发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
The Design of Information Acquisition and Sharing 信息获取与共享的设计
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.1086/726580
Dimitri Migrow, Francesco Squintani
{"title":"The Design of Information Acquisition and Sharing","authors":"Dimitri Migrow, Francesco Squintani","doi":"10.1086/726580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726580","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the optimal design of linear compensation schemes that incentivize information acquisition and sharing in multidivisional organizations. When the information shared between divisions is highly correlated and the information acquisition costs are not too high, the optimal strategy for the headquarters manager is to implement a compensation scheme that links the remuneration of each division to the performance of the other division. However, if the information is weakly correlated or the cost of acquisition is prohibitively high, the most effective incentive is to tie each manager’s remuneration solely to the performance of their own division.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134287947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Incumbency Advantages: Price Dispersion, Price Discrimination, and Consumer Search at Online Platforms 在位优势:价格分散、价格歧视与网络平台的消费者搜索
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-04-23 DOI: 10.1086/725335
K. Gugler, Sven Heim, M. Janssen, Mario Liebensteiner
{"title":"Incumbency Advantages: Price Dispersion, Price Discrimination, and Consumer Search at Online Platforms","authors":"K. Gugler, Sven Heim, M. Janssen, Mario Liebensteiner","doi":"10.1086/725335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725335","url":null,"abstract":"When lower prices are available only to consumers who search, firms can price discriminate based on search. We study local German electricity retail markets in which nonsearching consumers pay the incumbent’s baseline tariff. To observe other prices, consumers access an online platform. Pricing and search patterns differ substantially across local markets. Using panel data, we show that in local markets with more search, incumbents have higher baseline tariffs, while incumbents’ and entrants’ online tariffs are lower. In a theoretical model, we discuss when an incumbent has an incentive to differentiate tariffs and the welfare properties of banning such price discrimination practices.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128837330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revisiting a Natural Experiment: Do Legislators with Daughters Vote More Liberally on Women’s Issues? 重新审视一个自然实验:有女儿的立法者在妇女问题上更自由地投票吗?
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-22 DOI: 10.1086/724744
D. Green, Oliver Hyman-Metzger, G. Sood, Michelle A. Zee
{"title":"Revisiting a Natural Experiment: Do Legislators with Daughters Vote More Liberally on Women’s Issues?","authors":"D. Green, Oliver Hyman-Metzger, G. Sood, Michelle A. Zee","doi":"10.1086/724744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724744","url":null,"abstract":"The pioneering work of Washington in 2008 shows that legislators with daughters cast more liberal roll call votes on women’s issues. Costa and coauthors in 2019 find that this pattern subsides in more recent congresses and speculate that increasing party polarization might diminish the “daughter effect.” We investigate patterns of change over time by looking at eight congresses prior to the four studied by Washington and eight subsequent congresses, including three not included by Costa and coauthors. Contrary to the party polarization hypothesis, we find no daughter effect prior to the period that Washington studied and no effect thereafter.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126989074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Bad Repetition 坏的重复
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1086/724325
Geoffroy de Clippel, Kareen Rozen
{"title":"Bad Repetition","authors":"Geoffroy de Clippel, Kareen Rozen","doi":"10.1086/724325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724325","url":null,"abstract":"While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126184290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Work from Home and Productivity: Evidence from Personnel and Analytics Data on Information Technology Professionals 在家工作和生产力:来自信息技术专业人员的人员和分析数据的证据
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1086/721803
Michael J. Gibbs, F. Mengel, Christoph Siemroth
{"title":"Work from Home and Productivity: Evidence from Personnel and Analytics Data on Information Technology Professionals","authors":"Michael J. Gibbs, F. Mengel, Christoph Siemroth","doi":"10.1086/721803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721803","url":null,"abstract":"We study employee productivity before and during the working-from-home period of the COVID-19 pandemic, using personnel and analytics data from over 10,000 skilled professionals at an Indian technology company. Hours worked increased, output declined slightly, and productivity fell 8%–19%. We then analyze determinants of productivity changes. An important source is higher communication costs. Time spent on coordination activities and meetings increased, while uninterrupted work hours shrank considerably. Employees networked with fewer individuals and business units inside and outside the firm and had fewer one-to-one meetings with supervisors. The findings suggest key issues for firms in implementing remote work.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127626824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Editor’s Introduction to JPE Micro JPE Micro编者简介
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1086/724247
J. List
