发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Scaling versus Selling Startups: The Role of Foreign Acquirers in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 扩大规模与出售初创企业:外国收购者在创业生态系统中的作用
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1086/721807
Thomas Hellmann, Veikko Thiele
{"title":"Scaling versus Selling Startups: The Role of Foreign Acquirers in Entrepreneurial Ecosystems","authors":"Thomas Hellmann, Veikko Thiele","doi":"10.1086/721807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721807","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the decision of growing startups to either scale up on their own or sell to an established company. The model shows that in a closed economy, the number of scaleups is efficient. In an open economy, foreign buyers increase demand and raise acquisition prices. This stimulates startup formation but also encourages too many growing startups to sell instead of scale. In a dynamic equilibrium without externalities, foreign acquirers are a net benefit to the domestic ecosystem. Two model extensions identify conditions under which they can weaken it: (i) intergenerational externalities in the accumulation of scaleup experience and (ii) significant brain drain of serial entrepreneurs.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126354170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nonprofits in Good Times and Bad Times 繁荣时期和萧条时期的非营利组织
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1086/721805
C. Exley, Nils Haakon Lehr, Stephen Terry
{"title":"Nonprofits in Good Times and Bad Times","authors":"C. Exley, Nils Haakon Lehr, Stephen Terry","doi":"10.1086/721805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721805","url":null,"abstract":"Need fluctuates over the business cycle. We conduct a survey revealing a desire for nonprofit activities to countercyclically expand during downturns. We then demonstrate, using comprehensive US nonprofit data drawn from millions of tax returns, that the public’s hopes are disappointed. Nonprofit expenditure, revenue, and balance sheets fluctuate procyclically: contracting during national and local downturns. This finding is evident even for a narrow group of nonprofits that the public most wishes would expand during downturns, for example, those providing critical needs such as food or housing. Our new facts contribute to the charitable giving, nonprofit, and business cycle literatures.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"45 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113987882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Parallel Trends and Dynamic Choices 平行趋势和动态选择
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI: 10.1086/727363
P. Marx, E. Tamer, Xun Tang
{"title":"Parallel Trends and Dynamic Choices","authors":"P. Marx, E. Tamer, Xun Tang","doi":"10.1086/727363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/727363","url":null,"abstract":"Difference-in-differences is a common method for estimating treatment effects, and the parallel trends condition is its main identifying assumption: the trend in mean untreated outcomes is independent of the observed treatment status. In observational settings, treatment is often a dynamic choice made or influenced by rational actors, such as policy-makers, firms, or individual agents. This paper relates parallel trends to economic models of dynamic choice. We clarify the implications of parallel trends on agent behavior and study when dynamic selection motives lead to violations of parallel trends. Finally, we consider identification under alternative assumptions that accommodate features of dynamic choice.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121108978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Going…Going…Wrong: A Test of the Level-k (and Cognitive-Hierarchy) Models of Bidding Behavior 走向错误:对投标行为的k级(和认知层次)模型的测试
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.1086/723716
I. Rasooly
{"title":"Going…Going…Wrong: A Test of the Level-k (and Cognitive-Hierarchy) Models of Bidding Behavior","authors":"I. Rasooly","doi":"10.1086/723716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/723716","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we design and implement an experiment aimed at testing the level-k model of auctions. We begin by identifying (simple) environments that optimally disentangle the predictions of the level-k model from the natural benchmark of Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We then implement these environments within a virtual laboratory in order to see which theory can best explain observed bidding behavior. Overall, our findings suggest that, despite its notable success in predicting behavior in other strategic settings, the level-k model (and its close cousin, cognitive hierarchy) cannot explain behavior in auctions.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134230808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Efficient Estimation for Staggered Rollout Designs 交错推出设计的有效估计
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2021-02-02 DOI: 10.1086/726581
J. Roth, Pedro H. C. Sant’Anna
{"title":"Efficient Estimation for Staggered Rollout Designs","authors":"J. Roth, Pedro H. C. Sant’Anna","doi":"10.1086/726581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726581","url":null,"abstract":"We study estimation of causal effects in staggered rollout designs, i.e. settings where there is staggered treatment adoption and the timing of treatment is as-good-as randomly assigned. We derive the most efficient estimator in a class of estimators that nests several popular generalized difference-in-differences methods. A feasible plug-in version of the efficient estimator is asymptotically unbiased with efficiency (weakly) dominating that of existing approaches. We provide both $t$-based and permutation-test-based methods for inference. In an application to a training program for police officers, confidence intervals for the proposed estimator are as much as eight times shorter than for existing approaches.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128311485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
