{"title":"鲁宾斯坦议价博弈的一期版本","authors":"R. Evans","doi":"10.2202/1534-5971.1066","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.","PeriodicalId":282221,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game\",\"authors\":\"R. Evans\",\"doi\":\"10.2202/1534-5971.1066\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.\",\"PeriodicalId\":282221,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Contributions in Theoretical Economics\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-01-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Contributions in Theoretical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1066\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Contributions in Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1066","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game
A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.
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