发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Partner-Level Cumulative Industry Expertise and Audit Quality 合伙人级别的累积行业专业知识和审计质量
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-047
Like Jiang, Vic Naiker, Yu Wang, Shafu Zhang
{"title":"Partner-Level Cumulative Industry Expertise and Audit Quality","authors":"Like Jiang, Vic Naiker, Yu Wang, Shafu Zhang","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-047","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We employ a novel framework to evaluate the audit quality implications of cumulative industry expertise that audit partners acquire from auditing public clients across their careers. Leveraging the historical data of audit partner engagements with public clients in China, we find that the development of cumulative industry expertise is explained by various experiences of the partners in their initial year of handling public clients, as well as the growth, homogeneity, and demand for specialized knowledge in an industry. Our main results reveal a positive and significant association between partner cumulative industry expertise and different proxies of audit quality. We also find that many partners deemed specialists based on the largest market shares in a given year do not possess a high level of cumulative industry expertise and are insignificantly associated with audit quality. Our findings highlight the importance of adopting a cumulative perspective to study partners’ industry expertise.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141710768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Auditing Standards and Boards’ Decisions about CEO Risk-Taking Incentives: Evidence from the PCAOB’s Proposed Amendment to Auditing Standard No. 12 审计准则与董事会关于 CEO 风险承担激励的决策：来自 PCAOB 第 12 号审计准则拟议修正案的证据
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2023-074
S. Balsam, Michael A. Mayberry, Hyun Jong Park
{"title":"Auditing Standards and Boards’ Decisions about CEO Risk-Taking Incentives: Evidence from the PCAOB’s Proposed Amendment to Auditing Standard No. 12","authors":"S. Balsam, Michael A. Mayberry, Hyun Jong Park","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2023-074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2023-074","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We exploit a proposed amendment by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to Auditing Standard No. 12 (AS12) to examine its effect on CEOs’ risk-taking incentives. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that clients with an overlapping director on both the compensation and audit committees, which facilitates greater information sharing, decrease risk-taking incentives relative to control clients following the proposal. We argue that the shared information involves the increased salience of risk-taking incentives to audit committees, who convey a corresponding concern regarding financial reporting consequences to the compensation committee. In additional analysis, we fail to find statistically or economically significant evidence that auditors react to the proposed modification of AS12. Overall, our results are consistent with an unintended consequence of PCAOB standard setting. That is, although the PCAOB asserted that the modification should not impact the design of compensation arrangements, we find evidence that it did.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M12; M42.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141694688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Importance of Business Development Incentives to Audit Partners: Evidence from the Propensity to Issue Modified Opinions to Group-Affiliated Audit Clients 业务发展激励对审计合伙人的重要性：从向集团关联审计客户出具修改意见的倾向中获得的证据
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-050
Simon Yu Kit Fung, Like Jiang, Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang
{"title":"The Importance of Business Development Incentives to Audit Partners: Evidence from the Propensity to Issue Modified Opinions to Group-Affiliated Audit Clients","authors":"Simon Yu Kit Fung, Like Jiang, Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-050","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We analyze a unique incentive motivating audit partners to pursue new revenue streams from potential audit clients related to incumbent clients. In auditing clients belonging to business groups, a partner who issues a modified audit opinion (MAO) to a group-affiliated client risks losing not only that client but also the opportunity to extend their audit services to other member companies. We document that partners are less likely to render MAOs to group-affiliated clients when other group members are large relative to the partners’ client portfolio, and this relation intensifies when the incumbent group-affiliated clients themselves are economically less important. We also find that partners who issue MAOs to group-affiliated clients underperform in attracting new clients from the same business group. Further, investors perceive that audit quality is higher in these partners’ non-group-affiliated clients, reflecting that reputation protection forces discipline partners to resist the temptation to issue unwarranted clean opinions.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M42.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"90 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141695839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Tale of Two Intermediaries: Investment Banker-Auditor Social Ties and IPO Quality 两个中介的故事：投资银行家与审计师的社会关系与 IPO 质量
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-080
Xianjie He, Jeffrey Pittman, Shuwei Sun, Donghui Wu
