Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series最新文献

What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 替代制裁意味着什么?

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2019-10-28 DOI: 10.2307/1600237

D. Kahan

引用次数: 54

Informed Short Selling, Fails-to-Deliver, and Abnormal Returns 知情卖空，未能交付和异常回报

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2016-05-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2461088

Thomas Stratmann, John W. Welborn

引用次数: 10

Measuring Illegal and Legal Corruption in American States: Some Results from the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Corruption in America Survey 衡量美国各州的非法和合法腐败:埃德蒙·j·萨弗拉美国道德腐败调查中心的一些结果

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2015-03-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2579300

Oguzhan Dincer, Michael Johnston

引用次数: 22

Lost Opportunity: How Institutional Corruption Hampered Efforts to Protect Worker Health in America 失去的机会:制度腐败如何阻碍了美国保护工人健康的努力

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2015-03-02 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2572434

Jim Morris

引用次数: 0

Crony Capitalism, American Style: What are We Talking About Here? 美国风格的裙带资本主义:我们在这里谈论的是什么?

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2014-10-22 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2513490

Malcolm S. Salter

引用次数: 11

Tactical Asset Allocation Using Investors’ Sentiment 利用投资者情绪的战术资产配置

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2014-01-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1738946

Soohun Kim, Hyoung-Goo Kang

引用次数: 2

Blinding as a Solution to Institutional Corruption 制度腐败的盲目性解决方案

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-09-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2321353

C. Robertson

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引用次数: 1

Political Finance in the United Kingdom 英国的政治金融

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-08-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2317505

Timothy Winters

引用次数: 0

What's the Big Deal?: The Ethics of Public-Private Partnerships Related to Food and Health 这有什么大不了的?与食品和卫生有关的公私伙伴关系的道德规范

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-05-23 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2268079

J. Marks

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引用次数: 15

The Effects of Earmarks on the Likelihood of Reelection 专项拨款对连任可能性的影响

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1608230

Thomas Stratmann

引用次数: 36