CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)最新文献_第9页

Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.: The Search for Investor Protection Continues... 琼斯诉哈里斯律师事务所:继续寻求投资者保护

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-06-19 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1627369

Mark Andreu, Ryan John Bollman

引用次数: 1

Washington: The New Wall Street? 华盛顿:新华尔街?

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-04-11 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1587751

W. Gruver

引用次数: 0

Debtor’s Discharge Under United States Bankruptcy Code: Mechanisms and Consequences 美国破产法下债务人的解除:机制和后果

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-21 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1646608

V. Malhotra

引用次数: 0

Globalized Finance and National Regulation: The Influence of Internationalization on Supervisory Consolidation 金融全球化与国家监管:国际化对监管整合的影响

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1574484

R. Prabhakar

{"title":"Globalized Finance and National Regulation: The Influence of Internationalization on Supervisory Consolidation","authors":"R. Prabhakar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1574484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574484","url":null,"abstract":"Financial regulatory reform remains high on global and national political agendas. Some proposals call for the consolidation of regulatory structures by merging or eliminating existing regulatory agencies. Financial supervisory consolidation has occurred in a number of developed countries over the past two and a half decades. This paper seeks to explain why a substantial number of developed countries have opted to reform their financial regulatory structures from a sector-based to a consolidated model. Based on an ordered logistic regression analysis of a newly created cross-national financial dataset, this paper argues against the prevailing literature in globalization that has discounted the influence of multinational firms on domestic politics. It moreover disputes the assumptions of realist-based and policy diffusion perspectives that prioritize hegemonic market power. This paper demonstrates how the internationalization of finance, through the spread of global financial services firms (“conglomerates”), has driven supervisory consolidation in developed countries. These global firms prefer reduced compliance costs through the elimination of duplicative regulation. Motivated by competitiveness concerns, politicians and regulators in highly internationalized countries are pressured to consolidate financial supervision, lest they cause global firms to move elsewhere because of unfavorably duplicative regulation. A consolidated supervisor offers lower compliance costs compared to a system of sector-based supervisors by eliminating duplicative regulation. In sum, the higher the level of financial internationalization in a country, the greater the level of supervisory consolidation. This paper revises the undergraduate thesis, \"And Then There Was One: Conglomeration, Internationalization, and the Formation of Consolidated Financial Supervisors\": (http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1368797).","PeriodicalId":309706,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127937069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Efficiencies and Horizontal Merger Regulation: Is There Any Room for Further Reforms? 效率与横向并购监管:还有进一步改革的空间吗?

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1737812

Mario Ybar

引用次数: 0

Automatic Recapitalization Alternatives 自动资本重组方案

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1568302

R. Collender, Forrest W. Pafenberg, Robin Seiler

引用次数: 3

Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk 公平、效用与市场风险

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1565834

Jeff E. Schwartz

{"title":"Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk","authors":"Jeff E. Schwartz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1565834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1565834","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, I argue that we lack a satisfactory theory about how disclosure, the centerpiece of securities regulation, serves investor interests. To close this gap, I contend that the regulations should be viewed as part of a broader societal framework that protects individuals from stock-market risk. I flesh out this notion in three ways. First, I set out to justify protection from market risk as a valid societal goal. To do so, I appeal to Rawlsian and utilitarian notions of justice. These moral theories contain the principle that a just society helps individuals manage risk. I argue that this principle applies to the risk in the stock market - its volatility. Second, I describe how society currently protects investors from market swings. I contend that securities regulation provides one form of protection. Beyond that, I argue, we rely on a largely market-based paradigm, where individuals are expected to manage volatility on their own by diversifying their portfolios and investing for the long term. In the final part of the Article, I look at the normative implications of this analysis. I ask whether today’s risk-management framework is effective, efficient, and fair. I argue that it comes up short in these regards and consider avenues of reform. I posit that reforms to securities regulations offer little upside, but that we can help investors through the creation of institutions exogenous to the market that facilitate better portfolio diversification and the equitable sharing of market risk across society and generations.","PeriodicalId":309706,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122514293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

A Comparison of XBRL Filings to Corporate 10-Ks - Evidence from the Voluntary Filing Program XBRL申报与公司10- k的比较——来自自愿申报计划的证据

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-02-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1397658

Jon W. Bartley, Y. A. Chen, E. Taylor

引用次数: 112

Is it Possible to Re-Privatize the U.S. Financial System? 美国金融体系有可能重新私有化吗?

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1525008

R. C. Whalen

{"title":"Is it Possible to Re-Privatize the U.S. Financial System?","authors":"R. C. Whalen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1525008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1525008","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1930s, when the U.S. Congress interposed government regulation of banks for market discipline, the role of the state in the American financial system has steadily grown. While politicians and executives from the financial services industry characterize the relationship as a 'partnership,' the degree of control exercised by state and federal government over banks and other financial intermediaries has grown enormously over the years – even as the influence exercised over Washington by the largest banks has increased to the same degree. The growth of government involvement in finance, coupled with the growing federal debt and the rising political sway of the large, 'too big to fail' banks that act as dealers in U.S. government debt, raise troubling questions about the future of American democracy. This paper briefly reviews the growth in the role of the government in regulating and supporting the operations of banks and other financial intermediaries since the Great Depression and before. The paper concludes by asking whether this socialization of the risks taken by financial institutions and risk in general, and the growing political power of some of the largest financial services corporations in the world, can be reversed or even should be if consolidation and ever larger banks are the norm.","PeriodicalId":309706,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131369974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Indian Takeover Regulation - Under Reformed and Over Modified 印度收购法规——改革和过度修改

CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-11-30 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1517017

Sandeep Parekh

{"title":"Indian Takeover Regulation - Under Reformed and Over Modified","authors":"Sandeep Parekh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1517017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1517017","url":null,"abstract":"The takeover of substantial number of shares, voting rights or control in a listed Indian company attracts the provision of SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations 1997. The regulations have been amended nearly 20 times since inception, though the amendments have mainly concentrated on areas which needed no amendment. At the same time a vast number of obvious problems have not been rectified in the regulations. The large number of amendments have also created requirement of a compulsory tender offer of such unnecessary complexity as to make it virtually unintelligible to even a well qualified professional. This paper argues that the complexity in the trigger points for disclosure and tender offer introduced over the years lacks a philosophy, and most of the amendments can not only be deleted but a very simple structure can be introduced making compliance of the regulations straight forward and easy to understand by management of listed companies. Certain other areas which need amendments have also been discussed. Chief amongst these are the provisions relating to consolidation of holdings, conditional tender offers, hostility to hostile acquisitions, definitional oddities, payment of control premium in the guise of non compete fees, treatment of differential voting rights, treatment of Global Depository Receipts and disclosure enhancements. This paper does not try to portray a particular combination of numbers as the best possible set of trigger points and compulsory acquisition numbers but advocates that whatever numbers are adopted should not be changed for several decades. Arguments that state that the changing economic condition requires constant changes with these numbers, it is argued is wrong. [W.P. No. 2009-11-06]","PeriodicalId":309706,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132578873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1