{"title":"A Tale of Two Intermediaries: Investment Banker-Auditor Social Ties and IPO Quality","authors":"Xianjie He, Jeffrey Pittman, Shuwei Sun, Donghui Wu","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-080","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) appoint investment bankers and auditors to certify information disclosed to investors. We find that social connections significantly increase the likelihood that the bankers and auditors become involved in the same IPO deal. Although some theory and evidence suggests that information transferred via social networks may enhance economic agents’ performance, other research implies that such links may admit bias into auditor judgment or impair their independence. Empirically, we find that IPO firms report higher discretionary accruals when bankers and auditors are socially connected. We also document that banker-auditor social ties are associated with lower earnings credibility and worse post-IPO performance. However, auditors benefit from social connections with bankers by attracting higher fee premiums and securing more future IPO audit businesses.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"229 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141144837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Critical Audit Matters Be a Signal of Poor Accruals Quality? 关键审计事项是否是应计质量低下的信号？
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-065
Yuntian Li, Bing Luo, Zvi Singer, Jing Zhang
{"title":"Can Critical Audit Matters Be a Signal of Poor Accruals Quality?","authors":"Yuntian Li, Bing Luo, Zvi Singer, Jing Zhang","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-065","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the relationship between critical audit matters (CAMs) and accruals quality. We find that companies with a higher number of CAMs in their audit reports are associated with poorer accruals quality, and this association appears to be driven by recurring rather than nonrecurring CAMs. An examination of specific CAM topics shows that revenue CAMs are associated with lower revenue-related accruals quality, and tax CAMs are associated with poorer tax-related accruals quality, suggesting that CAMs are indicators of poor accruals quality. A cross-sectional analysis shows that the CAM signal about poor accruals quality is attenuated for companies when the information environment is richer, suggesting that a rich information environment restrains the use of discretion in accruals estimation such that CAMs no longer indicate poor accruals quality. Overall, our findings suggest that CAMs can provide a relevant signal of financial reporting quality in certain circumstances.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":" 36","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141132336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Using Field-Based Evidence to Understand the Antecedents to Auditors’ Skeptical Actions 利用实地证据了解审计师怀疑行动的前因
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2021-141
Kris Hardies, Sanne Janssen, A. Vanstraelen, Karla M. Zehms
{"title":"Using Field-Based Evidence to Understand the Antecedents to Auditors’ Skeptical Actions","authors":"Kris Hardies, Sanne Janssen, A. Vanstraelen, Karla M. Zehms","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2021-141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2021-141","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide field-based evidence on antecedents to auditors’ skeptical actions, with participants including over 600 auditors across all ranks from six audit firms. We evaluate the relative importance of situational, client, and individual auditor characteristics, along with measures of auditors’ cognitive processing in relation to their self-reports of skeptical actions on one of their own audits. We find that the most important antecedents are each audit firm’s overall professional orientation, auditors’ individual feelings of accountability, their trait skepticism, their motivation, and their intentions to behave skeptically. Auditors’ intentions are most influenced by social norms and less influenced by attitudes toward and self-efficacy about behaving skeptically. Other important antecedents include each audit firm’s quality control systems, certain individual auditors’ personality traits, their client-related industry expertise, and their audit knowledge. Our findings support various aspects of prior conceptual models and suggest ways in which audit firms can promote skeptical actions.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"211 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141133333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Audit Committee Remedial Actions and Regulatory Outcomes following FCPA Investigations 审计委员会在 FCPA 调查后采取的补救措施和监管结果
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2021-092
Krishnagopal Menon, David D. Williams
