16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.最新文献

Probabilistic noninterference through weak probabilistic bisimulation 通过弱概率双模拟实现概率不干扰

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212701

Geoffrey Smith

引用次数: 75

Symbolic protocol analysis with products and Diffie-Hellman exponentiation 带有乘积和Diffie-Hellman指数的符号协议分析

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212704

J. Millen, Vitaly Shmatikov

引用次数: 70

Identity based authenticated key agreement protocols from pairings 基于身份的身份验证密钥协议协议

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212715

Liqun Chen, C. Kudla

引用次数: 301

Type-based distributed access control 基于类型的分布式访问控制

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212712

Tom Chothia, Dominic Duggan, J. Vitek

引用次数: 43

A procedure for verifying security against type confusion attacks 用于验证针对类型混淆攻击的安全性的程序

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212705

C. Meadows

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引用次数: 27

Secure contexts for confidential data 机密数据的安全上下文

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212702

A. Bossi, Damiano Macedonio, C. Piazza, S. Rossi

引用次数: 5

A computational analysis of the Needham-Schroeder-(Lowe) protocol Needham-Schroeder-(Lowe)协议的计算分析

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212717

B. Warinschi

引用次数: 72

On generalized authorization problems 关于广义授权问题

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212714

Stefan Schwoon, S. Jha, T. Reps, S. Stubblebine

引用次数: 46

Using access control for secure information flow in a Java-like language 在类java语言中对安全信息流使用访问控制

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212711

A. Banerjee, D. Naumann

引用次数: 60

A derivation system for security protocols and its logical formalization 安全协议的派生系统及其逻辑形式化

16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. Pub Date : 2003-07-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212708

Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Dusko Pavlovic

引用次数: 75