{"title":"Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation","authors":"G. Giraud, J. Quah","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1058","url":null,"abstract":"A common theme in the theory of demand aggregation is that market demand can acquire properties which are not always individually present among the agents who make up that market, a phenomenon we call heteroiosis in this paper. This paper focusses on the well known result that with a suitable distribution of demand behavior (arising perhaps from the underlying distribution of preferences), market demand can become an approximately linear function of income or even take on approximately Cobb-Douglas properties. We highlight the mathematical arguments underpinning these models and show that in the right context, it is possible to carry the arguments further and achieve exact, rather than just approximate, results: exact Cobb-Douglas market demand or exact linearity of market demand with respect to income.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128864706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information","authors":"U. Doraszelski, Dino Gerardi, Francesco Squintani","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1084","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players' preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communication is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player's preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132242490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis","authors":"Matthew J. Ryan, R. Vaithianathan","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1074","url":null,"abstract":"Stiglitz (1977) established three well-known features of monopoly insurance markets subject to adverse selection: (i) at least one market segment is served, despite the informational asymmetry; (ii) there is always some screening of risk classes; and (iii) efficiency is sacrificed to achieve screening. We modify Stiglitzs model, replacing his expected utility assumption on consumer behavior with a version of Quiggins (1982) rank-dependent utility model that has received strong experimental support. We show that none of the conclusions (i)(iii) is robust to this revision. In particular, asymmetric information need not lead to any loss in efficiency.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128820379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Upgrading, Degrading, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination","authors":"Gea M. Lee","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1056","url":null,"abstract":"The paper studies monopoly pricing of a vertically differentiated durable good in a two-period model. It provides an explanation for seemingly unusual practice of a firm selling a \"degraded good,\" arguing that the presence of Coasian dynamics may lead to the sale of the degraded good that is not less costly to produce than a high-quality good. The main finding is that when the firm can identify previous customers only if they voluntarily reveal their past purchases, it sells the degraded good along with the high-quality good in the first period. When the firm sells an upgrade of the degraded good, the price of the high-quality good cannot be \"too low\" in the second period, since otherwise the upgrading customers would pretend to be new customers. Thus the firm can enhance first-period sales while mitigating consumers' incentive to wait until the next period.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"2005 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134475417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments","authors":"S. Guriev","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1048","url":null,"abstract":"We study an incomplete contract model where both contracting parties can invest, and the investments have both self- and cross-effects. We analyze the performance of non-contingent contracts, message games, option contracts and property rights. We find that the first best is implemented if (i) the cross effects are negative or weaker than self-effects; (ii) the strength of cross-effects relative to self-effects is symmetric across parties. If either of these conditions is violated, even message contingent revelation mechanisms fail to provide efficient incentives. For this case, we obtain a number of results characterizing the second best. We find that property rights outperform contracts and partially relax the symmetry constraint. In either first best or second best, the stronger the cross-effects, the lower the value of contracting. The optimal allocation of property rights assigns ownership to the party with stronger cross-effects.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117055646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game","authors":"R. Evans","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1066","url":null,"abstract":"A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130841045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy","authors":"Tarun Sabarwal","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1060","url":null,"abstract":"This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. Compared to related models, this model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, it is shown that every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium. Therefore, bankruptcy can co-exist with smoothly functioning competitive markets in fairly general economies. Examples highlight some welfare effects of bankruptcy.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127666978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders","authors":"Jeong‐Yoo Kim","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1080","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the possibility of signal jamming in games with multiple informed parties whose interests are conflicting. The possibility that signal jamming occurs in equilibrium depends on the observability of individual signals. Paradoxically, if the receiver can observe individual signals perfectly, signal jamming can occur in equilibrium, while it cannot occur if the receiver can observe only the one-dimensional signal synthesized from the senders' individual actions.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"6 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120807084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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