{"title":"欺诈威慑制度降低了内在诚信","authors":"Fabio Galeotti, V. Maggian, M. Villeval","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3752450","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The impact of deterrence institutions beyond their immediate scope of application is unknown. Using a quasi-experiment with naturally occurring variation in inspections, we found evidence of spillover effects across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters on public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections. We measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increased unethical behaviour of fraudsters but also, strikingly, of non-fraudsters. Learning about the prevailing norm is the likely channel of this spillover effect.","PeriodicalId":330992,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty\",\"authors\":\"Fabio Galeotti, V. Maggian, M. Villeval\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3752450\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The impact of deterrence institutions beyond their immediate scope of application is unknown. Using a quasi-experiment with naturally occurring variation in inspections, we found evidence of spillover effects across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters on public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections. We measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increased unethical behaviour of fraudsters but also, strikingly, of non-fraudsters. Learning about the prevailing norm is the likely channel of this spillover effect.\",\"PeriodicalId\":330992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New Institutional Economics eJournal\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New Institutional Economics eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752450\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New Institutional Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752450","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The impact of deterrence institutions beyond their immediate scope of application is unknown. Using a quasi-experiment with naturally occurring variation in inspections, we found evidence of spillover effects across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters on public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections. We measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increased unethical behaviour of fraudsters but also, strikingly, of non-fraudsters. Learning about the prevailing norm is the likely channel of this spillover effect.