{"title":"Political Environment and Financial Crises","authors":"Thanh Cong Nguyen, Vítor Castro, Justin P. Wood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489859","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the role of the political environment in the timing of financial crises over a sample of 85 countries during the period 1975-2017. We consider systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises in addition to twin and triple crises. Using a fixed effects logit model, this study shows that banking and currency crises are more likely to occur within one year after elections. There is also evidence that the probability of currency crises increases when right-wing parties are in office. Moreover, time in office of incumbent chief executives reduces the likelihood of any type of financial crises. The incidence of twin and triple crises is lower when majority governments are in office. This study contributes to the literature by calling attention to the importance of some political factors for different types of financial crises.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"25 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132463393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A New Measure of State Capacity, 1789-2018","authors":"Colin O’Reilly, Ryan H. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3643637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3643637","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to the literature on state capacity by creating a measure with far more comprehensive data coverage across time than has previously been possible. It uses data from the Varieties of Democracy dataset on fiscal capacity, a state’s control over its territory, the rule of law, and the provision of public goods used to support markets. Like previous literature, it demonstrates the historical prevalence of warfare to predict state capacity. It also links state capacity to economic growth. Unlike previous literature, it is able to test these findings using panel data. We are also able to quantitatively assess the position conjectured by Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) regarding the importance of balance between the power of society and the power of the state. These applications are meant to illustrate the ways in which the measure can improve upon the rigor of existing literature on state capacity.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125863246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the Devil in the Shadow? The Effect of Institutional Quality on Income","authors":"I. Jahan, Jamie Bologna Pavlik, R. Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3379061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3379061","url":null,"abstract":"The positive relationship between institutional quality and “official” income is well documented. It is unclear, however, whether this relationship holds once the “unofficial” economy is accounted for. An improvement in institutional quality tends to shift production out of the shadow and into the official sector, resulting in an increase in official income. However, this shift comes at the expense of the informal economy, potentially negating the perceived gains in output. This paper uses data from 5,506 Brazilian municipalities to explore the effects of institutional quality on total income per person. We additionally estimate the effect of institutions on informal sector size. Our most robust finding suggests that higher‐quality institutions using our broadest measure are significantly related to development. While good institutions do decrease the size of the informal sector, the consequential switch to formality raises overall productivity.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"552 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131551789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutions and Urban Concentration: The Role of State Capacity","authors":"U. Kelekar, S. Turner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3552951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3552951","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research has argued that non-democratic institutions tend to facilitate high levels of urban concentration due to government policies that favor primate cities. However, the mechanisms by which governments favor their large cities are still unclear, and whether favoritism predominately takes the form of lower extraction rates or more public goods. Differences in mechanism are important because disparities in public goods have different consequences for country-level growth than differences in extraction rates. We present a simple model where non-democratic governments are incentivized by rents to provide public goods. In this model, government favoritism to a specific region will take the form of superior public goods, when government coercive capacity is generally low and lower extraction rates when coercive capacity is high. Consequently, the model predicts that cities which are small/less productive will be favored in low capacity countries, but these results will be attenuated as capacity increases. Results from a panel data analysis of urban concentration for most of the large cities in the world for the period 1955-2010 are consistent with the model’s predictions. A calibrated version of our model implies that the effect of favoritism on urban concentration is negative for most countries of the world due to most countries having low capacity, resulting in favoritism towards small cities. Our results imply that under non-democratic governments, primate capital cities tend to grow faster than other large cities due to an increase in the provision of public goods. Using city level estimates of developed land per capita as a measure of public goods, we find evidence consistent with this public goods channel.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133449409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resource Rents, Political Rights and Civil Liberties","authors":"Robert V. Breunig, Anthony Wiskich, Chris Wokker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3544446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544446","url":null,"abstract":"Using data for the 2005-2017 period, we consider the effects of resource rents on the sub-components of Freedom House’s measures of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Higher resource rents lead to a deterioration in Political Pluralism and Participation, but do not affect other sub-components. We also consider the relationship between resource rents and aggregate measures of Political Rights and Civil Liberties between 1975 and 2015. We find no evidence that resource rents affect Political Rights or Civil Liberties. We demonstrate why our results contrast with previous literature.