Journal of Philosophy of Emotion最新文献_第3页

Emotions Under Trauma 创伤下的情绪

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2021-09-30 DOI: 10.33497/2021.summer.6

Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco

引用次数: 0

Précis: Propelled: How Boredom, Frustration, and Anticipation Lead Us to the Good Life 《前进:无聊、挫折和期待如何引领我们走向美好生活》

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2020-04-24 DOI: 10.33497/2022.winter.1

Andreas Elpidorou

引用次数: 11

Editorial: Introducing the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 社论:介绍《情感哲学杂志》

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2020-01-21 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.43

Cecilea Mun

引用次数: 0

Précis: Knowing Emotions pracimcis:了解情绪

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.42

R. A. Furtak

引用次数: 1

Emotional Cognitivism without Representationalism 没有表征主义的情感认知主义

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.35

Dave Beisecker

引用次数: 0

Emotions, Reasons, and Norms 情感、原因和规范

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.12

E. Simpson

{"title":"Emotions, Reasons, and Norms","authors":"E. Simpson","doi":"10.33497/jpe.v1i1.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/jpe.v1i1.12","url":null,"abstract":": A tension between acting morally and acting rationally is apparent in analyses of moral emotions that ascribe an inherent subjectivity to ethical thinking, leading thence to irresolvable differences between rational agents. This paper offers an account of emotional worthiness that shows how, even if moral reasons fall short of philosophical criteria of rationality, we can still accord reasonableness to them and recognize that the deliberative weight of social norms is sufficient to address the moral limitations of strategic rationality. The familiar dichotomy between reasoned and emotional responses to things is pretty clearly too sharp. After all, fear is a fitting response when one perceives a threat: the particular threat is a reason for the fear. Although it would not be irrational to feel nothing, the fearful response has a cognitive rationale absent from fear of something obviously harmless. Indeed, even fitting fears are subject to thoughtful criticism, as when one who accepts military norms suggests that fear of the enemy is not worthy of a soldier. Since such norms are themselves open to criticism, however, judgments of emotional worthiness may generate disputes that have no clear resolution, leading to a tension between norm-conformity and a philosophical understanding of rationality that has been identified by the anthropologist Michael Tomasello, among others. This discussion explicates and relaxes that tension. The problem is clear for moral emotions—such as sympathy and respect. They motivate us to care about others’ well-being in ways that may seem to collide with the philosophical criterion of rationality. According to this criterion, rational people","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124791990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Knowing Emotions: Replies to de Sousa, Beisecker, and Gallegos 了解情绪:回复de Sousa, Beisecker和Gallegos

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.30

R. A. Furtak

引用次数: 0

What are Emotions For? From Affective Epistemology to Affective Ethics 情绪的作用是什么?从情感认识论到情感伦理学

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.33

Francisco Gallegos

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引用次数: 1

Envy's Non-Innocent Victims 嫉妒的非无辜受害者

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.25

Iskra Fileva

{"title":"Envy's Non-Innocent Victims","authors":"Iskra Fileva","doi":"10.33497/jpe.v1i1.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/jpe.v1i1.25","url":null,"abstract":"Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications. Envy is a vice, and the envied are its victims. This is one of the major strands in our thinking about envy. Thus, we say such things as, \"Be careful with Bertha, she envies you,\" or, \"Don't believe what Gus says about Ethan—it's envy speaking,\" alleging that Bertha may harm you out of spite or that Gus is speaking to undermine Ethan's reputation behind his back. We find this view in literature as well: Dumas' Count of Monte Cristo, for instance, is so envied for his personal qualities, quick rise in the ranks, and the love of a beautiful woman that he is framed for a crime. In Jean Genet's play The Maids, two maids envy their mistress and conspire to kill her. Balzac's character Bette, from The Cousin Bette, envies the social status and superior physical beauty of her cousin, Hortense Hulot, and plots to destroy Hortense's happiness. The view of envy as a vice with the envied as its victims goes as far back as the Book of Genesis, where we find the story about Cain and Abel: Cain, envious of God's love for Abel, kills Abel. And in the Parson's Tale, Geoffrey Chaucer suggests that envy is the worst of all sins, \"For truly, all other sins are sometimes only against one special virtue, but","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132632579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Is Contempt Redeemable? 轻蔑可以挽回吗?

Journal of Philosophy of Emotion Pub Date : 2019-01-30 DOI: 10.33497/jpe.v1i1.10

D. Ronald

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引用次数: 5