ERN: Procurement (Topic)最新文献_第5页

National Drug Stockout Risks in Africa: Analysis of the Global Fund Disbursement Process for Procurement from 2002 to 2013 非洲国家药品缺货风险:2002 - 2013年全球基金采购支付过程分析

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2458038

Jérémie Gallien, I. Rashkova, R. Atun, Prashant Yadav

{"title":"National Drug Stockout Risks in Africa: Analysis of the Global Fund Disbursement Process for Procurement from 2002 to 2013","authors":"Jérémie Gallien, I. Rashkova, R. Atun, Prashant Yadav","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2458038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2458038","url":null,"abstract":"Despite substantial financial aid from international donors for procurement of health products, stockouts of life-saving drugs related to prevalent infectious diseases are still widespread in Africa. Addressing the lack of research on why these stockouts occur, we study the relationship between The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and its grant recipients. Specifically, we leverage extensive historical fund disbursement and drug procurement data to build a discrete-event simulation model predicting the joint impact of procurement and grant disbursement processes on national drug availability for the Global Fund’s recipient countries in Africa. This model is validated against cumulative stockout levels inferred from historical grant implementation lengths, and used to evaluate potential high-level modifications of disbursement or procurement processes. Results show the existence of substantial intrinsic stockout risks in many countries, due to the unpredictability of fund disbursements and the frequency of grant performance monitoring performed by the Global Fund. Interventions increasing fund disbursement levels to protect against disbursement timing uncertainty are predicted to be more effective than others that include regional buffer stocks and bridge financing.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133548376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Import Management: Efficient Use of Samples & Specification for Better Decision in Competitive Purchasing 进口管理:有效地利用样品和规格，以便在竞争性采购中做出更好的决策

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-28 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2417180

Tesfaye Wolde

引用次数: 0

Some Evidence of 'Smart' Public Procurement: Solutions for SMEs in Italy “智能”公共采购的一些证据:意大利中小企业的解决方案

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-10-30 DOI: 10.14596/PISB.157

G. Albano, Roberto Zampino

引用次数: 2

Offsets and Public Procurement 抵消和公共采购

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2293995

Patricia Josefchak, B. Mantin

{"title":"Offsets and Public Procurement","authors":"Patricia Josefchak, B. Mantin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2293995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293995","url":null,"abstract":"Major government or public procurements directly and indirectly impact a country’s economy, infrastructure, industry base and even security. Foreign competition has the potential of reducing governments’ procuring costs. However, this will hurt local industries and employment. Hence, governments impose offset requirements: a form of contractual obligation such that a portion of what a foreign firm supplies must be produced locally. Offsets are prevalent in key areas of public infrastructure such as energy, communications and transportation, and especially in defense and security. Using the defense industry as a leading example, we develop a model where two governments seek to minimize their Net Defense Costs (NDC). Using a standard definition for NDC, we find that governments — when they act independently — will set full offset requirements. However, coordination of offset policy requirements could achieve lower NDCs for governments. In this case we find that offset are eliminated. Taking a broader definition for NDC that also accounts for gravitation of production from one country to the other, governments may set partial, rather than full, offset requirements, whereas joint decision is always full offset.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130401697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Justice in a Globalizing World: Resolving Conflicts Involving Workers Rights beyond the Nation State 全球化世界中的正义:解决超越民族国家的工人权利冲突

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2293969

J. Fudge, G. Mundlak

{"title":"Justice in a Globalizing World: Resolving Conflicts Involving Workers Rights beyond the Nation State","authors":"J. Fudge, G. Mundlak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2293969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293969","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on two examples – first, the imposition of tariffs on tires made in China and exported to the United States, which culminated in a decision of World Trade Organization’s (WTO) appellate body to uphold the US tariffs, and, second, the development of the European law, especially the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union, on posted workers in the context of public procurement – in which labour concerns transcend the nation state’s borders and the relevant agents (states, municipalities, NGOs, trade unions, employers, industry associations) are in conflict outside the familiar space of the nation state. The examples refer to different markets – goods and capital, on the one hand, and services and labour, on the other, and they operate on different scales, the international in one case and the transnational (or regional) in the other. They also focus on qualitatively different governance regimes, which involve different constellations of political and social actors and different relationships between economic and social/political integration. Drawing on Fraser’s discussion of “abnormal justice”, a situation in which the traditional discourse and grammar of justice are being doubted, the paper juxtaposes the case studies in order to highlight three political dilemmas (“what”, “who”, and “how”) that arise in the context of abnormal justice and to illustrate how these dilemmas are interconnected. Although both cases exemplify the “what” question, the paper emphasizes the “who” and “how” dimensions of justice, arguing that if the process for resolving the conflict is fair, inclusive, and dynamically open to challenges, then its outcomes on distributive justice are more likely to be considered legitimate and persuasive.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133265448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The Use of Sealed Bidding and Competitive Negotiation in Brazil and Worldwide 密封招标和竞争性谈判在巴西和世界范围内的应用