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129258681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Dynasties and Political Competition in Pakistan","authors":"Noman Ahmad, F. Rehman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3531639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3531639","url":null,"abstract":"Existing literature on political dynasties argues that dynastic candidates enjoy a disproportionate electoral advantage. Theoretically, the presence of political dynasties can be considered as a non-institutional barrier to candidacy in the election. Using constituency-level data on national assembly elections (2002, 2008, & 2013) in Pakistan, we study the impact of political dynasties on various metrics of electoral competition. The empirical results show that political dynasties negatively affect political competition in Pakistan. A one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of dynastic candidates decreases political competition by 13% in a constituency. Similarly, other metrics of political competition also respond negatively to dynastic presence. Furthermore, we also exploit historical colonial rule variations across regions as an instrument to explore the causal effect of political dynasties on political concentration. The instrumental variable (IV) estimates are also consistent with the baseline results.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134231577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Putting Things in Place: Institutional Objects and Institutional Logics","authors":"R. Friedland, Diane-Laure Arjaliès","doi":"10.1108/s0733-558x20200000071003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/s0733-558x20200000071003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the role of institutional objects in the constitution of institutional logics. Institutional objects depend for their objectivity on the goods produced through those objects, such as economic models, passports or sacred texts. We theorize institutional logics as grammars of valuation that institutionalize goods through institutional objects. We identify four value moments through which goods are objectified: institution, the instituting of a good, a belief and an imagination of its objective goodness; production, how the good is produced, what practices are productive of the good; evaluation, how good is the good, the practices and objects through which worth in terms of that good is determined, and territorialization, the domain of reference of the good, to what objects and practices a good can and does refer in its instantiations. We assess the adequacy of our model through an institutional object based on the good of “market value” - i.e. an options pricing model. We discuss the implications of these findings for institutional logical theory and the sociology of valuation.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"206 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115275810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Alesina, D. Furceri, J. Ostry, C. Papageorgiou, D. Quinn
{"title":"Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset","authors":"A. Alesina, D. Furceri, J. Ostry, C. Papageorgiou, D. Quinn","doi":"10.3386/w26720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26720","url":null,"abstract":"We assemble two unique databases. One is on reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product markets and labor markets, which covers 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other is on electoral results and timing of elections. In the 66 democracies considered in the paper, we show that liberalizing reforms engender benefits for the economy, but they materialize only gradually over time. Partly because of this delayed effect, and possibly because voters are impatient or do not anticipate future benefits, liberalizing reforms are costly to incumbents when implemented close to elections. We also find that the electoral effects depend on the state of the economy at the time of reform: reforms are penalized during contractions; liberalizing reforms undertaken in expansions are often rewarded. Voters seem to attribute current economic conditions to the reforms without fully internalizing the delay that it takes for reforms to bear fruit.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124489639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working in Conflict/Post-Conflict Environments: Exploring How Context Shapes Programming and Informs Thinking and Working Politically","authors":"D. Guinn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3437451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3437451","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I want to examine how working in a conflict/post conflict environment shaped developmental programming, its design and implementation within three USAID funded legislative strengthening projects implemented by SUNY Center for International Development: Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (2005-2013); the Legislative Strengthening Project in Cote d’Ivoire (2012-2017); and the Strengthening Governing Institutions and Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013-2018). My goal is to compare and contrast the impact of the local context (political/social/cultural) and its effect on politically engaged programming (i.e. programming strategies falling under the TWP umbrella), examine possible shared substantive overlaps among the three, and consider what insights might be gleaned from those programs relative to the variations under the TWP.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122059590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Y. Algan, Nicolò Dalvit, Quoc-Anh Do, Alexis Le Chapelain, Y. Zenou
{"title":"Friendship Networks and Political Opinions: A Natural Experiment among Future French Politicians","authors":"Y. Algan, Nicolò Dalvit, Quoc-Anh Do, Alexis Le Chapelain, Y. Zenou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3397092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3397092","url":null,"abstract":"We study how friendship shapes students' political opinions in a natural experiment. We use the indicator whether two students were exogenously assigned to a short-term \"integration group\", unrelated to scholar activities and dissolved before the school year, as instrumental variable for their friendship, to estimate the effect of friendship on pairwise political opinion outcomes in dyadic regressions. After six months, friendship causes a reduction of differences in opinions by one quarter of the mean difference. It likely works through a homophily-enforced mechanism, by which friendship causes politically-similar students to join political associations together, which reinforces their political similarity. The effect is strong among initially similar pairs, but absent in dissimilar pairs. Friendship affects opinion gaps by reducing divergence, therefore polarization and extremism, without forcing individuals' views to converge. Network characteristics also matter to the friendship effect.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116401564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}