HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES最新文献

{"title":"THE INGARDENIAN DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSEPARABILITY AND DEPENDENCE: HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATIONS","authors":"M. Piwowarczyk","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-532-551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-532-551","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I present the Ingardenian distinction between inseparability and dependence. My considerations are both historical and systematic. The historical part of the paper accomplishes two goals. First, I show that in the Brentanian tradition the problem of existential (or broadly: ontological) conditioning was entangled into parts—whole theories. The best examples of such an approach are Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of the object and Edmund Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes. Second, I exhibit the context within which Ingarden distinguished inseparability and dependence. Moreover, Ingarden’s motivations are presented: the problem of understanding the Husserlian concept of “immanent transcendence,” the issue of the existence of purely intentional objects, and finally the problem of the relationship between individual objects and ideas. The systematic part deals with the ambiguity of Ingarden’s definition of inseparability. I seek to improve this definition by reference to the distinction (made by Ingarden himself) between absolute and summative wholes. I also present some divisions of inseparability and dependence and investigate whether these types of existential conditioning are reflexive, symmetric, or transitive.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131402998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"LISTENING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PATH TOWARDS LETTING THINGS BE","authors":"Maja Bjelica","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-212-231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-212-231","url":null,"abstract":"The Western philosophical and scientific tradition was and still is based on rationalism, objectivity, truths that are all sought from the ocularcentric paradigm. Many thinkers, however, have been recognising this perspective to be exclusive towards the other senses, and therefore insufficient. Listening, as enabled by the auditory sense, has a potential for revealing a deeper sense of being in the world. In this article listening is presented as a possible way towards inhabiting our life-world and nonetheless “to let things be.” In order to do so, an interdisciplinary approach of research is adopted. First, the author offers some perspectives from the field of the ethics of listening, where the thoughts of Lisbeth Lipari, Luce Irigaray and others expose listening as an intersubjective gesture of encounter with the other in acceptance. Through his philosophy of listening, Jean-Luc Nancy, one of the crucial voices in this study, offers an explication of how listening can be the force of liberating sense and senses. Further on, an account on auditory phenomenology is offered, combining it with and stressing the importance of Husserl’s understanding of intersubjectivity. These perspectives are then enriched with echoes from acoustic ecology and its experiences of listening to the environment. The reverberations of multiple voices presented in this text allow for an understanding of listening as an intersubjective and mutually constitutive activity. As such, it involves a liberation of sense and allows for an openness to being and beings.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131536550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"ARGUING FOR THE “DESTRUCTION” OF THE A PRIORI. THE PROMPTS FROM HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY","authors":"Stathis Livadas","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-114-140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-114-140","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues against the concept of a priori and essence as they have been traditionally thematized in the course of the old metaphysical-idealist tradition. Specifically, I argue against the existence of an ontological a priori, often endowed with metaphysical-platonic connotations, by attempting to “relocate” it in the subjective sphere and thus reduce it to the being and modes of being of a transcendental subjectivity. To do so, I will be appealing to a phenomenological, Husserlian approach, while pointing to a possible connection with the Kantian views on the matter and also taking into account certain views in the secondary literature. Since a substantial part of my position is associated with the notion of a constituting, transcendental subjectivity further reducible to the origin of inner temporality, I intend to show that the objectivity constraints put in this way on the conception of the transcendental a priori may ultimately lead to a “destruction” of its traditional ontological sense. Given that in transcendental phenomenology the concept of a priori “appears” both in the constituting and the constituted level, I aim to show that it is precisely in this context that the a priori cannot rid itself of the vestiges of factuality brought in by means of the very constitutive, subjective processes implying ipso facto the question of the role of the constituting origin of temporality.