HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES最新文献_第2页

PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND CARE FOR THE SOUL PatoČka的艺术哲学和对灵魂的关怀

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-602-612

J. Josl

{"title":"PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND CARE FOR THE SOUL","authors":"J. Josl","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-602-612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-602-612","url":null,"abstract":"The Socratic theme of care for the soul expresses in Patocka’s\u0000late thought his desire to keep the understanding of human\u0000existence as a place of turn, metanoia, of struggle between\u0000authenticity and inauthenticity. Th is tendency not only goes\u0000against Heidegger and his late philosophy, but is also opposed\u0000to Patocka’s own earlier project of asubjective phenomenology\u0000as well. Th is essay argues, fi rstly, that the importance of\u0000subjectivity and existential dimension is still present in art\u0000and secondly, that art represents for Patocka sort of care for\u0000the soul. Th e argument has three stages. First, I demonstrate\u0000what Patocka means by soul or experience of soul and how we\u0000should understand the term ‘care.’ I argue that what Patocka\u0000understands under the concept of soul consists has freedom,\u0000krisis, and physis as its main features. Th e second part\u0000demonstrates that in Patocka’s view, these features are present\u0000in art. Th e last part compares art and philosophy as two kinds\u0000of care for the soul and demonstrates the limits of art as care\u0000of the soul. My conclusion is that art represents for Patocka a\u0000limited form of care for the soul compared to philosophy.\u0000However, according to Patocka, in current situation it is the\u0000only way of care for the soul that is left .","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129709694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

“INARTICULATE SOUNDS” OF PHENOMENOLOGY: WITTGENSTEIN AND THE THESIS “NOTHING NOTHS” 现象学的“不清晰的声音”:维特根斯坦与命题“无无”

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-487-501

Georgy Chernavin

引用次数: 0

DEFENESTRATION 抛出窗外

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-760-781

Marc Richir

{"title":"DEFENESTRATION","authors":"Marc Richir","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-760-781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-760-781","url":null,"abstract":"The article « La Défenestration » by Belgian philosopher Marc Richir has been translated into Russian for the first time for this issue of the “Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology.” In his early work “The Defenestration” Richir raises the question of relation between the subject and conceivable world. Here, a philosopher is pictured contemplating the world through the window of his tower. In such detachment from the world the thinker finds himself according to all Modern philosophies of consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology inherits this detachment, since Husserl imposes the structure of transcendental ego as external to the world. Richir abolishes the concept of transcendental ego with the help of heideggerian Dasein, but analyzing Heidegger’s ontology he comes to the conclusion that the latter remains fixated on beings. Believing a person to live in the fundamental openness of Being, Heidegger places such a person in the secondary world of “truth.” In order to overcome the remains of traditional philosophy in Heidegger’s ontology Richir turns to Merleau-Ponty’ “cosmology of the visible.” The author takes the Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that everything visible has something fundamentally invisible in it. This allows him to discover the universe of “nothing” (rien), which includes both the visible and what is “behind” it. As a result Richir overcomes the classical dualism of the sensual and the intelligible. The concept of defenestration places the subject and the world in the same universe.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127687181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

PHENOMENOLOGY WITHOUT EGOLOGY: EDITH STEIN AS AN ORIGINAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKER 没有自我学的现象学:伊迪丝·斯坦作为一个原创性的现象学思想家

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-2-463-483

T. Burns

{"title":"PHENOMENOLOGY WITHOUT EGOLOGY: EDITH STEIN AS AN ORIGINAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKER","authors":"T. Burns","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-2-463-483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-2-463-483","url":null,"abstract":"Edith Stein is considered a leading figure in the early phenomenological movement and the disciple who performed in the best way the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl, and yet her relationship to phenomenology remains unclear in the literature. This article seeks to add clarity to her relationship to phenomenology while considering three inescapably related questions. (1) What did Stein conceive phenomenology to be? (2) How should we understand Husserl’s influence on Stein? (3) Was Stein an original phenomenological thinker? I argue that Stein conceives of phenomenology as an epistemological critique that aims to clarify the essential foundations of knowledge. It involves intentional analysis that proceeds by way of essential-seeing (Wesensschau), which can be brought about through the method of free imaginative variation, and its intentional analysis involves close attention to the relationship between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. I argue that the primary influence Husserl exerts on Stein is in the development of phenomenology as conceived in his Logical Investigations. Finally, I offer an understanding of how Stein conceived of her differences with Husserl on the issue of idealism in order to argue that Stein’s phenomenological writings in On the Problem of Empathy and “Sentient Causality” offer us a novel phenomenological account of the human being that begins with the ego but escapes being a mere egology. Edith Stein’s phenomenology of the human person begins with the ego and its experiences, and yet, she identifies within those experiences a certain kind of extra-egoic content, viz. experiences of my sentient states.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125251057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: WITTGENSTEIN BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND POSITIVISM 科学、知识与理解:维特根斯坦在现象学与实证主义之间