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction to JPE Micro","authors":"J. List","doi":"10.1086/724247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724247","url":null,"abstract":"I am pleased to present the inaugural issue of the Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics ( JPE Micro). JPE Micro, which is published by the University of Chicago Press and is closely tied to the Journal of Political Economy ( JPE), is intended to serve as a forum for high-quality theoretical and empirical research in microeconomics. More specifically, the journal strives to publish high-quality theoretical, empirical, and econometric research papers and replication studies that address issues of relevance to microeconomics. JPE Micro interprets microeconomics in the broadest possible sense, which means including issues related to how individuals, households, firms, and governments make choices and how those choices affect prices, the allocation of resources, and the well-being of people. JPE Micro welcomes submissions in all areas of microeconomics including, but not limited to, industrial organization and labor, behavioral, experimental, environmental, international, public, health care, education, and development economics. The journal is served by a truly outstanding board of editors, which includes Eduardo Azevedo, Lint Barrage, Anna Dreber Almenberg, Matthew Grennan, Christian Hansen, and Juanna Schrøter Joensen. Each is an exceptional scholar, and as a collective, they provide the breadth and depth of economic wisdom and knowledge that a top scholarly journal demands. In addition to these editors, several exceptional associate editors also have agreed to advise in the handling of manuscripts.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133338102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review 教育市场设计中的行为经济学:前瞻回顾
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1086/725054
A. Rees-Jones, Ran I. Shorrer
{"title":"Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review","authors":"A. Rees-Jones, Ran I. Shorrer","doi":"10.1086/725054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725054","url":null,"abstract":"The rational choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large body of work documents deviations from the predictions of this framework that appear influenced by behavioral economic phenomena. We review these findings and the body of behavioral theories that have been presented as possible explanations. Motivated by this literature, we lay out paths for behavioral economists to be directly useful to education market design.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133447281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Social Incentives, Delivery Agents, and the Effectiveness of Development Interventions 社会激励、交付代理和发展干预措施的有效性
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-10-11 DOI: 10.1086/722898
O. Bandiera, R. Burgess, Erika Deserranno, Ricardo Morel, M. Sulaiman, Imran Rasul
{"title":"Social Incentives, Delivery Agents, and the Effectiveness of Development Interventions","authors":"O. Bandiera, R. Burgess, Erika Deserranno, Ricardo Morel, M. Sulaiman, Imran Rasul","doi":"10.1086/722898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722898","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a rise in the use of the local delivery model for development interventions, where local agents are hired as intermediaries to target benefits to potential beneficiaries. We study this model in the context of a standard agricultural extension intervention in Uganda. We document a trade-off between coverage and targeting: delivery agents treat more farmers when they have a greater number of social ties, but they are significantly more likely to target their nonpoor ties. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the design of the local delivery model for antipoverty interventions.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131084836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Stress, Ethnicity, and Prosocial Behavior 压力、种族和亲社会行为
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1086/722367
J. Haushofer, Sara Lowes, A. Musau, D. Ndetei, Nathan Nunn, M. Poll, Nancy Qian
{"title":"Stress, Ethnicity, and Prosocial Behavior","authors":"J. Haushofer, Sara Lowes, A. Musau, D. Ndetei, Nathan Nunn, M. Poll, Nancy Qian","doi":"10.1086/722367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722367","url":null,"abstract":"While observational evidence suggests that people behave more prosocially toward members of their own ethnic group, many laboratory studies fail to find this effect. One possible explanation is that coethnic preference only emerges during times of stress. To test this hypothesis, we pharmacologically increase levels of the stress hormone cortisol, after which participants complete laboratory experiments with coethnics and non-coethnics. We find mixed evidence that increased cortisol decreases prosocial behavior. Coethnic preferences do not vary with cortisol. However, in contrast to previous studies, we find strong and robust evidence of coethnic preference.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121283934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents 错误代理的稳定匹配
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-07-28 DOI: 10.1086/722978
Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He
{"title":"Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents","authors":"Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He","doi":"10.1086/722978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722978","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by growing evidence of agents’ mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept—robust equilibrium—that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by applicant-proposing deferred acceptance. Although truth telling is a dominant strategy, almost all applicants may be nontruthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results imply that one can assume truthful agents to study deferred acceptance outcomes theoretically or counterfactually. However, to estimate the preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth telling.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124795934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信