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"196 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134106620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"VALUES AS NORMS—HOW TO DEFEND AN INTRICATE CONCEPT OF NICOLAI HARTMANN","authors":"F. Hausen","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-182-210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-182-210","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134144766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"SAUL KRIPKE AND PHENOMENOLOGY. THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF S. KRIPKE’S ARTICLE “VACUOUS NAMES AND FICTIONAL ENTITIES”","authors":"Alexander Prokhorov","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-670-675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-670-675","url":null,"abstract":"Цель настоящей статьи — представить русскоязычному читателю перевод одной из важных работ Сола Крипке и показать, чем этот текст может быть интересен и полезен именно феноменологу. Крипке критикует теорию референции Рассела-Фреге и логический анализ Хинтикки. В обоих случаях он отстаивает собственные воззрения на предикат существования и показывает, как его статус изменяется в зависимости от того, о каком типе сущности идёт речь в конкретном суждении. Решение вопроса о статусе предиката существования зависит от правильной оценки рассматриваемой ситуации и в некоторых случаях может определять условия истинности суждения. Крипке указывает, что классические теории референции не универсальны и без специальных оговорок применимы только в ограниченных пределах эмпирической реальности. Для аргументации он обращается к художественному вымыслу и говорит о литературном персонаже как об особом типе сущности, существующей в силу человеческой деятельности. Также он рассматривает вопрос о возможных отношениях между литературным персонажем и его историческим прототипом. Примеры Крипке, его собственная теория референции, в центре которой находится сущность, его онтология художественного вымысла и искусная техника его рассуждений оказываются полезным материалом как для иллюстрации базовых проблем феноменологии, связанных с редукцией, варьированием феноменов в фантазии и региональными онтологиями, так и для практической работы феноменолога. Исследования Крипке, и особенно примеры с вымыслом второго порядка (то есть вымыслом, заключённом внутри другого вымысла), могут, в частности, использоваться в рамках феноменологии языка, когда перед началом ноэтико-ноэматического анализа требуется описать взаимодействие автора, читателя и вымышленной реальности.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129374046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"P. CHEYNE, A. HAMILTON, M. PADDISON (EDS.) PHILOSOPHY OF RHYTHM: AESTHETICS, MUSIC, POETICS. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019 ISBN 978-0-19-934778-0","authors":"Ineta Kivle","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-312-319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-312-319","url":null,"abstract":"The review provides an outline of the collective monograph The Philosophy of Rhythm: Aesthetics, Music, Poetics, edited by Peter Cheyne, Andy Hamilton and Max Paddison, published by Oxford University Press, 2019. Concept of rhythm is analysed from different perspectives—philosophical, musicological and psychological. It considers a multidisciplinary approach and also includes both analytic and continental philosophical traditions. Rhythm is viewed as a pulse that is going through various metric structures including particular pieces of music, paintings, examples of poetry and philosophy. Twenty eight authors from the entire world discuss rhythm and specify definitions of rhythm. They try to give answers on crucial questions uniting experienced rhythm in philosophy and arts, thus giving an important contribution to rhythm studies. The book is organised thematically and based on different aspects of rhythm manifestations. The main questions of the research are as follows: How is rhythm experienced? Does rhythm necessarily involve movement? Why rhythm is so deeply rooted in human? How can static configurations be rhythmic? How does a rhythmic structure change from a stable pattern to a flexible texture? All these questions concern two interwoven issues common for the volume in general: immanence of rhythm to arts and human experience of it.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115059571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"THE TELEOLOGICAL THINKING IN NICOLAI HARTMANN. A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HARTMANN’S THEORY OF THE FINAL CAUSALITY OF NATURE AND KANT’S VIEWS ON TELEOLOGY","authors":"A. Scanziani","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-140-159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-140-159","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122478654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"THE PARADOXES OF ANALOGICAL REPRESENTATION: THE ORIGINAL AND A COPY IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION THEORY","authors":"Elena V. Drozhetskaya","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-208-228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-208-228","url":null,"abstract":"This article deals with a phenomenological standpoint on paradoxicality of image-consciousness (imagination), i.e., an analogical representation in which an image possesses material support. Contrary to tradition, E. Husserl thought of imagination as being both an intuitive and a mediate act. Husserl’s opinion results from paradoxical nature of an image itself: an image (Bildobjekt) appears but it doesn’t exist, while the exhibited thing (Bildsujet)does exist but doesn’t appear in proper sense. The paradoxicality of an image results in its double conflict — with actual present and with Bildsujet. Initially, Husserl considered that the more analogous features an image possesses the less conflict exists between it and Bildsujet, but then his own experience made him change his mind. Examining a wax figure example, he came to the conclusion that this perfectly human-like object is rather a fiction (an illusion) than an image for it is constituted in a position-taking intention, not in a neutralized one. However, despite we’ve got knowledge of illusory nature of such an object our consciousness keeps on fluctuating between an imaging intention and a perceptual one. Unlike Husserl neither J.