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-460-486

O. Beran

{"title":"SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: WITTGENSTEIN BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND POSITIVISM","authors":"O. Beran","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-460-486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-460-486","url":null,"abstract":"Th e paper explores some philosophical consequences of the phenomenological criticisms addressed (indirectly) to logical positivism. It introduces arguments by Husserl and Patočka concerning the duality inherent to the notion of world, as suggested by modern scientism: the real world is alleged to be diff erent from, and hidden behind, the everyday appearance (perception) of the world and things within it. Carnap’s project of reconstructing (scientifi c) knowledge in reductionist terms of psychological—atomic sense-data—and, ultimately, physical objects distinguishes him from Husserl: for the latter, meaningful experience originates in primitive encounters with meaningful things. Both, however, share a certain preoccupation with reductionist analyses of scientifi c rigour, while this tendency has been abandoned in Wittgenstein’s works. His expanded notion of verifi cation betrays motivations of a phenomenological kind. He tries to show that the relationship between simpler and more complex contents of knowledge is a relationship between contents playing diff erent, but interlinked, roles within our practices of understanding and making ourselves intelligible. Understanding other people and the events in their lives in terms of a soul (and what happens to it) is not a marginal, eccentric, or derivative case: it is the central, primitive form of this understanding. Wittgenstein’s working with the notion of ‘soul’ parallels Husserl’s analyses from Ideas II.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122017287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

RENAUD BARBARAS AND THE MULTIPLE MEANING OF “LIFE” 雷诺·巴巴拉斯与“生命”的多重意义

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-516-535

Jakub Čapek

{"title":"RENAUD BARBARAS AND THE MULTIPLE MEANING OF “LIFE”","authors":"Jakub Čapek","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-516-535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-516-535","url":null,"abstract":"Th e recent philosophy of Renaud Barbaras counts among the most original contributions to the phenomenology of life. My article examines it in the light of some conceptual observations based on the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Th e early phenomenological texts illustrate the complexity of the phenomenological approach to the living inasmuch as “life” can be said in diff erent ways, it is plural in meaning; further, life is also plural in that it can be attributed to a plurality of beings (consciousness, organisms, certain forms of existence, etc.). When developing his own account, Barbaras starts from a profound analysis of the phenomenological idea of correlation and comes to a new notion of life which is no longer attributed to organisms but to the world. Th e article critically follows this move from the life of organisms to the life of the world and articulates certain questions that this move can raise. Th e background of these questions is the double plurality of the notion of life. Even though saying that “life” has multiple meanings and attributions is purely formal and general, this multiplicity can serve as a ground for the phenomenological analysis of the way life is indeed experienced in its diff erent meanings.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121789457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

N. HARTMANN’S QUESTION OF “BEING AS BEING” AND M. HEIDEGGER’S QUESTION OF “THE MEANING OF BEING”: TWO VIEWS OVER ONTOLOGY 哈特曼的“作为存在的存在”问题与海德格尔的“存在的意义”问题:关于本体论的两种观点

