不平等

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-06-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3376992

Yao Cui, A. M. Davis

{"title":"Tax-Induced Inequalities in the Sharing Economy","authors":"Yao Cui, A. M. Davis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3376992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3376992","url":null,"abstract":"The growth of sharing economy marketplaces like Airbnb has generated discussions on their socioeconomic impact and lack of regulation. As a result, most major cities in the United States have started to collect an “occupancy tax” for Airbnb bookings. In this study, we investigate the heterogeneous treatment effects of the occupancy tax policy on Airbnb listings, using a combination of a generalized causal forest methodology and a difference-in-differences framework. While we find that the introduction of the tax significantly reduces both listing revenues and sales, more importantly, these effects are disproportionately more pronounced for residential hosts with single shared-space (nontarget) listings versus commercial hosts with multiple properties or entire-space (target) listings. We further show that this unintended consequence is caused by customers’ discriminatory tax aversion against nontarget listings. We then leverage these empirical results by prescribing how hosts should optimally set prices in response to the occupancy tax and identify the discriminatory tax rates that would equalize the tax’s effect across nontarget and target listings. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.","PeriodicalId":346888,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Income Inequality (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127161528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Nota Sobre a Distribuição Desigual do Crescimento no Brasil, 1960 a 1970 (A Note on the Unequal Distribution of Growth in Brazil, 1960 to 1970) 关于巴西1960 - 1970年增长不平等分配的说明(关于巴西1960 - 1970年增长不平等分配的说明)

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-29 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3563910

Rogerio J Barbosa, M. Medeiros

引用次数: 0

A Review of Thomas Sowell's Discrimination and Disparities 托马斯·索厄尔的《歧视与不平等》述评

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-02-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3532411

Jennifer L. Doleac

引用次数: 8

The Effect of Income-Based Mandates on the Demand for Private Hospital Insurance and its Dynamics 基于收入的授权对私立医院保险需求的影响及其动态

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3506380

T. Buchmueller, T. Cheng, N. Pham, K. E. Staub

{"title":"The Effect of Income-Based Mandates on the Demand for Private Hospital Insurance and its Dynamics","authors":"T. Buchmueller, T. Cheng, N. Pham, K. E. Staub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3506380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3506380","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of an income-based mandate on the demand for private hospital insurance and its dynamics in Australia. The mandate, known as the Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS), is a levy on taxable income that applies to high-income individuals who choose not to buy private hospital insurance. Our identification strategy exploits changes in MLS liability arising from both year-to-year income fluctuations, and a reform where income thresholds were increased significantly. Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia longitudinal survey, we estimate dynamic panel data models that account for persistence in the decision to purchase insurance stemming from unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. Our results indicate that being subject to the MLS penalty in a given year increases the probability of purchasing private hospital insurance by between 2 to 3 percent in that year. If subject to the penalty permanently, this probability grows further over the following years, reaching 13 percent after a decade. We also find evidence of a marked asymmetric effect of the MLS, where the effect of the penalty is about twice as large for individuals becoming liable compared with those going from being liable to not being liable. Our results further show that the mandate has a larger effect on individuals who are younger.","PeriodicalId":346888,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Income Inequality (Topic)","volume":"219 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134059029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Farewell President! Political Favoritism, Economic Inequality, and Political Polarization 总统告别!政治偏袒、经济不平等与政治两极分化

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3419695

Hui-Pei Cheng, E. Swee

{"title":"Farewell President! Political Favoritism, Economic Inequality, and Political Polarization","authors":"Hui-Pei Cheng, E. Swee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3419695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3419695","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of political favoritism on economic inequality in the short run and political polarization in the long run. We exploit the sudden death of an authoritarian leader - President Chiang Ching-Kuo of Taiwan - in 1988 to generate plausibly exogenous variation in partiality. We find that Chiang's nationalist regime conducted political favoritism broadly toward political immigrants via cronyism (allocating public sector positions) and also differentially toward specific subgroups of political immigrants via wage discrimination (offering higher payroll to these subgroups within the public sector). Favoritism led to a 7.2 percent immigrant payroll premium, which accounted for nearly three quarters of the immigrant-native payroll gap at the time. This in turn propelled overall income inequality by 4.5 percent. Moreover, political favoritism breeds political polarization in the long run by pulling apart the political views of immigrants and natives. Compared with natives, immigrants who were exposed to favoritism tend to adopt political positions that are aligned with the nationalist party today: they are more likely to support unification with China, and are more inclined to trust the mainland Chinese government and its citizens. Exposed immigrant (native) swing voters are also more (less) likely to vote for the nationalist party today.","PeriodicalId":346888,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Income Inequality (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117121016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The 0.0003 Percent: Short-Run Dynamics of Extreme Wealth in America 0.0003%:美国极端财富的短期动态

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-06-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3408794

Arshad Mirza, Nirvikar Singh

{"title":"The 0.0003 Percent: Short-Run Dynamics of Extreme Wealth in America","authors":"Arshad Mirza, Nirvikar Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3408794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3408794","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the short-run dynamics and changing sources of wealth among the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest individuals in the United States, using annual data for 12 years spanning before and after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-9. Over the entire time period the growth of wealth was negatively related to the previous years’ wealth, implying a slight degree of wealth convergence within the group. We ﬁnd that the overall growth of the group’s wealth slowed after the crisis but stayed well above the GDP growth rate. Considering the interaction of growth of wealth with personal characteristics, we ﬁnd that those who can be classiﬁed as self-made had a higher average wealth growth rate than their counterparts, although this lead narrowed after the ﬁnancial crisis, during the Great Recession. Similarly, those with advanced degrees also had higher average growth of wealth in the pre-crisis period. We also examine the mobility of in and out of the Forbes 400, and ﬁnd that turnover was higher in the period prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, particularly for self-made individuals and those with advanced degrees. The self-made were also more likely to rise in rank within the Forbes 400 conditional on persisting in the list. By employing an innovative method of dealing with selection bias in a truncated panel, we are able to ascertain that our results are not driven by these biases. We also ﬁnd some diﬀerences in these patterns at the sectoral level, compared to the aggregate group.","PeriodicalId":346888,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Income Inequality (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122695816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Why Do the Rich Oppose Redistribution? An Experiment with America’s Top 5% 为什么富人反对再分配?美国前5%人口的实验

PSN: Income Inequality (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3395213

Alain Cohn, Lasse J. Jessen, Marko Klašnja, Paul Smeets

引用次数: 27