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Is Decentralization Sustainable in the Bitcoin System? 去中心化在比特币系统中可持续吗?
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3478373
V. Jacob, Sailendra Prasanna Mishra, S. Radhakrishnan
{"title":"Is Decentralization Sustainable in the Bitcoin System?","authors":"V. Jacob, Sailendra Prasanna Mishra, S. Radhakrishnan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3478373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478373","url":null,"abstract":"The Bitcoin system is a decentralized monetary system in that any participant can potentially verify and record transactions onto a public ledger. Using a simple model, we show that the number of miners could be negatively (positively) related to the expected rewards, if miners with low-operating costs face less (more) severe financing constraints. We characterize the possibility of miners with low-operating (high-operating) costs facing less (more) severe financing constraints as large-size (small-size) miners. The empirical evidence supports the model’s prediction of large-size and small-size miner characterization. The negative association between the number of miners and expected rewards is attributable to the bitcoin’s exchange rate. Collectively, our evidence suggests that even though the Bitcoin system is designed as an egalitarian system, it is likely to evolve into a near-centralized system because of economic forces.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129713676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Measuring Institutional Trading Costs and the Implications for Finance Research: The Case of Tick Size Reductions 衡量机构交易成本及其对金融研究的启示:以交易规模缩减为例
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3255735
Gregory W. Eaton, Paul Irvine, Tingting Liu
{"title":"Measuring Institutional Trading Costs and the Implications for Finance Research: The Case of Tick Size Reductions","authors":"Gregory W. Eaton, Paul Irvine, Tingting Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3255735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3255735","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using proprietary institutional trade data, we construct a price impact measure that represents the costs faced by institutional investors. We show that many widely used liquidity measures do not adequately capture institutional trading costs. We then find that institutional trading costs are not dramatically impacted by decimalization, casting doubt on the widely used identification strategy that employs decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity, particularly institutional liquidity. Indeed, we find that conclusions from prior research are significantly altered when we measure liquidity using institutional trading data.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114563579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
The Quality of Legal Systems and Property Rights by State: A Ranking and Their Implications for Economic Freedom 国家法律制度和产权的质量:排名及其对经济自由的影响
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3466437
Ryan H. Murphy
{"title":"The Quality of Legal Systems and Property Rights by State: A Ranking and Their Implications for Economic Freedom","authors":"Ryan H. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3466437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466437","url":null,"abstract":"This paper constructs a new measure of the quality of the legal system and property rights by U.S. state, combining five pieces of data to develop a novel measure of institutional quality. It integrates this measure to the _Economic Freedom of North America_ index to give a more complete subnational comparison of United States institutions. The quality of the legal system and property rights are measured to be strongest in the upper Midwest and northern New England, and weakest in the South and Hawaii. The integration of this data into _Economic Freedom of North America_ has considerable implications for our understanding of economic freedom at the regional level","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122447247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Shooting the Messenger? Supply and Demand in Markets for Willful Ignorance 射杀信使?故意无知市场的供给和需求
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3464224
Shaul Shalvi, Ivan Soraperra, Joel J. van der Weele, M. Villeval
{"title":"Shooting the Messenger? Supply and Demand in Markets for Willful Ignorance","authors":"Shaul Shalvi, Ivan Soraperra, Joel J. van der Weele, M. Villeval","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464224","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the role of advisers in the transmission of ethically relevant information, a critical aspect of executive decision making in organizations. In our laboratory experiment, advisers are informed about the negative externalities associated with the decision-maker's choices and compete with other advisers. We find that advisers suppress about a quarter of \"inconvenient'' information. Suppression is not strategic, but based on the advisers' own preferences in the ethical dilemma. On the demand side, a substantial minority of decision makers avoid advisers who transmit inconvenient information (they \"shoot the messenger''). Overall, by facilitating assortative matching, a competitive market for advisers efficiently caters to the demand for both information and information avoidance. Decision-makers are less likely to implement their preferred option when they are randomly matched to advisers and there is no scope for assortative matching.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126879361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Competition Law and Policy as a Tool for Development: A Review of Making Markets Work for Africa: Markets, Development, and Competition Law in Sub-Saharan Africa by Eleanor Fox and Mor Bakhoum 作为发展工具的竞争法和政策:《让市场为非洲工作:撒哈拉以南非洲的市场、发展和竞争法》综述，埃莉诺·福克斯和莫尔·巴克胡姆著
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3457057
Jasper Lubeto
{"title":"Competition Law and Policy as a Tool for Development: A Review of Making Markets Work for Africa: Markets, Development, and Competition Law in Sub-Saharan Africa by Eleanor Fox and Mor Bakhoum","authors":"Jasper Lubeto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3457057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3457057","url":null,"abstract":"Prior to the recent commencement of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, (AfCFTA), there was no region-wide competition treaty in Africa. Concerted efforts have been invested in uniting broader political, economic and legal policies at sub-Saharan Africa level except for competition law and policy. Granted, the broader political, economic and legal order ought to lay the foundation for a harmonized competition law and policy dispensation. Eleanor Fox and Mor Bakhoum seem to be alive to this reality in their work, Making Markets Work for Africa: Markets, Development, and Competition law in sub-Saharan Africa. Their work brings together the historical, political, economic and legal underpinnings anchoring competition law and policy in today’s sub-Saharan Africa. They do not stop at that. They focus on the legal texts, institutional set-up and performance, and effects of sub-regional regimes on competition law and policy implementation. Fox and Bakhoum’s fairly broad analysis focusing on West, East, and Southern African countries brings to fore the real challenges at play in Africa. It is a fragmented, stratified yet at times vertically united legal and policy landscape. While they observe the need for convergence of competition law at the continental or regional level, they note the different states of developmental progress among sub-Saharan African countries hence concede the need for the fragmented approach.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115221072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 法律与规范:经验证据
