Compulsory Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives: The Changing Face of the Provision of Collateral

L. Gullifer
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Abstract

New regulation brought in as a result of the global financial crisis mean that more reliance than ever is being placed on collateral, not just as mitigation of credit risk in bilateral financing transactions, but as one of the main techniques supporting the architecture of the regulated capital markets. This is particularly true in the derivatives market, where, for transactions which meet a specified degree of standardisation, compulsory clearing through central counterparties is being introduced pursuant to the decision taken at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009. The Regulation introducing compulsory central clearing in Europe (‘EMIR’),takes an ambivalent attitude towards collateral. On one hand, it makes the provision of collateral to central counterparties (‘CCPs’) compulsory,in order to protect CCPs from credit risk if their counterparties default. On the other hand, it mandates particular collateral holding models, in order to protect counterparties from the risk of CCP insolvency, and to protect clients from the risk of their clearing broker’s insolvency.Both these requirements result in vastly increased demand for quality collateral.For many market participants this is only achievable at considerable cost. There is every incentive for the market to develop ways of reducing the amount of collateral that is required to be posted, and to enable the available collateral to ‘go further’. The chief technique used is netting of transactions: the more netting there is, the less exposure and therefore the less collateral is required. One of the benefits of central clearing is reduction of exposure through multilateral netting. However, netting at lower levels brings its own costs and difficulties. The market challenge has been to produce a range of collateral holding models so that participants can choose the particular balance of risks and costs which suits them. The purpose of this paper is to examine the new structure in relation to central clearing,as well as some of the market solutions, to analyse the legal position of each under English law and the resulting mix of risks and protections offered by each technique.
场外衍生品强制中央结算:抵押品提供的变化面貌
全球金融危机带来的新监管意味着,抵押品比以往任何时候都更加依赖,抵押品不仅是为了缓解双边融资交易中的信贷风险,也是支持受监管资本市场架构的主要技术之一。在衍生品市场尤其如此,对于符合特定标准化程度的交易,根据2009年9月匹兹堡G20峰会的决定,正在引入通过中央对手方进行的强制清算。在欧洲引入强制性中央清算(“EMIR”)的法规对抵押品采取了矛盾的态度。一方面,它强制要求向中央对手方(“ccp”)提供抵押品,以保护ccp在其对手方违约时免受信用风险。另一方面,它规定了特定的抵押品持有模式,以保护对手方免受CCP破产的风险,并保护客户免受清算经纪人破产的风险。这两项要求都导致对优质抵押品的需求大幅增加。对许多市场参与者来说,这要付出相当大的代价才能实现。市场有充分的动机去寻找减少需要公布的抵押品数量的方法,并使可用的抵押品“走得更远”。使用的主要技术是交易的净额:净额越多,风险敞口越小,因此需要的抵押品就越少。中央结算的好处之一是通过多边结算减少风险敞口。但是,较低级别的净额结算本身也有成本和困难。市场面临的挑战是,如何推出一系列抵押品持有模式,让参与者能够选择适合自己的风险和成本平衡。本文的目的是研究与中央清算相关的新结构,以及一些市场解决方案,分析每种技术在英国法律下的法律地位,以及每种技术提供的风险和保护的结果组合。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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