{"title":"“Semantic Dualism” and the Role of the Body in Emotional Experience","authors":"Michelle Maiese","doi":"10.33497/2023.summer.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.summer.2","url":null,"abstract":"Mun’s proposed taxonomy of theories of emotions highlights important commonalities and differences among a wide range of philosophical and psychological accounts and provides an astute mapping of the theoretical landscape. My critical comments focus primarily on the metaphysical account of the mind-body relation that Mun presents, and the implications of this “semantic dualist” account for three of the book’s central topics: (1) conscious experience, (2) underived intentionality, and (3) what it means to provide an embodied cognitive theory of emotions.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136276610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis: Interdisciplinary Foundations","authors":"Cecilea Mun","doi":"10.33497/2023.summer.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.summer.1","url":null,"abstract":"In the following précis, I provide a summary of Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion. Much of what I say can be found in the “About the “Book” section of my book, although I provide some elaborations here. My summary focuses primarily on the central aim of the book, and the general strategy that I take in order to achieve my aim. What I present is a proposal for an interdisciplinary science of emotion. That proposal goes by the name of meta-semantic pluralisme, and a central principle of this proposal is what I refer to as the α-ωe principle. My summary includes chapter summaries, which provides not only a more detailed account of my general strategy, but also a summary of the fruitfulness of this first principle for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion, including the work it can do in the areas of metaphysics, language, consciousness, intentionality, rationality, and epistemology. Finally, one should note that some of the contents of this précis should also provide a response to at least some of the commentators’ requests for clarification, and I address the concerns not covered in this précis in my subsequent replies.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136276612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to Maiese and Mendonça","authors":"Cecilea Mun","doi":"10.33497/2023.summer.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.summer.4","url":null,"abstract":"I begin with my replies to Michelle Maiese, especially with respect to the hard problem of consciousness, my version of reductive-realism, my version of a type-identity theory, my version of an embodied cognitive theory, and questions regarding exactly what an enactive or embodied theory entails. I also address Dina Mendonça’s concerns about cultural diversity in the study of emotion, in the section on reductive realism, type-identity theory, and objectivity in the science of emotion. I then move on to addressing the concerns raised by Mendonça on meta-emotions, reflexivity, and the third kind of language of emotion (a meta-language). In summary, I hope these replies give the reader a better idea of meta-semantic pluralisme, semantic dualism, semantic dualisme, including the various ways in which they might contribute to the discourse on the mind, emotion, and meta-emotions, as well as some inspiration for their own research and future publications.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136276611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reflexivity and Meta-Emotions in the Interdisciplinary Project for a Better Understanding of Emotions","authors":"Dina Mendonça","doi":"10.33497/2023.summer.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.summer.3","url":null,"abstract":"The localized commentary focuses on the way in which meta-emotions appear in the last chapter, and how reflexivity more generally is addressed. It shows how meta-emotions require a detailed explanation, which should capture their role and place within the interdisciplinary theoretical proposal in the already dense book. Though the commentary is limited to this specific issue, it is important to acknowledge and admire the proposal for its unity based on an interdisciplinary foundation. It highlights why every theory of emotion seems to capture something important about the nature of emotions. Nevertheless, Mun’s book would have been greatly improved with the connection of her own proposal to previous work done on meta-emotion. Though it is understandable it did not take place in the book, this commentary aims to point out possible future research directions which will connect the unifying hypothesis with reflexivity of emotions.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136241585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: An Apology and An Introduction","authors":"Liam Lobl","doi":"10.33497/2023.winter.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2023.winter.1","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>N/A</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124337373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grief and Self-Knowledge","authors":"Dave Beisecker","doi":"10.33497/2022.summer.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.5","url":null,"abstract":"In Grief: A Philosophical Guide, Michael Cholbi characterizes grief as a “questioning attitude”; it calls attention to and prompts questions about the significance of the departed specifically to the griever. Accordingly, Cholbi assigns grief a largely self-directed cognitive purpose: grief’s goodness is that it leads—when things go well—to greater self-knowledge. In this paper, I question this claim. Calling upon an ordinary episode of grief, I argue that there are at least a few cases of grief in which greater self-knowledge is neither likely nor reasonably expected.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121301203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis: Grief: A Philosophical Guide","authors":"M. Cholbi","doi":"10.33497/2022.summer.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.1","url":null,"abstract":"Précis of Grief: A Philosophical Guide.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128102059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vicarious Grief, Mental Health, and the Duty to Grieve","authors":"C. Garland","doi":"10.33497/2022.summer.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.2","url":null,"abstract":"In Grief: A Philosophical Guide, Michael Cholbi presents a compelling account of the nature of grief. To further illustrate how fruitful the philosophical study of grief, and Cholbi’s account of it is, I present three sets of comments. The first regards the extent to which Cholbi’s account of grief also provides an account of vicarious grief. The second concerns the paradox of grief and the good of grief, and suggests one reason we may recommend grief is that grieving is healthy. The final set of comments pertains to the duty to grieve, and whether this duty may extend to other emotionally rich activities, such as falling in love.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116902142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to Garland, Ben-Ze'ev, Timmerman, and Beisecker","authors":"M. Cholbi","doi":"10.33497/2022.summer.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.6","url":null,"abstract":"I respond here to commentators’ concerns about the scope of grief, further clarifying the role of practical identity in those whose deaths we grieve; elaborating my understanding of grief as egocentric; defending my own resolution of the paradox of grief against alternative resolutions proposed by my commentators; and substantiating the role of self-knowledge in the self-regarding duty to grieve.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124586661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grief’s Badness and the Paradox of Grief","authors":"T. Timmerman","doi":"10.33497/2022.summer.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33497/2022.summer.4","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I focus on the points of disagreement between Cholbi and myself about the nature of grief. More precisely, I am first going to provide reasons to reject Cholbi’s positive account of grief, specifically the condition that grief necessarily brings about a change in our practical identity. Then I am going to discuss the so-called Paradox of Grief, raising a few concerns I have about Cholbi’s solution and suggesting there is more to be said in favour of an existing solution (i.e., Pain as a Cost) he dismissed. My main goal is to raise these issues for discussion, rather than to prove my favoured view is true. I’m not quite sure what the correct account of grief is, though I am sure that Cholbi gets at least much of it right.","PeriodicalId":329066,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Emotion","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128463934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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