-P. Sartre nor M. Richir draws a distinction between an image and an illusion. Sartre considers the imaginary in its radical form to be a world of schizophrenic. As for Richir, he supposes the imaginary to be a mass-consumption product being used for ideological manipulations. He follows Plato’s intellectual strategy and characterizes an image as εἴδωλον (simulacre) which represents the reality instead of reaching it. Being saturated by visible an image lacks any gap that would give an impulse to a work of imagination. At the same time, Richir admits that simulacre does relate to art, whereas an artefact doesn’t. An artefact is made by technical device which imitates not reality but consciousness. Thus, an artefact in its turn is not a reality illusion but an illusion of a reality illusion. Its hallucinatory effect makes us believe that we look into a mirror of reality as if a technical agent had better access to it than a human eye does.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"01 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128847730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"IN SEARCH OF THE “MECHANISMS” OF PERSISTENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY: MINIMAL SELF AND AGENCY","authors":"Ivan Mlinar","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-502-515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-502-515","url":null,"abstract":"Th is paper aims to analyze neuropsychiatric pathological experiences (as thought insertion and delusions of control) in which features intrinsic to subjectivity are deeply aff ected to the extent that the fi rst-person perspective is lost, an essential core of the subjective condition. Th e distinction between the sense of agency and the sense of ownership is addressed, in particular in the context of unbidden thoughts and thought insertion. A gradualist reading of the distinction is suggested, and the problem of phenomenological adequacy of the sense of agency for thoughts is raised. Descriptive arguments are provided to show what a minimal self consists of and how it is possible that it does not get lost in extreme neuro- and psycho-pathologies, including a puzzling phenomenon such as terminal lucidity, the case in which an unexpected return of mental clarity and memory take place shortly before death in patients suff ering from severe psychiatric and neurologic disorders. Based on these phenomena it is suggested that subjectivity may be underlain by some ‘mechanisms’ diff erent from those usually assigned by neuroscientifi c models of normal brains. Finally, the challenges that emerge both for neurology and for phenomenological analysis are set out, opening new paths for the research and comprehension of subjectivity.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116645425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"HEIDEGGER’S WAY TO POETIC DWELLING VIA BEING AND TIME","authors":"O. Karamercan","doi":"10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-268-285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-268-285","url":null,"abstract":"Although Heidegger’s explicit account of “poetic dwelling” belongs to his later philosophy, there are important indications that he was already engaging with the core matter of the notion in his early thought. Contrary to the idea that in Being and Time, “dwelling” amounts to mere practical coping with the environment, we would like to demonstrate that the notion is already a poetic issue in his early thought, as it requires the appropriation of our relation to the world via an authentic experience of finitude. Following a topological mode of thinking, the paper thematizes the connections between Heidegger’s early and later thought, and elucidates the following three points: First, “freeing” and “letting” appears as the appropriate ethos of a poetic experience of finitude, one that maintains the “clearing” of meaningfulness. Second, a topological reading of Being and Time can explicate the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity as different disclosures of the clearing where human being-world correlation occurs. Third, the notion of “keeping-still” (Schweigen) can be interpreted as an authentic disposition that frees space for the disclosure of existence. The paper concludes that an authentic experience of finitude through “stillness” appears to reorient human ethos by releasing “discourse” from absorption in “idle-talk” and that such an act of existential re-orientation of one’s disposition towards the world is the essence of “authenticity,” and Heidegger’s early “poetic dwelling”.","PeriodicalId":305533,"journal":{"name":"HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121791809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}