LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Texas Attorney General as Debt Collection Act Enforcer and Practitioner: Post-Judgment Amicus Curiae Brief in State of Texas vs. Samara Portfolio Management, LLC, et al, in the 80th District Court of Texas, Harris County, Texas","authors":"Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3168959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168959","url":null,"abstract":"In 2017 Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, obtained a judgment for more than $25 million dollars in a civil enforcement action against Houston Attorney Joseph O. Onwuteaka, his debt buying company, Samara Portfolio Management, LLC, and his law firm, for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection Act (DTPA);—mostly for Onwuteaka’s practice of suing and obtaining default judgments against hapless consumers/defendants in a county in which they did not live (Harris County). Ironically, the Texas Attorney General engages in the very same conduct in suing former Texas college students and their co-signers on defaulted student loans made by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Loans (THECB). He files all such collection actions in Travis County (Austin, TX) regardless where the student loan obligors may live, and additionally engages in deceptive or otherwise dubious practices with respect to disclosure of interest accrual on some loans and hefty add-on attorney’s fees in most or all of them. The Travis County venue for THECB education loan collection suits was fixed by the Texas Legislature, while the other practices are discretionary. The hefty attorney’s fees are heaped on because student loan debtors are considered a suitable revenue source to help fund operations of the Office of the Attorney General. As of April 2018, the AG enforcement case against Onwuteaka et al remains on hold in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, pending performance of a settlement agreement.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"266 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123354982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Collateral","authors":"P. Paech","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3046835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3046835","url":null,"abstract":"This book draws together all of the property law, regulatory and contractual issues relevant to financial collateral transactions. Collateralized finance transactions played a major role in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near-failure of AIG during the early months of the global financial crisis, and they are being increasingly recognised as being integral to the stability of the global financial system. The book provides a detailed legal analysis of the types of transactions which make up collateralised financing transactions and examines them in their commercial context. Recognising that financial collateral transactions are often global in nature, the book covers the legal position in the UK, US, and the EU with specific relevance to practice in the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium. The book opens with an explanation of how financial collateral transactions are construed, including the relevant standard contract forms. The following chapters discuss the major legal issues and practical considerations, as well as a number of specialist concepts such as safe harbours, 'minimum floors' and securities custody. The book brings together consideration of the European Securities Financing Regulation, the Collateral Directive, and relevant parts of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"336 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120970101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Оправданность приоритета, предоставляемого кредитору вещным обеспечением: Очерк догмы, теории и политики права (The Justification of the Priority Provided by the Real Security: The Essay on the Dogma, Theory and Politics of the Secured Credit)","authors":"R. Bevzenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3087209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3087209","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В статье анализируются основные догматические и экономические объяснения приоритета, предоставляемого обеспеченным кредиторам, имеющим залог или иное вещное обеспечение в отношении активов должника. Разбираются проблемы, связанные с конкуренцией обеспеченных и необеспеченных (как добровольных, так и недобровольных) кредиторов несостоятельного должника. <b>English Abstract:</b> The paper is dealing with the main theoretical explanations of the priority provided to the secured creditor, either dogmatic or economic in character. The author analyses the nature and fairness of the secured creditor’s priority over unsecured creditors, both voluntary or involuntary.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131777811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Courts as Information Intermediaries: A Case Study of Sovereign Debt Disputes","authors":"Sadie Blanchard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025052","url":null,"abstract":"When foreign sovereigns default on their debt, creditors sometimes sue them. These creditors are sophisticated actors, and they sue even though courts can do little to force a sovereign to satisfy a judgment. Why do they sue? This Article argues that courts serve as information intermediaries that strengthen reputational enforcement in the international sovereign debt market. It shows, through a case study of sovereign debt defaults and disputes, three ways in which courts play this role. First, in hard cases, courts clarify reputational signals by publicly determining whether breach occurred. Second, through discovery and fact finding, they mitigate information asymmetries concerning aspects of sovereign behavior during default that are difficult to monitor. Third, they provide a forum for shaping the norms by which behavior is judged. The sovereign debt market thus relies on a hybrid of legal and nonlegal enforcement. Parties appeal to the law to determine rights and detect bad behavior. At the same time, they depend on reputation to discourage violations. Contracts scholars debate the extent to which nonlegal mechanisms such as reputation can support trade. Recognizing that courts can function as information intermediaries implies that courts can expand the range of markets that reputation can support. Under certain conditions, courts can supplement legal remedies by transmitting accurate and credible information about market participants’ expectations and behavior.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128589687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bail-In between Liquidity and Solvency","authors":"W. Ringe","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2782457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2782457","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of “bailing in” a distressed bank’s creditors to avoid a taxpayer-financed public rescue is commonly accepted as one of the most significant regulatory achievements in the post-crisis efforts to end the problem of “Too Big To Fail”. Yet behind the political slogan, surprising uncertainties remain as to the viability of the concept and its optimal legal design. This paper traces the development of the bail-in concept since it was first conceived in 2010 and demonstrates that it has undergone an important conceptual metamorphosis. Bail-in, first understood as fulfilling the “redistributory” purpose of sparing taxpayers from rescuing banks, has more recently been promoted as additionally serving a “market stabilizing” function: to stem a panic and to avoid run risks.Whilst this trend is to be welcomed, it requires a number of changes to the present legal frameworks that are in place in many jurisdictions around the world. Issues to be addressed include, inter alia, to formulate appropriate criteria to trigger bail-in measures and to overcome a natural reluctance by resolution authorities to intervene and apply bail-in powers. This paper makes the case for early intervention triggers and demonstrates that liquidity provision by a lender of last resort during resolution is crucial to make bail-in credible. The paper places bail-in as a conceptual tool into the broader debate of how to deal with distressed banks and derives a number of concrete regulatory proposals.