2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)最新文献_第3页

Rethinking Large-Scale Consensus 重新思考大规模共识

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.37

R. Pass, E. Shi

引用次数: 64

UC-Secure Non-interactive Public-Key Encryption UC-Secure非交互式公钥加密

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.14

J. Camenisch, Anja Lehmann, G. Neven, Kai Samelin

{"title":"UC-Secure Non-interactive Public-Key Encryption","authors":"J. Camenisch, Anja Lehmann, G. Neven, Kai Samelin","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2017.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.14","url":null,"abstract":"The universal composability (UC) framework enables the modular design of cryptographic protocols by allowing arbitrary compositions of lower-level building blocks. Public-key encryption is unarguably a very important such building block. However, so far no UC-functionality exists that offers non-interactive encryption necessary for modular protocol construction. We provide an ideal functionality for non-committing encryption (i.e., public-key encryption secure against adaptive corruptions) with locally generated, and therefore non-interactive, ciphertexts. As a sanity check, we also provide a property-based security notion that we prove to be equivalent to the UC notion. We then show that the encryption scheme of Camenisch et al. (SCN '16) based on trapdoor permutations securely implements our notion in the random-oracle model without assuming secure erasures. This is the best one can hope to achieve as standard-model constructions do not exist due to the uninstantiability of round-optimal adaptively secure message transfer in the standard model (Nielsen, Crypto '02). We illustrate the modular reusability of our functionality by constructing the first non-interactive signcryption scheme secure against adaptive corruptions without secure erasures in the UC framework.","PeriodicalId":269696,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133049329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Differential Privacy in Quantum Computation 量子计算中的差分隐私

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.23

Li Zhou, M. Ying

引用次数: 32

SAT-Equiv: An Efficient Tool for Equivalence Properties SAT-Equiv:等效性质的有效工具

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-07-21 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.15

V. Cortier, Antoine Dallon, S. Delaune

引用次数: 26

Securing Databases from Probabilistic Inference 从概率推理中保护数据库

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-06-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.30

M. Guarnieri, Srdjan Marinovic, D. Basin

引用次数: 22

Types for Location and Data Security in Cloud Environments 云环境中的位置和数据安全类型

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-06-06 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.25

I. Gazeau, Tom Chothia, Dominic Duggan

{"title":"Types for Location and Data Security in Cloud Environments","authors":"I. Gazeau, Tom Chothia, Dominic Duggan","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2017.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.25","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud service providers are often trusted to be genuine, the damage caused by being discovered to be attacking their own customers outweighs any benefits such attacks could reap. On the other hand, it is expected that some cloud service users may be actively malicious. In such an open system, each location may run code which has been developed independently of other locations (and which may be secret). In this paper, we present a typed language which ensures that the access restrictions put on data on a particular device will be observed by all other devices running typed code. Untyped, compromised devices can still interact with typed devices without being able to violate the policies, except in the case when a policy directly places trust in untyped locations. Importantly, our type system does not need a middleware layer or all users to register with a preexisting PKI, and it allows for devices to dynamically create new identities. The confidentiality property guaranteed by the language is defined for any kind of intruder: we consider labeled bisimilarity i.e. an attacker cannot distinguish two scenarios that differ by the change of a protected value. This shows our main result that, for a device that runs well typed code and only places trust in other well typed devices, programming errors cannot cause a data leakage.","PeriodicalId":269696,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129135960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Towards a Flow- and Path-Sensitive Information Flow Analysis 面向流和路径敏感的信息流分析

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-06-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.17

Peixuan Li, Danfeng Zhang

引用次数: 13

A Sound Flow-Sensitive Heap Abstraction for the Static Analysis of Android Applications 用于Android应用程序静态分析的可靠的流敏感堆抽象

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-05-30 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.19

Stefano Calzavara, Ilya Grishchenko, Adrien Koutsos, Matteo Maffei

引用次数: 4

Synthesis of Adaptive Side-Channel Attacks 自适应侧信道攻击的综合

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-05-09 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.8

Quoc-Sang Phan, Lucas Bang, C. Pasareanu, P. Malacaria, T. Bultan

{"title":"Synthesis of Adaptive Side-Channel Attacks","authors":"Quoc-Sang Phan, Lucas Bang, C. Pasareanu, P. Malacaria, T. Bultan","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2017.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.8","url":null,"abstract":"We present symbolic analysis techniques for detecting vulnerabilities that are due to adaptive side-channel attacks, and synthesizing inputs that exploit the identified vulnerabilities. We start with a symbolic attack model that encodes succinctly all the side-channel attacks that an adversary can make. Using symbolic execution over this model, we generate a set of mathematical constraints, where each constraint characterizes the set of secret values that lead to the same sequence of side-channel measurements. We then compute the optimal attack, i.e, the attack that yields maximum leakage over the secret, by solving an optimization problem over the computed constraints. We use information-theoretic concepts such as channel capacity and Shannon entropy to quantify the leakage over multiple runs in the attack, where the measurements over the side channels form the observations that an adversary can use to try to infer the secret. We also propose greedy heuristics that generate the attack by exploring a portion of the symbolic attack model in each step. We implemented the techniques in Symbolic PathFinder and applied them to Java programs encoding web services, string manipulations and cryptographic functions, demonstrating how to synthesize optimal side-channel attacks.","PeriodicalId":269696,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115962926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56

Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols RFID协议的形式化计算不可链接性证明

2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2017-05-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2017.9

Hubert Comon-Lundh, Adrien Koutsos

引用次数: 16