{"title":"Audit Committee Remedial Actions and Regulatory Outcomes following FCPA Investigations","authors":"Krishnagopal Menon, David D. Williams","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2021-092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2021-092","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study examines audit committee (AC) remedial actions in firms investigated for a likely bribery-related violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Specifically, we study the relation between AC remedial actions and regulatory outcomes of an FCPA investigation. We consider three types of AC remedial actions: AC turnover, adding a newly elected director to the AC, and replacing the AC chair. These actions are not associated with the likelihood of a regulatory investigation concluding in an enforcement action. However, in firms that face enforcement actions, adding a newly elected director is associated with lower monetary penalties, a shorter resolution time, and a lower likelihood of an independent FCPA monitor being required. Additional analyses suggest that these results are driven by firms in which the newly elected director is appointed as the AC chair. Overall, this study adds to the literatures on regulatory cooperation and audit committees.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"261 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141144944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group Audit Risk and Component Auditor Use: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis 集团审计风险与组件审计师的使用：差异分析
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-027
Katherine A. Gunny, Juan Mao, Jing Zhang
{"title":"Group Audit Risk and Component Auditor Use: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis","authors":"Katherine A. Gunny, Juan Mao, Jing Zhang","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study examines the association between group audit risk and component auditor use. The audit risk model defines audit risk as a function of the risk of material misstatement and detection risk. We use the revelation of an internal control material weakness (ICMW) as an event that increases the risk of material misstatement. Since higher risk of material misstatement requires the lead auditor to reduce detection risk, component auditor use could change after an ICMW. We find that the likelihood of starting component auditor use significantly increases after an ICMW. We also find an increase in the number of large component auditors used after an ICMW and such increase is concentrated in more pervasive entity-level ICMWs and higher-quality component auditors. Our evidence indicates that lead auditors perceive component auditor use as decreasing group audit risk. Our findings should inform the debate on the costs and benefits of component auditor use.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"54 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140795821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Costs of Public Auditor Oversight: Real Earnings Management and Innovation Loss 公共审计监督的成本：实际收益管理与创新损失
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-089
Phillip T. Lamoreaux, Noah M. Myers, Mason C. Snow
{"title":"Costs of Public Auditor Oversight: Real Earnings Management and Innovation Loss","authors":"Phillip T. Lamoreaux, Noah M. Myers, Mason C. Snow","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-089","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Prior research documents positive effects of PCAOB oversight on reporting and audit quality. However, to have a clear understanding of the net benefits of regulation, it is important to also investigate corresponding costs. To this end, we investigate the relation between PCAOB inspection oversight and real earnings management, a potentially value-destroying activity. We exploit the staggered timing of foreign governments’ allowance of PCAOB inspections in a generalized difference-in-differences design and find that companies engage in greater REM after the introduction of PCAOB inspection oversight. This relation is stronger for companies with a reduced ability to manage earnings via accruals. Lastly, we find a negative association between PCAOB oversight and innovation, particularly for firms making larger discretionary cuts to R&D expenditures. Collectively, our findings document unintended consequences of auditor regulatory oversight.\u0000 JEL Classifications: G38; M41; M42; M48.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140795581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Superstition, Risk Aversion, and Audit Quality: Evidence from China 迷信、风险规避与审计质量：来自中国的证据
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.2308/ajpt-2022-140
Huan Dou, Eunice S. Khoo, Weiqiang Tan, Janus Jian Zhang
{"title":"Superstition, Risk Aversion, and Audit Quality: Evidence from China","authors":"Huan Dou, Eunice S. Khoo, Weiqiang Tan, Janus Jian Zhang","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-2022-140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-2022-140","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine whether signing auditors’ perceptions of bad luck related to the Chinese zodiac-year superstition affect audit quality. We argue that these perceptions of bad luck heighten signing auditors’ sense of risk and lead them to act more cautiously in their zodiac years, leading to improved audit quality. We find that clients audited by lead engagement auditors in their zodiac years exhibit lower discretionary accruals and lower propensity to restate. The effects of zodiac-year superstition are evident among lead engagement auditors who are older and hold the partner title. The effects are also evident in large audit firms, which face greater reputation risk, and in provinces with a strong influence of traditional culture. In addition, we find some suggestive evidence that lead engagement auditors may increase audit effort during their zodiac years. Overall, our results support the contention that lead engagement auditors’ zodiac year beliefs positively affect audit quality.\u0000 JEL Classifications: D81; M40; M42; Z10.","PeriodicalId":330359,"journal":{"name":"Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"40 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140276293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信