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Contextual Advertising 上下文广告
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2011-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1753881
Kaifu Zhang, Z. Katona
{"title":"Contextual Advertising","authors":"Kaifu Zhang, Z. Katona","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1753881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1753881","url":null,"abstract":"Contextual advertising entails the display of relevant ads based on the content that consumers view, exploiting the potential that consumers' content preferences are indicative of their product preferences. This paper studies the strategic aspects of such advertising, considering an intermediary who has access to a content base, sells advertising space to advertisers who compete in the product market, and provides the targeting technology. The results show that contextual targeting impacts advertiser profit in two ways: First, advertising through relevant content topics helps advertisers reach consumers with a strong preference for their product. Second, heterogeneity in consumers' content preferences can be leveraged to reduce product market competition, especially when competition is intense. The intermediary has incentives to strategically design its targeting technology, sometimes at the cost of the advertisers. When product market competition is moderate, the intermediary offers accurate targeting such that the consumers see the most relevant ads. When competition is high, the intermediary lowers the targeting accuracy such that the consumers see less relevant ads. Doing so intensifies competition and encourages advertisers to bid for multiple content topics in order to prevent their competitors from reaching consumers. In some cases, this may lead to an asymmetric equilibrium where one advertiser bids high even for the content topic that is more relevant to its competitor.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131892190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 76
Discussion of the Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing: Evidence from Private U.S. Firms 债务融资中财务报表验证的价值探讨:来自美国私营公司的证据
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2011-01-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1749491
Gavin Cassar
{"title":"Discussion of the Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing: Evidence from Private U.S. Firms","authors":"Gavin Cassar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1749491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1749491","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss Minnis [2010] in the context of the broader literature on private firm financing. In particular, I focus on the unique features of the private firm setting and how it affects research design and inference. I detail the alternative information sources available to debt financiers of private firms that may limit the role of auditors and firm financial statements. I review research in the private firm setting that documents the heightened importance of many omitted correlated variables such as the loan characteristics, contractual terms, and the characteristics of the entrepreneur that affect cost of debt. In evaluating the validity of Minnis’s [2010] hypotheses and econometric methods, I report findings from a representative sample of private firms provided by the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Small Business Finances.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121202722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34
Money, Financial Stability and Efficiency 货币、金融稳定与效率
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2011-01-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1743043
Franklin Allen, E. Carletti, Douglas Gale
{"title":"Money, Financial Stability and Efficiency","authors":"Franklin Allen, E. Carletti, Douglas Gale","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1743043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1743043","url":null,"abstract":"Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts. However, in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here. We consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. We show that, with non-contingent nominal deposit contracts, the first-best efficient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized banking system. What is required is that the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money. Variations in the price level allow full sharing of aggregate risks. An interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk. In contrast, idiosyncratic (bank-specific) return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone; real transfers are needed.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130593560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 76
Powerpoint: Bankruptcy Immunities, Transparency, and Capital Structure ppt:破产豁免、透明度和资本结构
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2011-01-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1738539
M. Simkovic
{"title":"Powerpoint: Bankruptcy Immunities, Transparency, and Capital Structure","authors":"M. Simkovic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1738539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1738539","url":null,"abstract":"Summarizes and further develops themes from \"Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008\".Secret Liens:This article explains the roots of financial crises in one of the oldest and most fundamental problems of commercial law: hidden leverage. Common law courts wrestled with this problem for centuries and developed a time - tested solution: the doctrine of secret liens. If the debtor becomes insolvent, the doctrine of secret liens punishes secret lien holders by subordinating their claims to those of other creditors. In other words, by overriding privately negotiated payment priorities, the doctrine of secret liens creates incentives for transparency. This article argues that legal changes over the last 80 years eroded the doctrine of secret liens, and thereby led to the financial crisis. Due to these legal changes, complex and opaque financial products received the highest priority in bankruptcy, and creditors' incentives were therefore to structure transactions using these favored financial products. The opaque credit environment that resulted permitted debtors - particularly investment banks - to hide the extent of their leverage, to the detriment of all creditors. This article argues that Congress can prevent future financial crises by restoring the doctrine of secret liens, or by adopting a modernized regulatory regime built on the doctrine of secret liens' fundamental insight - that creditors should be compelled to disclose their claims in exchange for payment priority.Additional information:The powerpoint presentation documents specific real world events which bear out the \"secret liens\" theory, including mischaracterization of Repo transactions as Lehman Brothers, Citibank, and Bank of America, and the use of currency and interest rate swaps by Greece and Italy to hide their debts. The powerpoint also shows different estimates of taxpayer losses from the AIG bailout.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127217777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Borrowing Base Revolvers: Liquidity for Risky Firms 借贷基础左轮手枪:高风险公司的流动性
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2011-01-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1741306
M. Flannery, Sara Wang
