{"title":"The Stance of Moral Protest","authors":"Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 2 sets out a conception of blame without the notion of deserved pain or harm. To blame is instead to take on a non-retributive stance of moral protest. The reasons for taking on this stance are forward looking: moral formation or reconciliation in a relationship that has been impaired as a result of the wrongdoing, protection from wrongdoing, and restoration of the integrity of its victims. Regret, a painful response to one’s own wrongdoing which by contrast with guilt (by stipulation) does not involve the supposition that the pain it involves is basically deserved, may appropriately accompany self-blame. The pain of guilt, an attitude distinct from regret, conceptually involves basic desert since it involves the supposition that it would be prima facie permissible for those who are suitably situated to intentionally impose it on a wrongdoer for a non-instrumental reason. The pain of regret does not involve this supposition.","PeriodicalId":334832,"journal":{"name":"Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions","volume":"34 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123489005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Religion and Hope","authors":"Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 7 defends the rationality of hope for humanity on both theistic and non-theistic grounds. Hope is appropriate when our interest lies in an unknown outcome due to factors completely beyond our control, as is the case if our future is rendered inevitable by theological determination or by the past and the laws of nature. Conceptions of divine providence, whether or not they endorse free will, are challenged by moral wrongdoing and natural evil that appear not to be justified by any good to which they contribute. Responses to the problem of evil, e.g. theodicies, are not decisive, but they allow for rational hope that a providential God exists. There is a related hope that is rational on either theistic or atheistic presuppositions, a counterpart of John Dewey’s “common faith,” a faith in the survival and progress of humanity embedded in a thriving natural environment.","PeriodicalId":334832,"journal":{"name":"Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133044690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crime, Protection, and Compassion","authors":"Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 4 sets out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects the retributive justification for punishment, does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means, and can actually work in the real world. The proposal is largely justified as special deterrence by the right to self-defense and defense of others. This account features a quarantine analogy for a justification of the incapacitation of criminals, for example by preventative detention or monitoring, together with provisions for rehabilitation and reintegration. It also features a justification for penalties designed to secure effective general deterrence, measures that cannot be justified as special deterrence by the self-defense right. Here consequentialist considerations and duties of compensation have a justificatory role.","PeriodicalId":334832,"journal":{"name":"Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127530499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defensive Harm and Measured Aggression","authors":"Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 3 concerns how we might justify effectively dealing with those who pose dangerous threats supposing they do not deserve to be harmed. Wrongly posing a threat, by contrast with deserving harm for posing the threat, is proposed as the core condition for what I call robust liability to defensive killing, a liability that agent A has just in case A poses a threat to agent B as a result of which B and third parties are prima facie morally permitted to intentionally kill A to defend B from that threat. A non-retributive measured aggressive stance appropriately facilitates taking defensive action. Such an emotional stance, if it presupposes only that its target wrongly poses a threat, accords with skepticism about free will, and is also better for those called upon to confront injustice than the alternatives.","PeriodicalId":334832,"journal":{"name":"Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133037759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Love and Freedom","authors":"Derk Pereboom","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199395729.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199395729.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 6 contends that love and relationships need not be compromised if we, motivated by ethical considerations and skepticism about free will, relinquished the retributive emotions. When we are wronged in relationships, there are non-retributive emotions available to us, whose expressions can play the relevant roles. These emotions include feeling hurt or shocked or disappointed about what the offending agent has done, and sadness or sorrow and concern for him, and taking on the stance of moral protest against him. Personal relationships might presuppose free will due to being structured by moral obligations, and, by way of the ‘ought implies can principle,’ moral obligations presupposing the ability to refrain from wrongdoing. Two responses are offered, one compatibilist about the relevant ability to do otherwise, and the other invoking a sense of ‘ought’ that does not imply ‘can’ in the threatening sense.","PeriodicalId":334832,"journal":{"name":"Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131473589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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