Competition Policy in a Simple General Equilibrium Model 一个简单一般均衡模型中的竞争政策
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2021-02-01 DOI: 10.1086/722154
L. Kaplow
{"title":"Competition Policy in a Simple General Equilibrium Model","authors":"L. Kaplow","doi":"10.1086/722154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/722154","url":null,"abstract":"Most industrial organization research, including applications to competition policy, undertakes partial equilibrium analysis in a single sector, often with a fixed number of firms. For welfare analysis, this approach is valid only if the rest of the economy is perfectly competitive, an assumption far from reality. This article examines competition policy in a simple, multisector, general equilibrium model with free entry and exit, allowing for differing distortions in each sector. Flows between sectors readily reverse standard prescriptions. But such results may be partially offset or overturned yet again when incorporating free entry and exit. Analysis of efficiencies also changes qualitatively.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124124840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity 妥协，不要优化:推广完美的贝叶斯均衡以允许歧义
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2020-03-05 DOI: 10.1086/726841
K. Schlag, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
{"title":"Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity","authors":"K. Schlag, Andriy Zapechelnyuk","doi":"10.1086/726841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726841","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors. Players make choices by looking for compromises that yield a good performance under each of their updated priors. Our solution concept is called perfect compromise equilibrium. It generalizes perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show how it deals with ambiguity in Cournot and Bertrand markets, public good provision, Spence's job market signaling, bilateral trade with common value, and forecasting.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132059826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Politics of Personalized News Aggregation 个性化新闻聚合的政治
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2019-10-24 DOI: 10.1086/724326
Lin Hu, Anqi Li, I. Segal
{"title":"The Politics of Personalized News Aggregation","authors":"Lin Hu, Anqi Li, I. Segal","doi":"10.1086/724326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/724326","url":null,"abstract":"We study how personalized news aggregation for rationally inattentive voters (NARI) affects policy polarization. In a two-candidate electoral competition model, an attention-maximizing infomediary aggregates source data about candidates’ valence into easy-to-digest news. Voters decide whether to consume news, trading off the expected gain from improved expressive voting against the attention cost. NARI generates policy polarization even if candidates are office motivated. Personalized news aggregation makes extreme voters the disciplining entity of policy polarization. The skewness of their signals helps sustain a high degree of policy polarization in equilibrium. Analysis of disciplining voters informs the equilibrium and welfare consequences of regulating infomediaries.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123069858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Econographics
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2018-08-01 DOI: 10.1086/723044
Jonathan Chapman, M. Dean, Pietro Ortoleva, E. Snowberg, Colin Camerer
{"title":"Econographics","authors":"Jonathan Chapman, M. Dean, Pietro Ortoleva, E. Snowberg, Colin Camerer","doi":"10.1086/723044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/723044","url":null,"abstract":"We study the pattern of correlations across a large number of behavioral regularities, with the goal of creating an empirical basis for more comprehensive theories of decision-making. We elicit 21 behaviors, using an incentivized survey on a representative sample (n=1,000) of the US population. Our data show a clear and relatively simple structure underlying the correlations between these measures. Using principal components analysis, we reduce the 21 variables to six components corresponding to clear clusters of high correlations. We examine the relationship between these components, cognitive ability, and demographics. Common extant theories are not compatible with all the patterns in our data.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126588779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design 机构设计的几何方法
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Pub Date : 2013-06-05 DOI: 10.1086/721806
J. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir
{"title":"A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design","authors":"J. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir","doi":"10.1086/721806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721806","url":null,"abstract":"Applying basic techniques from convex analysis and majorization theory we develop a novel approach to mechanism design that is geometric in nature. This geometric approach provides a simple and unified treatment of the optimal mechanisms for general social choice problems with arbitrary linear objectives, including revenue and welfare maximization. We further present applications and extensions to nonlinear objectives.","PeriodicalId":289840,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129139303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信