{"title":"A summary of the LDV solution to the homework problem","authors":"P. Stachour, D. Thomsen","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81069","url":null,"abstract":"At the 2nd RADC Database Security Workshop the requirements for a small secure application were presented as a homework problem. This paper highlights how LDV (LOCK Data Views, a prototype trusted DBMS from Honeywell) enforces the security requirements of this application. The results were simulated on a small LDV prototype written in LISP. Rather than present LDV's whole solution to the homework problem this paper presents some of the unique security features of LDV that were used to solve the problem.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127641702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TCB subset architecture","authors":"Linda L. Vetter","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81037","url":null,"abstract":"The advantages of using TCB (trusted computing base) subset architecture in designing secure RDBMS (relational database management system) products are described. These advantages include ease of evaluation, portability, full operating system features, performance, standards, and assurance. TCB subset architecture extends the existing security mechanisms of a secure operating system with complementary mechanisms within the RDBMS. There is a clear distinction between the RDBMS portion of the TCB and the operating system and hardware portions of the TCB on which the RDBMS runs: the RDBMS implements RDBMS-specific aspects of the security policy without violating the security policy of the secure operating system base.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126817947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protection of call detail records data in federal telecommunications","authors":"Santosh Chokhani","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81030","url":null,"abstract":"Techniques for protection of the call detail records (CDR) in US federal government telecommunications systems, such as the FTS2000 and agency PABXs, are identified. CDR data flow, its use in telecommunication, and its protection requirements are described. Descriptions of threats and countermeasures are provided. Recommendations for handling and protection of the CDR database are made for the following organizations: FTS2000 contractor billing, FTS2000 contractor network engineering, Service Oversight Center, and user agencies.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"229 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133320249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure query processing in intelligent database management systems","authors":"B. Thuraisingham","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81052","url":null,"abstract":"In a multilevel secure database management system, users cleared at different security levels access and share a database with data at different sensitivity levels. A serious threat to database security, not adequately addressed at present, is the inference problem. That is users acquire unauthorized information from the responses that they legitimately receive. It is the inferencing capability and deductive power of intelligent database systems that could provide viable approaches for handling the inference problem. The author describes secure query processing in intelligent database systems. The types of database systems that are considered are augmented relational systems, fuzzy relational systems and object-oriented systems.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122825310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ADP security within the Customs Service","authors":"William Green","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81045","url":null,"abstract":"Computer security within the US Customs Service is discussed. The structure and functions of the Office of Data Systems are outlined. Several cases are related that illustrate problems in the AIS (automated information system) security area. They involve customs employees who stole government funds.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122188095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issues in distributed database security","authors":"A. Downing, I. Greenberg, T. Lunt","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81051","url":null,"abstract":"The requirements for multilevel security have been shown to conflict with some database integrity and consistency properties. The authors examine the data consistency requirements for a distributed database system, consider the effects of multilevel security on meeting those requirements, and consider architecture for achieving them. They discuss the problem of providing serializability in a single-site database system and propose a solution based on optimistic concurrency control. They then extend this solution to a distributed database system. They also describe an approach for weak consistency concurrency control in a distributed database system based on the Optimistic Protocol.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128163526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure database design panel","authors":"T. Hinke","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81070","url":null,"abstract":"It is shown that tuple-level mandatory protection and relation-level discretionary protection are adequate for supporting the security requirements of the RADC (Rome Air Development Center) homework problem, a 22-page specification for a multilevel secure database. The tuple-level granularity of control induced database decomposition to provide tuples of uniform classification. Likewise, the discretionary protection on relations induced database decomposition to meet the discretionary requirements. While there were a few examples in which tuple-level discretionary controls would have been desirable, this slight inconvenience is balanced by the lower overhead of relation level discretionary controls.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125364170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Designing a trusted client-server distributed network","authors":"Sammy Migues, R. Housley","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81033","url":null,"abstract":"The client-server distributed network model was analyzed from a security perspective, and an expanded client-server model which includes security-relevant properties was developed. A network-oriented security policy was produced as the next step in developing a trusted client-server network. The various services provided on the distributed network map into NTCB partitions, producing an easily specified system architecture and simplifying the task of resource protection. This approach also allows the NTCB interface to be easily specified, since the interface is defined by the network protocols fused to access the individual services.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126717626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security model development environment","authors":"J. Heaney, M. Adkins, G. Dolsen, J. Page","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81066","url":null,"abstract":"Introduces the Security Model Development Environment (SMDE); a suite of prototype tools for the development of secure systems. The development of the SMDE was performed under contract for the Rome Air Development Center and Strategic Defense Initiative. The SMDE is based on a methodology for the construction and analysis of security models, which supports the model developer via an iterative model design process. The methodology supports a concept of automatic rule base generation which required the development of the prototype tools and the Common Notation for the expression of security models. The prototype tools are the Model Translator Tool (MTT) and the Testbed. The MTT automatically generates a rule base from a security model and the Testbed simulates the activity of a system using a model's rule base. The methodology, together with an extended model description, provides support for the automated tools and the impact of the methodology on security model development is summarized. The SMDE provides an iterative modeling approach that increases the productivity of model designers, simultaneously causing the model development process to be more accessible.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126668083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A security standard for LANs","authors":"Kimberly E. Kirkpatrick","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81019","url":null,"abstract":"The work of IEEE 802.10, the LAN Security Working Group, in developing the Standard for Interoperable LAN Security (SILS) is described. The areas for security standardization are: a protocol for the secure exchange of data at the data link layer, the management of cryptographic keys at the application layer, and the specification of the network management objects associated with the secure data exchange protocol and the key management protocol. As of July 1989, IEEE 802.10 has produced the fifth draft of SILS. The standard contains the SILS model and the secure data exchange protocol specification. It also includes the security definitions, the objectives of SILS, and the threats against which the services defined can provide protection.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116815434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}