PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Identifying Politically Connected Firms: A Machine Learning Approach","authors":"Deni Mazrekaj, Vítězslav Titl, F. Schiltz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3860029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3860029","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces machine learning techniques to identify politically connected firms. By assembling information from publicly available sources and the Orbis company database, we constructed a novel firm population dataset from Czechia in which various forms of political connections can be determined. The data about firms’ connections are unique and comprehensive. They include political donations by the firm, having members of managerial boards who donated to a political party, and having members of boards who ran for political office. The results indicate that over 85% of firms with political connections can be accurately identified by the proposed algorithms. The model obtains this high accuracy by using only firm-level financial and industry indicators that are widely available in most countries. These findings suggest that machine learning algorithms could be used by public institutions to improve the identification of politically connected firms with potentially large conflicts of interests.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"333 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134544555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"State Formation and Bureaucratization: Evidence from Pre-Imperial China","authors":"Joy Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3394381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394381","url":null,"abstract":"How does one build a centralized bureaucratic state? A dominant view is that wars incentivize rulers to directly extract resources, thereby increasing state capacity. The Chinese empire, one of the earliest states to develop a centralized bureaucracy, can provide useful insights. Using hand-collected data, I present the first systematic evidence on patterns of military conflicts and state-building in pre-imperial China. I develop an incomplete contract model to examine ruler's and agent's incentives at conflict, and demonstrate that defensive and offensive wars exert opposite effects on state-building. Defensive needs drive decentralization: land-owning local administrators have more to gain from a successful defense, and are therefore more committed. Offensive needs drive centralization: the landowning ruler has personnel control over the non-land-owning local administrator, and can therefore force the latter to participate in less lucrative attacks. Empirical tests and historical examples are consistent with model predictions.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132349907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Developmental State Experience in Ethiopia and Rwanda: Lessons for Libya?","authors":"M. Maru","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3902446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902446","url":null,"abstract":"Libya's present complicated transitional situation offers an opportunity to discuss a new state model which is less path-dependent and more reflective of the country's long-term peace and development needs. Libyans have an opportunity to choose between the liberal market-led model, the developmental state model or the welfare state model as an in-between. They may also choose to blend and harmonise elements from different models that they find most suitable to the particularity of the Libyan context. Among these options, what would be the advantages and disadvantages of the developmental state model in addressing the challenges Libya is currently facing? What lessons can Libya learn from the experience of developmental states, particularly countries such as Rwanda and Ethiopia? Although they are different in many ways, these two countries have gone through post-war/post-genocide stabilisation and reconstruction processes, and by applying the developmental state model have achieved fast economic growth. Building upon the developmental state trajectories in the cases of pre-2018 Ethiopia and Rwanda, the paper argues that, if Libya is to enjoy peace, prosperity and democracy, it can benefit from more, not less, state intervention. Establishing an efficient and effective state would one of the vital tasks in Libya’s transition. It could significantly contribute to rapid peacebuilding and development. The peacebuilding and state-building process would require a normative framework and a high state capability to restore law and order, stability and effective socio-economic institutions that can allocate public resources, make and enforce laws and adjudicate disputes. In Libya, the developmental state model may take the form of post-conflict reconstruction and development plans with the aim of stabilisation, state building, and democratisation. In the current context, developmental state would relate to the sequence of actions that would place appropriate stress on security, resource governance, development, and democracy. However, in order to achieve these objectives, key requirements would need to be met, including political agreement on the development model and political legitimacy of its implementors.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133615239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Economic Security and the Strength of Religious Cleavages","authors":"J. Huber, A. E. Mohamed","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3762195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762195","url":null,"abstract":"Religious belief and church-attendance often go hand in hand, but the strength of the connection between these two dimensions of religiosity varies considerably across countries. By focusing on the strength of this connection, this paper challenges the entrenched idea that the politicization of religion in elections will decline as economic security increases. We provide evidence from established democracies that religious belief has the strongest connection to religious practice in societies where economic security is the highest. We also show that religious voting cleavages are strongest when there is a strong connection between religious belief and church attendance. This is true because strong beliefs are associated with distinctive policy preferences (but not with political engagement), and church attendance is associated with political engagement (but not, so much, with distinctive policy preferences). Thus, societies with high levels of economic security can facilitate the cohesion of religious groups associated with strong religious voting cleavages.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126078664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Monopoly Rents, Institutions, and Bribery","authors":"Boliang Zhu, Qing Deng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3100936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100936","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some firms pay more bribes than others? We extend the literature by examining the role of one crucial, but overlooked industry characteristic---fixed asset intensity---in shaping firms' bribe payments. High fixed asset intensity creates natural entry barriers, thereby leading to market concentration and opportunities for monopoly rent extraction. High rents, in turn, increase the value of government officials' ``control rights'' and thus their incentive to engage in predatory behavior. Firms in fixed-asset intensive industries therefore have strong incentives to pay bribes in exchange for de facto property rights. We further posit that strong legal institutions weaken this quid pro quo by providing security for property rights and increasing the risk for government officials' behaving corruptly. We find empirical support for our arguments based on data from a large firm survey in China. Our findings have important implications for governance and industrial regulations in developing countries.