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-67-86

M. Gusev

{"title":"N. HARTMANN’S QUESTION OF “BEING AS BEING” AND M. HEIDEGGER’S QUESTION OF “THE MEANING OF BEING”: TWO VIEWS OVER ONTOLOGY","authors":"M. Gusev","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-67-86","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-67-86","url":null,"abstract":"The article addresses two versions of returning to ontology and two views on the nature of ontology. The aim of the article is to reveal the way two 20 th century philosophers—Nicolai Hartmann and Mar-tin Heidegger—saw the meaning and purpose of ontology, as well as the answer to the question as to why each of them thought that the other’s ontological approach was fundamentally flawed. My investi-gation is based on Hartmann’s book Ontology: Laying the Foundations and Heidegger’s book Being and Time . Hartmann’s option of returning to ontology implies the question about being as being. It is im-possible to reduce being as being (being as such) to being in some definite, limited sense. Thus, being as being possesses absolute universality and cannot be defined, albeit one can distinguish some structure in it. Not only being is always both being-there ( Dasein ) and being-so ( Sosein ), but being is also always either real or ideal. Hartmann is certain that the restriction of being as being to being in some definite sense and the miscomprehension of that four-component system leads up to various errors. According to Hartmann, Heidegger misses the ontological question because he puts the question on being as it is given instead of that on being as it is in itself. According to Heidegger, Hartmann misses the ontological question because he stays on the grounds of the unrestricted speculations instead of understanding being and its meaning by means of being itself. The question arises as to who of them is right. As a matter of fact, there are no arguments that both philosophers would deem acceptable. Each of them is deaf to the opponent’s opinion. In addition, we are not obligated to accept neither Heidegger nor Hartman’s opinion because there are certainly more than just two views on ontology. of being, being as being, phenomenology, world, Dasein .","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127629700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

WHY PHENOMENOLOGY COULD NOT COMMIT THE LINGUISTIC TURN? 为什么现象学不能进行语言转向?

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-558-583

Anastasia A. Medova

{"title":"WHY PHENOMENOLOGY COULD NOT COMMIT THE LINGUISTIC TURN?","authors":"Anastasia A. Medova","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-558-583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-558-583","url":null,"abstract":"Frege and Husserl are traditionally regarded as the precursors of the linguistic turn; however, the importance of their ideas for this event still is not fully comprehended. This article contributes to such comprehension: the principles of the linguistic turn in its analytical interpretation provided by Rorty are applied as an indicator revealing the commonality and difference of Frege’s and Husserl’s positions regarding key issues of their concepts. The connection of the philosophers’ ideas with the linguistic turn is viewed in the context of their interpretation of predicativity, propositionality, contextuality of meaning, and ways of categorization. The analysis conducted gives rise to distinguishing between Frege’s and Husserl’s referential schemes. It is based on the differences in the characteristics of the connection between perception and predication. In conclusion, the arguments against Frege’s and Husserl’s involvement in the linguistic turn are emphasized. These arguments stem from the idea of the primacy of sense over language fundamental for both philosophers who proceed from the fact that certain a priori logical relations underlie utterances or other acts. There is a more solid argument which does not allow considering Frege’s and Husserl’s legacies as its source. This argument consists in the fact that they regard sense as an objective, communicable, and universal phenomenon independent of its carriers, not inherently linguistic, and pre-logical which is due to its intentional nature according to Husserl and logical “indecomposability” of concepts according to Frege.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133682141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

NICOLAI HARTMANN’S PHILOSOPHY OF OBJECTIVE SPIRIT AS SEEN THROUGH HIS COLLEAGUES’ REVIEWS 尼古拉·哈特曼的客观精神哲学，从他同事的评论中可以看出

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-160-181

S. Kluck

引用次数: 0

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING: THE CASE OF ROCK MUSIC 音乐理解的现象学:以摇滚乐为例

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-607-624

E. Kosilova

{"title":"PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING: THE CASE OF ROCK MUSIC","authors":"E. Kosilova","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-607-624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-607-624","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the problem of understanding the meaning of music on the example of rock music. The purpose of the article is to find a criterion for such an understanding. For this purpose, the question is considered as to what musical meaning is. Since rock compositions usually have a short length and one explicit melody, it can be said that musical understanding is the grasping of this melody. The question arises as to what it means to grab a melody, and whether it means the ability to sing it. Not necessarily, it turns out–rather, it means capturing its pattern. The idea that music is a language is rejected: music does not have external meaning. The article discusses several examples of the “translation” of one melody into another style or mode. In such a translation the hyletic data changes, but the pattern remains. This is associated with the preservation of musical meaning and musical thought. The most important criterion of musical understanding is the existential experience of the melody. To understand music, to grasp its meaning, the listener must be open, that is, be ready to perceive music as an aesthetic object. At the moment of listening, music is a saturated phenomenon, because it completely fills its horizon. Any other, alternative music is impossible. The problem of corporeality in the perception of music is examined. It is especially important in rock music, which usually has a clear rhythm. The pattern of the melody also has a spatial character, which refers to corporality. Here we can talk about a certain “resonance” of external music with the inner musical world of the listener.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133239426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1