Offsets and Public Procurement

Patricia Josefchak, B. Mantin
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Abstract

Major government or public procurements directly and indirectly impact a country’s economy, infrastructure, industry base and even security. Foreign competition has the potential of reducing governments’ procuring costs. However, this will hurt local industries and employment. Hence, governments impose offset requirements: a form of contractual obligation such that a portion of what a foreign firm supplies must be produced locally. Offsets are prevalent in key areas of public infrastructure such as energy, communications and transportation, and especially in defense and security. Using the defense industry as a leading example, we develop a model where two governments seek to minimize their Net Defense Costs (NDC). Using a standard definition for NDC, we find that governments — when they act independently — will set full offset requirements. However, coordination of offset policy requirements could achieve lower NDCs for governments. In this case we find that offset are eliminated. Taking a broader definition for NDC that also accounts for gravitation of production from one country to the other, governments may set partial, rather than full, offset requirements, whereas joint decision is always full offset.
抵消和公共采购
重大的政府或公共采购直接或间接地影响到一个国家的经济、基础设施、产业基础甚至安全。外国竞争有可能降低政府的采购成本。然而,这将损害当地产业和就业。因此,政府施加抵消要求:一种合同义务的形式,即外国公司供应的一部分必须在当地生产。补偿在能源、通信和交通等公共基础设施的关键领域,特别是在国防和安全领域普遍存在。以国防工业为例,我们开发了一个模型,其中两国政府寻求最小化其净国防成本(NDC)。根据国家自主贡献的标准定义,我们发现,当政府独立行动时,它们将设定全部抵消要求。然而,协调抵消政策要求可以降低各国政府的国家自主贡献。在这种情况下,我们发现抵消被消除了。如果把国家自主贡献的广义定义也考虑到生产从一个国家向另一个国家的引力,那么政府可能会设定部分而非全部抵消要求,而共同决定总是完全抵消。
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