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3581720
Tom Lane, Daniele Nosenzo
{"title":"Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence","authors":"Tom Lane, Daniele Nosenzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3581720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581720","url":null,"abstract":"A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms, but empirical evidence remains scant. Using a novel identification strategy, we provide a compelling empirical test of this proposition. We use incentivized vignette experiments to directly measure social norms relating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Our large-scale experiments (n = 7,000) run in the United Kingdom, United States, and China show that laws can causally influence social norms. Results are robust across different samples and methods of measuring norms, and are consistent with a model of social image concerns where individuals care about the inferences others make about their underlying prosociality. (JEL C91, C92, D91, K00, K42, P37)","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129130476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Education Projects for Sustainable Development: Evidence from Ural Federal University 可持续发展教育项目:来自乌拉尔联邦大学的证据
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-08 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28890.08641
M. Volkova, Jol Stoffers, Dmitry Kochetkov
{"title":"Education Projects for Sustainable Development: Evidence from Ural Federal University","authors":"M. Volkova, Jol Stoffers, Dmitry Kochetkov","doi":"10.13140/RG.2.2.28890.08641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28890.08641","url":null,"abstract":"Sustainable development is a worldwide recognized social and political goal, discussed in both academic and political discourse and with much research on the topic related to sustainable development in higher education. Since mental models are formed more effectively at school age, we propose a new way of thinking that will help achieve this goal. This paper was written in the context of Russia, where the topic of sustainable development in education is poorly developed. The authors used the classical methodology of the case analysis. The analysis and interpretation of the results were conducted in the framework of the institutional theory. Presented is the case of Ural Federal University, which has been working for several years on the creation of a device for the purification of industrial sewer water in the framework of an initiative student group. Schoolchildren recently joined the program, and such projects have been called university-to-school projects. Successful solutions of inventive tasks contribute to the formation of mental models. This case has been analyzed in terms of institutionalism, and the authors argue for the primacy of mental institutions over normative ones during sustainable society construction. This case study is the first to analyze a partnership between a Federal University and local schools regarding sustainable education and proposes a new way of thinking.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127501871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty 欺诈威慑制度降低了内在诚信
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3752450
Fabio Galeotti, V. Maggian, M. Villeval
{"title":"Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty","authors":"Fabio Galeotti, V. Maggian, M. Villeval","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3752450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752450","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The impact of deterrence institutions beyond their immediate scope of application is unknown. Using a quasi-experiment with naturally occurring variation in inspections, we found evidence of spillover effects across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters on public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections. We measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increased unethical behaviour of fraudsters but also, strikingly, of non-fraudsters. Learning about the prevailing norm is the likely channel of this spillover effect.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134230982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
The Political Economy of a Diverse Monetary Union 多元化货币联盟的政治经济学
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3661497
E. Perotti, Oscar Soons
{"title":"The Political Economy of a Diverse Monetary Union","authors":"E. Perotti, Oscar Soons","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3661497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3661497","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the political economy of monetary unification among countries with different quality of institutions. Countries with stronger institutions have lower public spending and better investment incentives, even under a stronger currency. Governments under weaker institutions spend more so must occasionally devalue. In a MU market prices and flows adjust quickly but institutional differences persist, so a diverse monetary union (DMU) has many redistributive effects. The government in the weaker country expand spending and investment may be reduced by the fiscal and common exchange rate effect. Strong country production benefits from the weaker currency but needs to offer fiscal support in a fiscal crisis, a transfer legitimized by its ex ante devaluation gain. Some governments may join a DMU even if it depresses productive capacity to expand public spending. Even in a DMU beneficial for all countries, workers and firms in weaker countries and savers in stronger countries may lose.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121982651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best? 设计电话拍卖制度消除价格泡沫:英语荷兰语是最好的吗?
New Institutional Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-28 DOI: 10.1257/AERI.20190244
Cary A. Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker
{"title":"Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?","authors":"Cary A. Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker","doi":"10.1257/AERI.20190244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AERI.20190244","url":null,"abstract":"The bubble-and-burst pattern in asset markets is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in markets organized by standard double auction rules with mispricing in markets organized by two alternative sets of clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in past commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction yields prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing cash-to-asset ratio. (JEL C91, D44, G12)","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126039427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
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