{"title":"Borrowing Base Revolvers: Liquidity for Risky Firms","authors":"M. Flannery, Sara Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1741306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1741306","url":null,"abstract":"How do risky firms with low cash flow finance their liquidity needs? This paper investigates a relatively common, but little-studied type of credit line, for which funds availability is limited by the firm’s time-varying asset composition. A \"borrowing base\" line of credit provides funds as a proportion of (e.g.) the amount of the borrower’s accounts receivable. This quantity constraint serves as a sort of time-varying covenant: if the firm sells no output, its accounts receivable will be low and the bank lends only a small amount. We find that borrowing base (\"BB\") revolvers are taken more often by borrowers with high risk and low profits or cash flow. Compared to other types of secured credit lines, the BB loan rate is relatively insensitive to the borrower’s initial risk profile because the lender has security and the loan terms automatically limit credit extended to unsuccessful firms. Borrowers use the BB to reduce their borrowing cost, gain a more generous credit limit, and operate with fewer financial covenants.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121228531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Diversification in Firm Valuation: A Multivariate Copula Approach 企业估值中的多元化:多元联结方法
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2011-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1739736
Stefan Erdorf, Thomas Hartmann-Wendels, Nicolas Heinrichs
{"title":"Diversification in Firm Valuation: A Multivariate Copula Approach","authors":"Stefan Erdorf, Thomas Hartmann-Wendels, Nicolas Heinrichs","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1739736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1739736","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new discounted cash flow model which adopts the diversification effect of multi-business firms. We face two challenges: One is examining how different diversification extents can affect the firm value due to risk reduction, and the other is modeling segment-specific cash flows and discount rates to reflect the differences in risk and growth characteristics across the different businesses that a firm operates in. Since the co-movement of business segments depends on the state of the economy, we use a multivariate copula approach taking the state-varying dependence of business segments explicitly into account. A high level of a firm's diversification determined by a low dependence between the firm's business segments leads to a lower probability of firm default which results in a higher firm value through reduced bankruptcy costs. We demonstrate this effect by comparing the values of three U.S. firms when modeling independence, dependence with copulas, and perfect dependence between businesses.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122465776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power 风险投资融资中的企业估值:投资者议价能力的作用
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2010-12-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1729773
Andy Heughebaert, S. Manigart
{"title":"Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power","authors":"Andy Heughebaert, S. Manigart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1729773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729773","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the impact of bargaining power of venture capital (VC) firms on the valuation of their portfolio companies. We argue that VC firm types with greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the entrepreneur negotiate lower valuations compared to VC firm types with less bargaining power. We find that VC firm types with stronger bargaining power, namely university and government VC firms, value investments lower compared to independent VC firms. The valuations of captive VC firms equal those of independent VC firms. Our findings suggest that valuations in the VC contract reflect the relative bargaining power of the VC investor.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131184827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 45
Internal Sources of Finance and the Great Recession 内部资金来源与大衰退
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2010-12-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1708204
M. Barnes, N. A. Pancost
{"title":"Internal Sources of Finance and the Great Recession","authors":"M. Barnes, N. A. Pancost","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1708204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1708204","url":null,"abstract":"The rising stockpile of cash as a share of total assets at U.S. firms has intrigued economists since at least the paper of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006), yet there has been relatively little work on where this cash has come from and how it is related to investment performance. We exploit Statement of Cash Flows data from Compustat to decompose firms' cash stocks and show that the rise in cash holdings has coincided with an increased willingness to save internally generated cash. We show that although investment is normally sensitive to externally generated cash, the increased sensitivity of investment to cash during the Great Recession is driven by cash from internal sources. Smaller firms were also more affected by the recent downturn than larger firms. Our results agree with the findings of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) on cash hoarding and financial constraints, as well as the estimates in Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) on the important role of saved cash during the financial crisis.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126119131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Capital Structure, Relation-Specific Investment, and Supplier Competition 最优资本结构、关系特定投资与供应商竞争
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2010-12-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1725451
Yongqiang Chu
{"title":"Optimal Capital Structure, Relation-Specific Investment, and Supplier Competition","authors":"Yongqiang Chu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1725451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1725451","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between firm leverage and supplier market structure by examining their joint impacts on bargaining and relation-specific investments. We find that firm leverage decreases with the degree of competition among suppliers. Specifically, leverage decreases with the elasticity of substitution between suppliers. Leverage also decreases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity of substitution is high, and increases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity is low. Empirical evidence supports these model predictions. We find that firm leverage is positively related to the number of supplying industries, and negatively related to the average number of suppliers per supplying industry. Moreover, we find that firm leverage is positively related to the degree of input goods heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123384341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Quantification of Counterparty Risk Via Bessel Bridges 通过贝塞尔桥量化交易对手风险
ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth Pub Date : 2010-12-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1722604
Mark H. A. Davis, M. Pistorius
{"title":"Quantification of Counterparty Risk Via Bessel Bridges","authors":"Mark H. A. Davis, M. Pistorius","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1722604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1722604","url":null,"abstract":"We construct a dynamical credit model that can be calibrated exactly to CDS quotes. Modelling the default time as the first-passage time of a credit index process to the level zero, we show that the parameters of this credit index process can be chosen such that the risk-neutral (implied) distribution of the time of default is matched. Employing this default model we develop a model for asset prices conditional on the occurrence of default at a given time. We illustrate the use of the model in estimating the expected positive exposure of an oil swap traded with an airline as counterparty.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131872635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
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