{"title":"自动资本重组方案","authors":"R. Collender, Forrest W. Pafenberg, Robin Seiler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1568302","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Regulators are seeking ways to reduce the procyclical effect of the current capital regulatory regime and the spillovers associated with financial firm distress. This paper examines one set of proposed solutions: ex post mechanisms that would automatically recapitalize systemically important financial institutions during periods of distress. Such mechanisms include contingent capital notes (CCNs) and capital insurance.","PeriodicalId":309706,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Automatic Recapitalization Alternatives\",\"authors\":\"R. Collender, Forrest W. Pafenberg, Robin Seiler\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1568302\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Regulators are seeking ways to reduce the procyclical effect of the current capital regulatory regime and the spillovers associated with financial firm distress. This paper examines one set of proposed solutions: ex post mechanisms that would automatically recapitalize systemically important financial institutions during periods of distress. Such mechanisms include contingent capital notes (CCNs) and capital insurance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":309706,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"63 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-03-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1568302\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1568302","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulators are seeking ways to reduce the procyclical effect of the current capital regulatory regime and the spillovers associated with financial firm distress. This paper examines one set of proposed solutions: ex post mechanisms that would automatically recapitalize systemically important financial institutions during periods of distress. Such mechanisms include contingent capital notes (CCNs) and capital insurance.
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