{"title":"Security model consistency in secure object-oriented systems","authors":"T. Keefe, W. Tsai","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81065","url":null,"abstract":"Examines three techniques for evaluating the logical consistency of an object-oriented Database security model. The first technique consists of judging the model with respect to a set of general consistency properties for database security models. The second technique compares the SODA model against two other database security models. The third technique consists of defining a set of entities and mechanisms fundamental to the object-oriented model and considering the effect on them by the security model. Each of these techniques are applied to the Secure Object-Oriented Database (SODA) security model and are evaluated with respect to their applicability difficulty and usefulness. Using the results of this analysis the authors characterize the consistency of the SODA security model.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125935715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Process execution controls as a mechanism to ensure consistency","authors":"E. Bacic","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81040","url":null,"abstract":"A mechanism for ensuring that the changes to a system and its data occur in a consistent manner is presented. The mechanism, process execution controls, imposes restrictions on the method of access to the data, unlike access controls which impose restrictions upon which users can access the data. This mechanism imposes another layer to the currently existing access control restrictions, but one that is, for the most part, transparent to the user. Although transparent, the system offers the capability of containing viruses within a given domain. The author presents two methods of implementation; extending current access control lists and implementing complementary execution control lists.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"214 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123298022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The CALS Data Protection and Integrity Industry Working Group","authors":"Bennett C. Karp","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81014","url":null,"abstract":"The CALS (Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistics Support) Data Protection and Integrity (DP&I) Industry Working Group (WG) has been addressing security issues associated with the CALS initiative. The group's mission, structure, composition, activities, accomplishments, and future plans are described. The CALS initiative is a cooperative effort between the Department of Defense and industry to aid in the transition from the current weapon-procurement and logistics-support processes, which are paper intensive, to a more highly integrated mode of operation. The DP&I WG has played an important role in CALS security by identifying CALS security issues, assessing data protection technologies for possible use in CALS, commenting on the CALS Phase I documents, and cooperating in the development of a CALS DP&I policy.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"210 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115014882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Data protection requirements in computer-aided acquisition and logistic support","authors":"W. Gorham","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81015","url":null,"abstract":"The author describes computer-aided acquisition and logistic support (CALS), a Department of Defense (DoD) and industry strategy to enable and accelerate the integration of digital technical information for weapon system acquisition, design, manufacture, and support. CALS will provide for an effective transition from current paper-intensive weapon system life-cycle processes to the efficient use of digital information technology. Particular emphasis is placed on CALS goals (including data protection goals) and requirements.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116156924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A survey of commercially available secure LAN products","authors":"G. King","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81057","url":null,"abstract":"The advent of the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) and the widespread availability of powerful microcomputers has resulted in the development of secure local area networking (LAN) products. Potentially, these products provide tremendous economic benefit by allowing multi-level secure operation of local area networks. The author examines eight of the most popular secure LAN products from a technical perspective. The surveyed products include the Verdix Secure LAN, the Boeing Secure LAN, the Sun MLS OS, IBM/TIS's Secure Xenix, DEC's Ethernet Enhanced Security System, the Harris LAN/SX, the Ford Aerospace Multinet Gateway, and the Xerox Encryption Unit. Following the examination of these products, the paper provides subjective conclusions about the state of LAN security.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124130777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implementing sensitive but unclassified security, today-a workshop proposal","authors":"Rolf Lang","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81017","url":null,"abstract":"The status of unclassified systems security in the US and how that status can be changed are discussed. The problem is outlined from the manufacturer's and the user's points of view. The problems of an overwhelmingly large base of installed telecommunications and computer products, of the lack of cost-effective, secure platforms, and of the lack of a systematic security market are addressed. Particular attention is given to the work of the Corporation for Systemic Security Today (CSST), a nonprofit corporation with a charter to improve today's computer systems security. The objectives of CSST are a cooperative work style, a focus on today's expansion of markets in order to lower prices, and fast response. The basic CSST charter is summarized.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130068173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computer security and air traffic automation","authors":"Steven D. Smith","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81046","url":null,"abstract":"Summary form only given. The author addresses the problem of whether it is possible to have an advanced automated air traffic system and still meet the safety concerns of both the controllers and system engineers as well as the computer security demands of the new Public Law 100-235, the Computer Security Act of 1987. Security has been an integral part of the planning for the advanced automation system, the air traffic control system. Yet, when the system design was still very young, automated security found itself neglected due to a fear that inclusion of a security package might deny access to a controller or system engineer in a time of urgent need. The solution was to develop a security package that would not cause such a denial of service. The author emphasizes the need for computer security education.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127136895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does TCB subsetting enhance trust?","authors":"R. Feiertag","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81035","url":null,"abstract":"Trusted computing base (TCB) subsetting consists of subdividing a large TCB into smaller separate TCBs, each of which can be separately designed, implemented, and analyzed. The idea of TCB subsetting is attractive because it can simplify the difficult task of constructing TCBs. However, there are many unanswered questions, connected in particular with determinating the useful and meaningful ways of subsetting a trusted system. It is concluded that the notion of TCB subsetting is appealing, but there are many pitfalls and unanswered questions, making it necessary to ensure that the cost is commensurate with the benefits.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127883070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Access control by Boolean expression evaluation","authors":"D. V. Miller, R. Baldwin","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81042","url":null,"abstract":"An access control mechanism based on Boolean expression evaluation is presented. This mechanism allows the implementation of customer-specified, rather than vendor-specified, security policies. The mechanism makes it possible to easily implement such conventional mechanisms as access control lists, named access control lists, user groups, user attributes, user capability lists, and user roles. Additional access restrictions based on time, day, date, location, load average, or any customer-supplied function can be incorporated into access decisions. This mechanism can directly express Clark-Wilson triples, and it can easily implement policies that are difficult or impossible to implement using the Bell-LaPadula model.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127962027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Software methodology for development of a trusted BMS: identification of critical problems","authors":"S. D. Crocker, Emilie J. Siarkiewicz","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81047","url":null,"abstract":"The vast range of security levels/compartments, complex ownership, continuous evolution, adaptive policy requirements, and the large size of battle management systems (BMSs) make it evident that the trust issues are substantial and will require extensive attention throughout the development cycle of the system. The authors outline the software development process for a BMS and identify where trusted system development requirements fit into the process. The focus is on the identification and discussion of eight leverage points that cut across the entire development process and provide the greatest opportunity to affect the security of the software that is developed. These points are visibility, protocols, downloading, configuration control, monitoring and measurement, environment, communication, and verification.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114174625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}