{"title":"风险投资融资中的企业估值:投资者议价能力的作用","authors":"Andy Heughebaert, S. Manigart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1729773","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the impact of bargaining power of venture capital (VC) firms on the valuation of their portfolio companies. We argue that VC firm types with greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the entrepreneur negotiate lower valuations compared to VC firm types with less bargaining power. We find that VC firm types with stronger bargaining power, namely university and government VC firms, value investments lower compared to independent VC firms. The valuations of captive VC firms equal those of independent VC firms. Our findings suggest that valuations in the VC contract reflect the relative bargaining power of the VC investor.","PeriodicalId":340291,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"45","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power\",\"authors\":\"Andy Heughebaert, S. Manigart\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1729773\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study explores the impact of bargaining power of venture capital (VC) firms on the valuation of their portfolio companies. We argue that VC firm types with greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the entrepreneur negotiate lower valuations compared to VC firm types with less bargaining power. We find that VC firm types with stronger bargaining power, namely university and government VC firms, value investments lower compared to independent VC firms. The valuations of captive VC firms equal those of independent VC firms. Our findings suggest that valuations in the VC contract reflect the relative bargaining power of the VC investor.\",\"PeriodicalId\":340291,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-12-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"45\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729773\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Intertemporal Firm Choice & Growth","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729773","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power
This study explores the impact of bargaining power of venture capital (VC) firms on the valuation of their portfolio companies. We argue that VC firm types with greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the entrepreneur negotiate lower valuations compared to VC firm types with less bargaining power. We find that VC firm types with stronger bargaining power, namely university and government VC firms, value investments lower compared to independent VC firms. The valuations of captive VC firms equal those of independent VC firms. Our findings suggest that valuations in the VC contract reflect the relative bargaining power of the VC investor.
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