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2340992

Wagner Silva

{"title":"The Use of Sealed Bidding and Competitive Negotiation in Brazil and Worldwide","authors":"Wagner Silva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2340992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2340992","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, both public officials and the private sector have faced the challenge of efficiently procuring goods and services to governments. This task is of utmost importance in the infrastructure area of developing countries, considering the investments required and the scarcity of funds. Corruption is always a threat. Governments have issued rules to conduct bidding seeking standardization of procedures and agility. They also encourage competition and transparency. Some rules limit discussions and others encourages them. In the U.S., both methods are equally accepted since 1984. Brazil introduced legislation on a new regime in 2011, called Differential Public Procurement Regime (RDC) and just began initial experience with it. In this context, the questions that arise are: (1) should Brazil make broader use of competitive negotiation for infrastructure and other projects? (2) Are the mechanisms of control prepared for these changes? (3) What is the role of transparency in this process? (4) Is it necessary any change in legislation in order to improve it? (5) What else should be done? Answering to these questions seems to be premature, but efforts to promote transparency, to prevent and fight corruption and impunity are highlighted, once corruption occurs no matter the bidding method applied.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115887767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts 第三方机会主义与公共契约的性质

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-12-01 DOI: 10.3386/W18636

Marian W. Moszoro, P. Spiller

引用次数: 52

Reputation, Competition, and Entry in Procurement 采购中的信誉、竞争和进入

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1988818

G. Spagnolo

引用次数: 126

수익형 민간투자사업(Bto) 입찰평가 분석: 도로사업을 중심으로 (Analysis on Bidding Behavior in Score Auction: Highway BTO Projects) 收益型民间投资事业(Bto)投标评价分析:以道路事业为中心(Analysis on Bidding Behavior in Score Auction: Highway Bto Projects)

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.143

Jungwook Kim

{"title":"수익형 민간투자사업(Bto) 입찰평가 분석: 도로사업을 중심으로 (Analysis on Bidding Behavior in Score Auction: Highway BTO Projects)","authors":"Jungwook Kim","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.143","url":null,"abstract":"Korean Abstract: 수익형 민간투자사업의 경우 가격요소와 비가격요소를 동시에 고려하는 다차원경매제도가 시행되고 있다. 본 논문은 수익형 민간투자사업 중 도로사업의 입찰평가자료를 분석하여 정책적 시사점 및 개선방안을 제시함을 목적으로 한다. 입찰평가자료 분석 결과, 평가 1위 사업자들의 득점이 증가하고 있는데, 이는 기본점수의증가와 경쟁의 심화로 인한 것으로 판단된다. 평가 1위 사업자 선정에는 비가격부문에서 발생하는 점수편차가 결정적인 것으로 제시되었다. 또한 최초제안자 우대점수가 높게 설정된 사업의 경우 경쟁이 발생하지 않음도 확인하였다. 가격부문 중 재정지원부문의 점수 별 금액은 평균 7.3억원으로 통행료부문의 점수 별 금액 24.3억 원과 큰 차이를 보였다. 비가격부문의 점수 별 금액은 23.0억 원 정도로 추정되어 가격부문과는 다소 차이를 나타내었다. 분석결과를 토대로, 최초제안자 우대점수의 적정 수준 유지, 재정지원부문의 평가방식 개선, 기본점수의 재조정 등이 제언되었다. English Abstract: Upon selecting preferred bidder in Public-Private Partnership projects, multi-dimensional procurement auction, where price factor and non-price factor are evaluated, is used. This paper tries to analyze bidding data in BTO road projects. It is shown that a winner tends to get higher score in bidding evaluation, which is partly due to increase in base score as well as fiercer competition among bidders. It turns out that score margin in non-price factor was determinant in selecting winner. Also, there was no competition when the level of bonus point was set too high. For price factor, it costs 730 million KRW per score in construction subsidy by government, while it costs 2.43 billion KRW per score in toll revenue. For non-price factor, it was estimated to cost 2.30 billion KRW. Based on the results, it was suggested that we should have appropriate level of bonus point for first initiator, change in scoring rule in construction subsidy part, adjustment of base score in evaluation.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126368741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies: Theory and Data 不确定规模经济下的分奖采购拍卖:理论与数据

ERN: Procurement (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1356811

James J. Anton, Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo

引用次数: 27