{"title":"Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems","authors":"Joseph Y. Halpern, K. O'Neill","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212706","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a framework for reasoning about information-hiding requirements in multiagent systems and for reasoning about anonymity in particular. Our framework employs the modal logic of knowledge within the context of the runs and systems framework, much in the spirit of our earlier work on secrecy (Halpern and O'Neill, 2002). We give several definitions of anonymity with respect to agents, actions, and observers in multiagent systems, and we relate our definitions of anonymity to other definitions of information hiding, such as secrecy. We also give probabilistic definitions of anonymity that are able to quantify an observer's uncertainty about the state of the system. Finally, we relate our definitions of anonymity to other formalizations of anonymity and information hiding, including definitions of anonymity in the process algebra CSP and definitions of information hiding using function views.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131279512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme in the strand-space model","authors":"Jonathan C. Herzog","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212716","url":null,"abstract":"The Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme is a standard component of cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we propose a way in which protocols that use this computational primitive can be verified using formal methods. In particular, we separate the computational aspects of such an analysis from the formal aspects. First, we use Strand Space terminology to define a security condition that summarizes the security guarantees of Diffie-Hellman. Once this property is assumed, the analysis of a protocol is a purely formal enterprise. (We demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of this property by analyzing a sample protocol.) Furthermore, we show that this property is sound in the computational setting by mapping formal attacks to computational algorithms. We demonstrate that if there exists a formal attack that violates the formal security condition, then it maps to a computational algorithm that solves the Diffie-Hellman problem. Hence, if the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, the security condition holds globally.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129979087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Observational determinism for concurrent program security","authors":"S. Zdancewic, A. Myers","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212703","url":null,"abstract":"Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies for data confidentiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to concurrent programs has proved problematic. In this paper we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent calculi, provides first-class channels, high-order functions, and an unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a generalization of noninterference that ensures immunity to internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit information about the thread scheduler. Elimination of these refinement attacks is possible because the enforced security property extends noninterference with observational determinism. Although the security property is strong, it also avoids some of the restrictiveness imposed on previous security-typed concurrent languages.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131645473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On distributed security transaction that use secure transport protocol","authors":"Philippa J. Hopcroft, G. Lowe","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212710","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider techniques for designing and analyzing distributed security transactions. We present a layered approach, with a high-level security transaction layer running on top of a lower-level secure transport protocol. The secure transport protocol provides protection against dishonest outsiders, while the transaction layer can be designed to provide protection against dishonest insiders. We specify generic services that one might expect such secure transport protocols to provide. We give examples of this layered approach, with the aim of demonstrating that the separation of concerns allows for a cleaner, more intuitive design. We consider how to analyze such a layered security architecture.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120990187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Bodei, Mikael Buchholtz, P. Degano, F. Nielson, H. R. Nielson
{"title":"Automatic validation of protocol narration","authors":"C. Bodei, Mikael Buchholtz, P. Degano, F. Nielson, H. R. Nielson","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212709","url":null,"abstract":"We perform a systematic expansion of protocol narrations into terms of process algebra in order to make precise some of the detailed checks that need to be made in a protocol. We then apply static analysis technology to develop an automatic validation procedure for protocols. Finally, we demonstrate that these techniques suffice for identifying a number of authentication flaws in symmetric key protocols such as Needham-Schroeder, Otway-Rees, Yahalom and Andrew Secure RPC.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123650493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using first-order logic to reason about policies","authors":"Joseph Y. Halpern, Vicky Weissman","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212713","url":null,"abstract":"A policy describes the conditions under which an action is permitted or forbidden. We show that a fragment of (multi-sorted) first-order logic can be used to represent and reason about policies. Because we use first-order logic, policies have a clear syntax and semantics. We show that further restricting the fragment results in a language that is still quite expressive yet is also tractable. More precisely, questions about entailment, such as 'May Alice access the file?', can be answered in time that is a low-order polynomial (indeed, almost linear in some cases), as can questions about the consistency of policy sets. We also give a brief overview of a prototype that we have built whose reasoning engine is based on the logic and whose interface is designed for nonlogicians, allowing them to enter both policies and background information, such as 'Alice is a student', and to ask questions about the policies.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123298020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","authors":"L. Gong, J. Jacob","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212699","url":null,"abstract":"The following topics are discussed: information flow; protocols; logics for anonymity and distributed system security; access control; authorization and security policies; and computational analysis of security protocols.","PeriodicalId":283743,"journal":{"name":"16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126981721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}