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128483716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regulations, Community Bank and Credit Union Exits, and Access to Mortgage Credit","authors":"A. Alexandrov, X. Ang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2462128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2462128","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effect of a U.S. subprime mortgage regulation on the availability of mortgage credit. Due to all subprime mortgage originators being affected by the regulation, there is no natural control group. We use the assumption of profit maximization to construct a control group. We find no statistically or economically significant impact, despite about 200 institutions exiting the subprime mortgage market in over 200 counties. These results, along with other evidence presented in the paper, strongly suggest that consumers were able to switch to similar loans originated by the exiting creditors' competitors. We then perform several robustness checks, including comparing our approach with a more traditional method of using an unaffected but related market (subprime manufactured housing) as a control group and analyzing the effects of a later regulation exempting many creditors from the aforementioned regulation, with this newer regulation presenting a natural threshold for a regression discontinuity approach.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115503130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Main Problems in the Transposition of the Mortgage Credit Directive into Hungarian and Czech Law","authors":"R. Simon","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2791010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2791010","url":null,"abstract":"The previously unregulated gap in European consumer credit law was relatively quickly filled by Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property under the pressure stemming from the financial crisis. The deadline of the transposition expired on 21.3.2016, however only 9 member states published their national implementing measures in time, namely the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Estonia, Hungary, etc. In less developed mortgage markets with a highly reserved consumer law approach, like the Hungarian and Czech markets, the regulatory framework was created mostly because of the pressure of obligatory transposition. After a brief appraisal of the directive (1) and a short introduction on the already existing Hungarian and Czech mortgage credit regulation (2), this article will examine the main problem areas of these two national implementations: the information provision requirements towards credit intermediaries and creditors (3), and the admission of intermediaries (4).","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125001438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Single-Payment Vehicle Title Lending","authors":"Cfpb Office of Research","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3790779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3790779","url":null,"abstract":"This report examines consumer usage, default and rates of vehicle seizure for single-payment auto title loans, with a detailed look at the extent to which these loans are reborrowed.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"215 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115951799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tracing, Value and Transactions","authors":"Tatiana Cutts","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12189","url":null,"abstract":"Tracing is generally understood to be the process of following value through one or more substitutions, by which a claimant ‘transmits’ his claim from the right substituted into its exchange product. Understood thus, the exercise of tracing has been made increasingly difficult to conduct and predict by the development of complex payment mechanisms involving multiple payment instructions and interceding periods of indebtedness. This article argues that concepts of value are conceptually and practically misleading. Identifying and determining the content of transactions are normative processes that depend, not upon identifying the precise mechanisms by which a particular change in legal relations is sought and executed, but rather upon the manifested intentions of the transacting parties. This allows us to deal straightforwardly with complex payment structures, clearing and credit, and to focus instead upon the role of transactions in the justification for a resulting claim.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122805339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Compulsory Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives: The Changing Face of the Provision of Collateral","authors":"L. Gullifer","doi":"10.5040/9781474201537.ch-020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474201537.ch-020","url":null,"abstract":"New regulation brought in as a result of the global financial crisis mean that more reliance than ever is being placed on collateral, not just as mitigation of credit risk in bilateral financing transactions, but as one of the main techniques supporting the architecture of the regulated capital markets. This is particularly true in the derivatives market, where, for transactions which meet a specified degree of standardisation, compulsory clearing through central counterparties is being introduced pursuant to the decision taken at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009. \u0000The Regulation introducing compulsory central clearing in Europe (‘EMIR’),takes an ambivalent attitude towards collateral. On one hand, it makes the provision of collateral to central counterparties (‘CCPs’) compulsory,in order to protect CCPs from credit risk if their counterparties default. On the other hand, it mandates particular collateral holding models, in order to protect counterparties from the risk of CCP insolvency, and to protect clients from the risk of their clearing broker’s insolvency.Both these requirements result in vastly increased demand for quality collateral.For many market participants this is only achievable at considerable cost. There is every incentive for the market to develop ways of reducing the amount of collateral that is required to be posted, and to enable the available collateral to ‘go further’. The chief technique used is netting of transactions: the more netting there is, the less exposure and therefore the less collateral is required. One of the benefits of central clearing is reduction of exposure through multilateral netting. However, netting at lower levels brings its own costs and difficulties. The market challenge has been to produce a range of collateral holding models so that participants can choose the particular balance of risks and costs which suits them. \u0000The purpose of this paper is to examine the new structure in relation to central clearing,as well as some of the market solutions, to analyse the legal position of each under English law and the resulting mix of risks and protections offered by each technique.","PeriodicalId":269732,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Issues in Debtor-Creditor Relations (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123395367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}