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125560230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Europe Looks so Much like China: Big Government and Low Income Inequalities","authors":"V. Popov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3794669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3794669","url":null,"abstract":"One view in the literature (Popov 2020) is that East Asian model is superior to other models in the Global South, at least in terms of catch-up development and possibly even in innovations beyond the technological frontier. Unlike economic models in Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa, the East Asian model prioritizes community interests (e.g., that of work collective, neighborhood, nation-state, and all of humanity) over those of individuals with the possibility of limiting some human rights for the greater benefit of all. <br><br>Crucial features of the East Asian economic model include relatively low income and wealth inequalities, strong state institutional capacity (as measured by the murder rate and share of the shadow economy). The origins of the East Asian economic model can be traced to different trajectories of the development of the Global South since the 16th century (Popov, 2009; 2014). <br>This paper argues that European economic model and East Asian model have a lot in common. <br><br>After controlling for the size of the country and the level of development, it turns out that government consumption as a share of GDP is relatively high in both models, whereas income inequalities are relatively low. <br>","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116405295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Limits of a Centralized Bureaucracy: Evidence from the Stock Market in China","authors":"Yishuang Li, Z. Lei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3594874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3594874","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research shows that political centralization can reduce elite capture and improve governance outcomes. Despite these benefits, we demonstrate that there is a limit for an independent-minded, centralized bureaucracy to eliminate the influence of private and local interests. We study a highly centralized approval-based system of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese stock market. Such a system is designed to avoid the influence of private, local interests and select well-performing firms for IPO based solely on efficiency criteria. However, we find that seemingly powerless provincial politicians can still strongly influence the allocation of IPOs in favor of loyal mayors by cooperating strategically with central bureaucrats. Hence, firms in loyal subordinates’ cities are more likely to receive IPO approval. These findings contribute to our understanding of the limits of centralized bureaucracy as a tool to improve governance outcomes and prevent the influence of local and private interests.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125807550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Are the SUS and the Right to Health Incompatible with Universal Health Coverage? Challenging Misconceptions around the Concept of UHC in the Public Health Scholarship in Brazil","authors":"D. Wang","doi":"10.25091/s01013300202000030009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25091/s01013300202000030009","url":null,"abstract":"English abstract: The literature on public health in Brazil has criticized the idea of universal health coverage (UHC), arguing that UHC is incompatible with the universal health system and the right to health. This article assesses that criticism and concludes that it creates a “strawman” argument. The idea of UHC that is being criticized in Brazil bears little similarity to the concept of UHC promoted by international organizations and discussed in the international literature. Portuguese abstract: Uma parte importante dos estudos em Saúde Coletiva no Brasil tem criticado a ideia de Cobertura Universal de Saúde (UHC) porque UHC preconizaria um modelo de sistema de saúde incompatível com o Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS) e com o direito à saúde. Este artigo analisa os fundamentos dessa crítica e conclui que ela se sustenta em uma “falácia do espantalho”. A ideia de UHC à qual os críticos se opõem guarda pouca semelhança com a UHC defendida por organizações internacionais e discutida na literatura internacional. (http://novosestudos.com.br/o-sus-e-o-direito-a-saude-sao-incompativeis-com-a-cobertura-universal-de-saude/)","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"499 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123896643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Weak State and Strong Microsocieties in Papua New Guinea","authors":"N. Bizhan, E. Gorea","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3712733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3712733","url":null,"abstract":"The case of Papua New Guinea (PNG) shows the difficulty of forging a national identity and creating effective state institutions. State weakness and societal fragmentation are dominant. The archipelago nature of the country has had a dominant role in the latter. Politics in this context shows a stable-fragile characteristic. On the one hand, despite persistent political instability, democracy has survived in the past half-century mainly due to societal diversity and the consensual nature of decision-making embedded in communities. On the other, even though PNG is a resource-rich county, successive governments have not converted the economic benefits of the mineral boom into effective development outcomes, and high levels of poverty and inequality exist. We argue that many of these characteristics reinforce each other, trapping the country, for now, in a low-level equilibrium. In this paper, we aim to examine dimensions of state fragility and look at what might change, and how PNG might break out of the equilibrium currently trapping the country in poverty and state weakness.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126269130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Rise of Statism in Contemporary India: An Institutional Perspective","authors":"A. Mukherjee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733672","url":null,"abstract":"In the recent past, India has seen a rise of strong state which made its presence felt through se series of difficult measures such as demonetization, abolition of Tin-Talaq practice and article 370 even though none of these are particularly welfare enhancing for the majority population of India. I reckon that these measures merely act as signaling devices; signaling the emergence of a new kind of statism, different from the old, Nehruvian statism which prevailed in India for the larger part of its post-independence history. The usual interpretation for the new regime is given in terms of the state leaders’ ideology which essentially is a supply side explanation. While the supply side argument is a valid one, in this article, I focus on the demand side instead and analyze how the electoral success of the new regime can be seen as a rise in the demand for a strong state. In my view, the answer to this question lies in the relationship three fundamental institutions — state, community and market. I show that historically the state and the communities keep contesting over the legal framework critical for resource allocation. Both the institutions had their moments of wins and losses as unlike many Western societies, in India the state could not dominate the communities. I extend this argument to show that in the recent past, with the emergence of market for club-goods and rise in income inequality, the very balance of power between the state and communities got disturbed, leading to a rise in demand for strong state.","PeriodicalId":300478,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Comparative Political Institutions & Development (Topic)","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116492890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}